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Abstract 
Under the rule of Saddam’s dictatorship during 1970s and 1980s huge part of the rural 
area in the Kurdish region of Iraq was destroyed and caused enormous internally 
displaced people and consequently most social structures as part of social capital were 
collapsed. In 1991, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces took control over a major part of the 
Kurdish region and tried to build their own institutions for reconstruction and 
development of the controlled area by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). 
Lack of experiences in good governance and effective management has made the social 
reengineering very difficult and has also created an enabling environment for power 
abuse, corruption and misuse of public resources. The current rural-urban mass 
migration in the region is a clear indicator on the lack of effective institutional 
arrangements for rural community development. Increased corruption as a result of poor 
governance has put a question mark on the legitimacy and capability of the KRG to 
effectively deal with the development problems. This is the background on which this 
thesis has been written.  
To effectively deal with current development problems in the Kurdish region, 
Community Driven Development (CDD) strategies are proposed that operate on the 
principles of local empowerment, participatory governance, administrative autonomy, 
greater downward accountability and enhanced local capacity to use social capital 
effectively. The principles of good governance such as rule of law, participation, 
transparency, and accountability necessary to achieve sustainable local development are 
examined in a traditional and post-conflict society that face many challenges toward a 
real democracy.  
In this process the need for fundamental but incremental change in existing 
institutional structure to strengthen the rule of conduct and coordination of efforts are 
highlighted. The study emphasises the need to introduce the “participatory local 
governance” where political and institutional reforms are carried out to increase the 
capacity and authority of the local institutions. The study also introduces 
“communicative planning” to build network and partnership among local institutions, 
which as a legitimating process requires trust, consensus-building and democratic 
control to direct the development course of the society. The findings justify the need for 
political and institutional pluralism to promote local governance for sustainable CDD. 
Key words: Social capital, traditional society, civil society, community empowerment, 
sustainability, grassroots participation, institutional capacity building, accountability, 
corruption, local governance and decentralization.  
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1 Introduction  
The study of institutions as formal rules and informal constraints in a particular region 
or country needs an in-depth look into the historical, cultural, social, political and 
economic circumstances and tracing the incremental evolution of the institutions. In the 
Kurdish region of Iraq during the last decades many factors in a complex environment 
have interacted to create the current political and institutional structure1.  
The aim of this chapter is to explain the context of the Kurdish region in Iraq 
relevant for later references in the thesis. Then based on the context of the Kurdish 
region from which the most current development problems are rooted, the research 
problems and objectives will be discussed. Finally, the structure of the work will be 
presented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure  1.1: Areas of majority Kurdish settlement in the Middle East and Iraq  
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 The main focus of this study is on the functional understanding of institutions and not so much on the organisational 
structures. For more explanation see page 14.  
     Kurdish region in the Middle East   
      Kurdish region in Iraq 
 
Source: Adapted from  www.krg.se, access: 15 May 2005 
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1.1 The context of the Kurdish region in Iraq  
The Kurdistan Regional Government  
The Kurdistan region is an autonomous, federally recognized, political entity located in 
north part of Iraq2. It borders Iran to the east, Turkey to the north and Syria to the west 
(see Figure  1.2 on page 3). Its capital is the city of Erbil, known in Kurdish as Hewlêr. 
The name Kurdistan is a combination of the word "Kurd" derived from the ancient 
Kingdom of Corduene plus the suffix "istan", together meaning Land of the Kurds. The 
full name of this region is Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) which in the new 
Iraqi constitution is referred to the Kurdish region under the control of the Kurdish 
authorities.  
A Kurdish autonomous region was established in 1970 following the agreement of an 
autonomy accord between the government of Iraq and leaders of the Iraqi Kurdish 
community. A legislative assembly was established in the city of Erbil with theoretical 
authority over the Kurdish-populated provinces of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah. In 
practice, however, the assembly was under the control of former Iraqi dictator Saddam 
Hussein until the 1991 Kurdish uprising against his rule.  
The Kurdistan region gained de facto independence after creating the Iraqi no-fly-
zones which were proclaimed by the coalition forces and UN after the Gulf war of 1991 
to protect Kurds from the further attack of former Iraqi army. As a result, since 1991, 
the region has been ruled by the two principal political parties, the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) without any 
control from Baghdad. The KDP and the PUK are originally initiated by people during 
the 1960s and the 1970s to organize the Kurdish movement to build a territorial 
autonomy in Iraq. While the provinces of Erbil and Dohuk and part of Ninawa province 
are the stronghold of the KDP, the PUK is dominating the Sulaymaniyah province and 
part of Kirkuk and Dyala provinces (see Figure  1.2  on page 3). The region has its own 
flag and National Anthem.  
Geography, demography and culture 
The area of the Kurdish region in Iraq is about 80.000 sq km, and thus it forms 18% of 
the total area of Iraq (about 435.000 sq km). The Kurdish population in Iraq is about six 
million, of whom  2/3 inhabiting the three provinces of Erbil, Sulaimanyah, Dohuk and 
parts of Dyala, Kirkuk and Mosul provinces currently under the control of the KRG. 
The remaining population inhabit the area under the control of coalition forces and Iraqi 
government. There will be a referendum in December 2007 to determine whether the 
other provinces will be included in the KRG.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
2
 The information source of this section is from different public documents e.g. UNICEF (2002), Wikipedia (2006), 
Kurdistan Parliament (2007), etc. whose reliability has been cross-checked. It is worth to note that the term Northern 
Iraq" is a bit of a geographical ambiguity in usage. "North" typically refers to the Kurdish region. "Center" and 
"South" are referring to the other areas of Iraq. Media types continually refer to "North" and "Northern Iraq" as 
anywhere north of Baghdad.  
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Figure  1.2: Map of the Kurdish region in Iraq  
The Kurdish region in Iraq is largely mountainous with the highest point being a 3,611 
m point known locally as Cheekah Dar (black tent). There are many rivers flowing and 
running through mountains of the region making it distinguished by its fertile lands, 
plentiful water, and picturesque nature. The largest lake in the region is Lake Dukan. 
The mountainous nature of the region, the difference of temperatures in its various 
parts, and its wealth of waters, make the Kurdish region a land of agriculture and 
tourism. In addition, there are various minerals in particular oil in the province of 
Kirkuk that is not controlled by the KRG. 
The majority of the people in the Kurdish region in Iraq are Sunni Muslims. There 
are also significant numbers of Christians and Yazidis, who believe in Zarathushtra as 
the ancient Kurdish religion. Kurds comprise the ethnic majority in the region while the 
Assyrian who particularly resides in the western part of the area makes up the second 
largest group. 
Kurdish cultural heritage is rooted in one of the world's oldest cultures, the 
Mesopotamian. Through the ages, this heritage has been subject to injustices, neglect 
and repression or has been eclipsed by other cultures. Important components of the 
original cultural heritage have disappeared or have been destroyed3. Kurds have always 
been among the more liberal Muslims and as a result Kurdish women have faced fewer 
restrictions in wearing headscarf or holding jobs outside home than other Muslim 
women. The Kurdish culture is close to Iranian culture among their neighbours, for 
example they celebrate Newroz as the New Year which is celebrated on March 21 as the 
first day of spring in Iranian and Kurdish calendar.  
Economy 
The economy of the Kurdish region in Iraq is dominated by the agriculture and tourism 
sectors. In addition, there are huge oil reserves in those areas that are not yet controlled 
by the KRG especially in the province of Kirkuk. Prior to the removal of Saddam 
                                                
3
 There are numerous examples of how valuable or irreplaceable Kurdish physical heritage are endangered or 
destroyed, like the threat posed by the Illusi Dam in Kurdish region in Turkey, where the oldest Kurdish city, 
Hasankeyf, soon is to be covered by water.  
 
The provinces wholly under the KRG located  
in the north and northern east bordered to Iran 
and Turkey are: 
  1. Sulaymaniyah 
  2. Erbil (Arbil) 
  3. Dohuk  
The provinces claimed totally or in part by the  
KRG are: 
  4. Ninawa (Mosul)  
  5. Kirkuk  
  6. Dyala 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Kurdistan    
Parliament 2007 
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Hussein, the KRG received approximately 13% of the revenues from Iraq's oil-for-food 
program4. 
Following the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the subsequent 
sectarian violence in Iraq, the three provinces fully under the KRG's control were the 
only three in Iraq to be ranked “secure” by the international community. The relative 
security and stability of the region has allowed the KRG to sign a number of investment 
contracts with foreign companies. In 2006 the first new oil well since the invasion of 
Iraq was drilled in the Kurdish region by the Norwegian energy company DNO. Initial 
indications are that the oil field contains at least 100 million barrels of oil and will be 
pumping 5,000 bpd by early 2007. The KRG has signed exploration agreements with 
two other oil companies, Canada's Western Oil Sands and the UK's Sterling Energy. 
The relative stability of the Kurdish region has allowed it to achieve a higher level of 
development than other regions in Iraq. Since 2003, the reconstruction boom in the 
Kurdish region has attracted around 20,000 Arab workers from the rest of Iraq. The two 
chief cities of the region, Erbil and Sulaimanyah, both have international airports 
serving destinations through the Middle East and parts of Europe. The KRG continues 
to receive a portion of the revenue from Iraq's oil exports and will soon implement a 
unified foreign investment law.  
Politics 
Since 1992, the KRG has been based in Erbil which consists of a parliament, elected by 
popular vote, called the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) and a cabinet composed 
of the KDP, the PUK and their allies (Iraqi Communist Party, the Socialist Party of 
Kurdistan etc.). Nechervan Idris Barzani has been prime minister of the KRG since 
1999. The main Kurdish parties and Kurdish Peshmerga forces cooperated with the US-
led coalition during the 2003 invasion of Iraq that led to Hussein's overthrow and 
afterwards Kurdish politicians were represented in the Iraqi governing council. On 
January 30, 2005 three elections were held in the Kurdish region: the first for 
Transitional National Assembly of Iraq; the second for the KNA and the third for 
provincial councils. The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional 
Period recognized the autonomy of the KRG during the interim between "full 
sovereignty" and the adoption of a permanent constitution. 
The KRG has constitutionally recognized authority over the provinces of Erbil, 
Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk, as well as de facto authority over parts of Dyala and Ninawa 
and Kirkuk provinces. One particularly difficult issue yet to be resolved is the future 
boundaries of the region. Many Kurds wish it to be expanded to include the largely 
Kurdish cities of Mosul and Kirkuk but this is complicated by the Assyrian, Turkmen 
and Arab populations of both cities and the opposition of Turkey which is concerned 
about the region's potential to break away from Iraq with possible consequences for its 
own Kurdish minority.   
The final boundaries of the autonomous region are set to be decided through a 
number of referendums. The referendum on Kirkuk was supposed to be held on 15 
November 2007 to decide its status with respect to the region but was delayed first to 31 
December and then by a further six months. In the wake of the ratification of the Iraqi 
constitution in October 2005, Iraqi Kurdistan reconstitutes itself as a region under the 
                                                
4
 For more information about the oil-for-food program see page 9.   
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new constitutional framework. The relatively high political achievement in the region is 
a result of historical efforts of its people who have gone through many crisis and 
difficulties during last century as explained in the following section.  
History 
The Kurdish region in Iraq has gained very different political and socioeconomic 
settings during the last decades. It is highly imperative to give a historical background 
to the region to better understand the complex context of its current development 
problems. Before 1970s, in the Kurdish region, agriculture and animal husbandry 
provided most employment and household food security. But, the region has during last 
decades especially in 1980s been subjected for tremendous political, social, 
demographic and economic challenges causing drastic decrease in agricultural 
production and destruction of rural infrastructure which are explained chronologically 
below.  
British mandate 
On December 1918 during a meeting in Sulaymaniyah with Colonel Arnold Wilson (the 
Acting Civil Commissioner for Mesopotamia) Kurdish leaders called for British support 
for a united and independent Kurdistan under British protection. Between 1919 and 
1922, Sheikh Mahmoud Hafid, an influential Kurdish leader based in Sulaymaniyah, 
formed a Kurdish government and led two revolts against the British rule. It took the 
British authorities two years to put down the uprisings and exiled Sheikh Mahmoud to 
India. In July 1920, 62 tribal leaders of the region called for independence of the 
Kurdish region under a British mandate. 
 The objection of the British to the Kurdish self-rule was driven by the fear that the 
success of the Kurdish region will tempt the two Arab areas of Baghdad and Basra to 
follow suit, hence endangering the direct British control over all Mesopotamia. In 1922, 
Britain restored Sheikh Mahmoud to power hoping that he would organize the Kurds to 
act as a buffer against the Turks who had territorial claims over Mosul. Sheikh 
Mahmoud declared a Kurdish Kingdom with himself as the King, though later on he 
agreed to limited autonomy within the new state of Iraq. In 1930, following the 
announcement of admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, Sheikh Mahmoud started 
a third uprising which was suppressed with British air and ground forces.  
By 1927, Barzani clan had become vocal supporters of Kurdish rights in Iraq. In 
1929, the Barzanis demanded the formation of a Kurdish province in northern Iraq and 
emboldened by these demands in 1931 Kurdish notables appealed the League of 
Nations to set up an independent Kurdish government. Under the pressure from the 
Iraqi government and the British, the most influential leader of the clan, Mustafa 
Barzani was forced into exile in Iran in 1945 and after the collapse of the Republic of 
Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan in 1946 moved to the Soviet Union.  
Barzani revolts 1960-1975 and their aftermath 
Abdul Karim Qasim, who was an army officer, overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 
and became head of the newly formed Republic of Iraq. This enabled Barzani to return 
from exile and to set up his own political party, the KDP which was granted legal status 
in 1960. But soon afterwards, Qasim tried to incite Baradost and Zebari tribes against 
Barzani. In June 1961, Barzani led his first revolt against the Iraqi government with the 
aim of securing Kurdish autonomy. Due to the disarray in the Iraqi Army after the 1958 
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coup, Qasim's government was not able to subdue the insurrection. This stalemate 
irritated powerful factions within the military and is said to be one of the main reasons 
behind the Baathist coup against Qasim in February1963. Abdul Salam Arif declared a 
ceasefire in February 1964 which provoked a split among Kurdish urban radicals on one 
hand and traditional forces led by Barzani on the other. Barzani agreed to the ceasefire 
and fired the radicals from the party which later resulted in building the PUK. Despite 
this, Baghdad government tried once more to defeat Barzani's movement by the use of 
force but this campaign failed in 1966 when Barzani forces defeated the Iraqi Army 
near Rawanduz. After this, Arif regime announced a twelve-point peace program in 
June 1966 which was not implemented due to the overthrow of Arif in 1967 in a coup 
by the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein.  
 The Baath regime started a campaign to end the Kurdish insurrection that was 
stalled in 1969. This can be partly attributed to the internal power struggle in Baghdad 
and also tensions with Iran. Moreover, Soviet pressured the Iraqis to come to terms with 
Barzani. Hence a peace plan was announced in March 1970 which provided for a 
broader Kurdish autonomy than before. The plan also gave Kurds representation in 
government bodies and it was to be implemented in four years. Despite this, the Iraqi 
government embarked on an Arabization program in the oil-rich regions of Kirkuk and 
Khanaqin in the same period. In the following years, Baghdad government overcame its 
internal divisions and concluded a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in April 
1972 and ended its isolation within the Arab world. As a result, Kurds remained 
dependent on the Iranian military support and could do little to strengthen their forces. 
The Algiers agreement 
In 1974, the Iraqi government began a new war against the Kurds and pushed them 
close to the border with Iran. Meanwhile, Iraq informed Tehran that it was willing to 
satisfy other Iranian demands in return for an end to its aid to the Kurds. With the 
mediation of the Algerian President Houari Boumédiènne, Iran and Iraq reached a 
comprehensive settlement in March 1975 known as Algiers Pact. The agreement left the 
Kurds helpless as Tehran cut supplies to the Kurdish movement. Barzani fled to Iran 
with many of his supporters and others surrendered en masse and the rebellion was 
finished in a few days. Consequently, Iraqi government extended its control over 
northern region after 15 years and started an Arabization program by moving Arabs to 
the oil fields in the Kurdish region particularly the ones around Kirkuk.  
The repressive measures carried out by the Iraqi regime against Kurds after the 
Algiers agreement, led to renewed clashes between the Iraqi army and Kurdish 
guerrillas in 1977. Consequently in 1978 and 1979, nearly 600 Kurdish villages were 
burned down in order to cut support for Kurdish guerrilla in monotonous area bordered 
to Iran and as a consequence around 200,000 rural people were deported to the small 
collective towns far from their farmlands and livestock. The Kurdish resistance was 
calmed down for a while but never gave up the struggle for ethnic rights and regional 
autonomy within Iraq.   
Iran-Iraq war and Anfal campaign 
By removing Shah of Iran from power in 1979, the historical conflicts between Iran and 
Iraq again appeared which led to a long-lasting war between the two countries (1980-
1988). The Iraqi army concentrated its resources in the south to battle the Iranian army 
and the Kurdish resistance groups took the golden opportunities to reorganize 
themselves in the north of the country. But later a new front of war was opened in the 
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north as well and consequently, huge rural areas of the Kurdish region bordered to Iran 
became large minefields and were heavily contaminated with weapons especially with 
mines and Explosive Remnant of War (ERW) which have caused thousands of innocent 
death and everlasting handicap of the rural people. The existence of landmines and 
unexploded ordnance in the rural area, which is still not totally cleared, has had a direct 
impact on the environmental, social and economic aspects of the rural area.  
Anfal campaign constituted a systematic genocide of the Kurdish people by Iraqi 
army between 1986 and 1989 (during and just after the Iran-Iraq war). Rural people 
were collected, systematically killed and mass graved far away from their home region.  
The campaign takes its name from Surat Al-Anfal in the Koran, which was used as a 
code name by the former Iraqi regime for a campaign against the Kurdish community of 
northern Iraq characterized by the following human rights violations by the most 
conservative estimates: The widespread use of chemical weapons, the wholesale 
destruction of some 2,000 villages, and slaughter of around 50,000 rural Kurds. The 
large Kurdish town of Qala Dizeh (population 70,000) was completely destroyed by the 
Iraqi army. The Anfal campaign is said to have cost the lives of 182,000 civilian Kurds, 
according to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Mass graves of the dead 
have been discovered in centre and south of the country after the collapse of former 
Iraqi dictatorship.  
"Arabization" was another major element of Al-Anfal which heavy population 
redistribution was carried out, most notably in the oil-rich area of Kirkuk. This was a 
further policy of ethnic cleansing and a tactic used by Saddam's regime to drive Kurdish 
families out of their homes in Kirkuk and built several public housing facilities in the 
city as part of his “Arabization”, shifting poor Arabs from Iraq's southern regions to 
Kirkuk with the lure of inexpensive housing.  
The Anfal campaign has been considered as one of the most terrible genocide policy 
for ethnic cleansing in modern history but the Kurdish resistance did not give up and the 
former Iraqi dictatorship did not stop carrying out further collective punishment against 
a people who struggled for their right of autonomy. During the Iran-Iraq war, the regime 
implemented anti-Kurdish policies which was widely-condemned by the international 
community but was never seriously punished for oppressive measures, including the use 
of chemical weapons against the Kurds that resulted in thousands of deaths in the town 
of Halabja.  
Halabja poison gas attack 
Among all of the atrocities committed against the Kurds, as part of Anfal campaign, 
Halabja poison gas attack has come to symbolize the worst of the repression of the Iraqi 
Kurds. Saddam Hussein's regime carried out conventional and chemical bomb attacks 
over three days in March of 1988 on the Kurdish town of Halabja of 70,000 people 
located about 8-10 miles from the Iranian border. Whole families died while trying to 
flee clouds of nerve and mustard agents descending from the sky. At least 5,000 people 
died immediately as a result of the chemical attack and as a further effect of this single 
chemical massacre of the Kurds, many who managed to survive still suffer from cancer, 
blindness, respiratory diseases, miscarriages, and severe birth defects among their 
children. 
The Gulf war and creating no-fly-zones 
The Gulf war was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force of approximately 20 
nations led by the United States and mandated by the UN in order to liberate Kuwait 
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from the Iraqi occupation. The war began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 
2, 1990, following Iraqi arguments that Kuwait was illegally slant-drilling petroleum 
across Iraq’s border. The invasion was met with immediate economic sanctions by the 
UN against Iraq. Hostilities commenced in January 1991, resulting in a decisive victory 
for the coalition forces which drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait with minimal coalition 
deaths.  
A peace conference was held in Iraqi territory occupied by the coalition. At the 
conference, Iraq won the approval of the use of armed helicopters on their side of the 
temporary border, ostensibly for government transit due to the damage done to civilian 
transportation. Soon after, these helicopters and much of the Iraqi armed forces were 
refocused toward fighting against a Shiite uprising in the south. In the North, Kurdish 
leaders took heart in American statements that they would support an uprising and 
began fighting in the hopes of triggering a takeover. However, when no American 
support was forthcoming, Iraqi generals remained loyal and brutally crushed the 
Kurdish troops and as a result Millions of Kurds fled across the mountains to Kurdish 
areas of Turkey and Iran.  
Concerns for safety of Kurdish refugees was reflected in the UN Security Council 
Resolution 688 which gave birth to a safe haven in which allied air power protected a 
Kurdish zone inside Iraq. Then following several bloody clashes between Iraqi forces 
and Kurdish troops, an uneasy and shaky balance of power was reached and the Iraqi 
regime withdrew its military and other personnel from the region in October 1991.  
As a consequence of creating the no-fly-zones, the Kurdish people took the historical 
chance and participated in a multi party election in June 1992 and the main Kurdish 
political parties (the KDP and the PUK) established the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG), the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) and other institutions to 
run their own issues. But, due to the lack of democratic traditions and experiences in 
institutional building, the elections produced an uncertain outcome that the assembly 
was divided almost equally between the two main parties and their allies. Anyway, the 
primary objective of the KRG, UN-agencies and other aid organizations was the 
reconstruction of the destroyed villages and rural infrastructure to encourage internally 
displaced people to return to their farms. At the same time, Iraq imposed an economic 
blockade over the region, reducing its oil and food supplies. 
Imposition of triple embargo  
During this period, the Kurds were subjected to a double embargo: one imposed by the 
UN on Iraq and one imposed by Saddam Hussein on the Kurdish region. The severe 
economic hardships caused by the embargoes and power struggle between the KDP and 
the PUK over control of trade routes and resources led to intra-Kurdish conflict between 
1994 and 1996. The third embargo was imposed by the two separated administrations of 
the KDP and the PUK on their respective areas in the region. In this manner, the triple 
embargo caused enormous poverty and under-nourishment among people and decreased 
the quality of education, and thereby mass out-migration of the people to the western 
European courtiers which caused brain-drain and erosion of human capital. As a result 
trust as social capital between people and institutions was eroded which has still not 
recovered and it says to be one of the obstacles to really reunify the separated 
administrations of the KDP and the PUK. In addition, the main infrastructure of the 
region e.g. buildings, roads, power facilities, water facilities, and waste processing 
capability was damaged that allowed eroding the physical capital that are still not fully 
reconstructed especially in the rural areas.  
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Emerging enormous poverty among the urban population in the region who lacked of 
food, fuel and other basic needs convinced the rural people to stay in their villages 
focusing on the agricultural related activities that provide them a relatively self-
sufficient and secure livelihood sources. 
Oil-for-food programme and Washington agreement 
According to the 1996 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UN and the 
former Iraqi government, the UN was entitled to implement Security Council 
Resolution 986, which stipulated the terms of reference of the oil-for-food programme, 
on behalf of the former Iraqi government in the three northern governorates. The UN 
used the 13 percent of funds allocated to the Kurdish region from the total budget for 
the programme. The programme was funded by commissioned oil sales and was 
allocated for provision of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi population which began 
operating in the three governorates (Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dohuk) in the Kurdish 
region in 1997. The two Kurdish administrations of the KDP and the PUK were at no 
point mentioned as a party of the legal framework of the programme which recognised 
only the relation between the former Iraqi government and the UN.  
Meanwhile, direct United States mediation, led the two parties to a formal ceasefire 
in Washington agreement in September 1998 convincing them to return to negotiation 
table and put armed conflict aside. It is also argued that the oil-for-food program from 
1997 onward had an important effect on end of the hostilities which all led that the 
situation in the Kurdish region gradually improved, although in a very uneven manner. 
Education, health, and water and sanitation facilities were reconstructed and service 
delivery was improving due to more imports of equipment, spares and essential supplies 
and food rations met the basic food needs of the population.  
The reconstruction programmes provided many local people with causal labour 
employment and the resumption of state services enabled people to return to their jobs 
in education and health sectors. The financial resources brought in by the programme 
have also helped boost the economy and above all, internal peace has allowed the local 
population to begin rebuilding their lives. But, the programme had also a negative 
impact on the livelihood sources of the rural people as most food grains were imported 
and distributed free among the people of Iraq contra-productive to the local farming. As 
a consequence, in the Kurdish region, the rural people started migrating to the urban 
area to look for other income sources.  
Political development after Operation Iraqi Freedom 
The Kurdish military forces known as peshmerga have played a key role in the 
overthrow of former Iraqi regime in spring 2003 by joining coalition forces in the 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Despite lack of peace and stability and increased sectarian 
violence in south and centre parts of Iraq, the political development has been positive 
especially in the Kurdish region. All Iraqis, for the first time, went for a multi-party and 
democratic election in January 2005 which has increased the chance for establishment 
of a democratic and decentralized planning system in the country and opening the door 
for the institutions in the Kurdish region to find other development partners in the rest 
of Iraq. The KDP and the PUK have united to form an alliance with several smaller 
parties to increase the voice of the Kurdish people in Baghdad. The Kurdish alliance has 
53 deputies and the Kurdish Islamic Union has five in the new Baghdad parliament. The 
PUK-leader Jalal Talibani has been elected president of the new Iraqi administration, 
while KDP leader Massoud Barzani is president of the KRG.  
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The security situation has got worse in Iraq during last years following by the 
outbreak of sectarian violence and increased insurgencies in the centre and south of the 
country which make the national reconciliation very difficult. The Kurdish community 
in the north fears that the outbreak of a civil war in other parts of Iraq will endanger the 
relative peace and stability in the Kurdish region and the Shiite-dominated government 
in Baghdad would not act according to the new Iraqi constitutions to accept the legal 
status of the KRG. However, this is not a justification to ignore substantial institutional 
reforms in the Kurdish region for a more participatory planning. Planning is largely 
about how to deal with limitations and uncertainties in the future.  
1.2 Problem statement  
Intra-Kurdish conflict between the main political parties (the KDP and the PUK) during 
1990s, which was explained earlier in this chapter, was one of the factors to mass out-
migration of the people to the western European courtiers which caused brain-drain and 
erosion of human capital. As a result trust as social capital between people and 
institutions was eroded which has still not recovered and it says to be one of the 
obstacles to really reunify the separated administrations of the KDP and the PUK.   
The negative trend of rural-urban mass migration in the region caused by the 
implementation of the oil-for-food programme was reinforced after collapsing of the 
Iraqi dictatorship in 2003. It was positive that the legal status of the KRG was accepted 
and financial capacity of the KRG was increased but it lacked effective policy for 
regional rural development. Instead, it has focused only on urban development which 
convinced rural people to out-migrate in searching for employment within the public 
sector in the urban area as police and security guards. As a result, the farmland 
remained uncultivated and the livestock were sold to the Iranian villagers which have 
had negative effects on agricultural related activities as the basis of local economy. The 
rural people who were in better economic conditions moved to the big cities in the 
region where they had already a house and income generating capabilities. The poor 
households remained in the rural area are largely engaging themselves in subsistence 
farming that has already endangered food security of the region. The major income 
source of rural inhabitants in the border area to neighbouring countries is cross-border 
trade activities. Regarding the relationship between the civilians and the government 
institutions, there is a high social capital deficit. The rural people have simply lost their 
confidence in the government as it lacks regional rural development policies to connect 
the rural and urban economies (Jalal.F., 2006: 4).  
Furthermore, ineffective land use management and agricultural policy has eroded the 
natural capital in the region. Large agricultural land, as the main production factor for 
agricultural output, is still contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance and has 
eroded the natural capital. The mine clearance process has not been successfully 
implemented and mine action organizations have argued the slowdown of the process 
due to the Kurdistan nature, terrain and topography, and the existing of a high number 
of metal fragments in the land which make mine clearance very difficult. Since 2003 the 
agricultural land in the region has rapidly being transformed into building land or it is 
left unplanted since farming is no longer profitable. As a result, the rural-urban mass 
migration is continuing to such an extent as never seen before5. Now, the big cities are 
characterized by the highest population, job density, expansion of informal settlement 
                                                
5
 Information about the exact number of the out-migrated rural people is missing by the local authorities as well as by 
the international aid agencies.    
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areas and increased traffic volume. Increasing land claims and impairments through 
housing, industry, commerce and traffic endanger the quality of natural resources. The 
spatial development trends are alarming because of many negative effects on the 
environment and hence on the quality of life (Jalal.j., 2005:14).  
Latest tense public discussions on the Kurdish mass media have pointed out that the 
KRG system is not able to deal with development problems in the region. Current rural-
urban mass migration is a clear indicator on lack of effective mechanism and 
institutional arrangement for community-driven and sustainable rural development. 
Sustainable agricultural and rural development strategies are missing despite that the 
agricultural sector is the main potential for the economic development in the region and 
fulfils the national and regional polices on food security. The policies to achieve 
sustainable development in the rural communities based on available capital assets 
(natural, social, human and physical) are missing. In addition, the system is not able to 
effectively absorb the human and intellectual capital provided by the Kurdish returnees 
in western European countries.  
The core institutional obstacle to the development in the region is that the planning 
system is highly characterized by sectoral and top-down approaches inherited from the 
former Iraqi system. Recent development efforts have been solely concentrated on 
physical development in urban area in ad hoc approach and the strengths of rural area 
with its rich natural resources to achieve sustainable development have not been 
considered. The capacity development of local institutions, as social capital additionally 
to other capital assets (natural, human and physical), has largely been ignored. For 
example, in the rural area it has been easier to build irrigation channels than to put a 
workable water management system in place which require common action from the 
community people. For many development agencies in the region, the main dilemma 
has been how to reconcile the twin objectives of physical development and local 
institutional development as a soft and cross-disciplinary activity. In addition, the local 
governments suffer from a “power deficit” as they will continue to lack the tools very 
needed to become powerful local development actors. Latest public discussion in the 
region has also emphasized the urgent need to alleviate the corruption as a major 
obstacle to fairly distribute the resources among civilians and to provide basic social 
services for grassroots people (Qadir, 2006:12; Bayani weekly newspaper, 2006:1) 
To summarise, the reasons of development problems in the Kurdish region to a large 
extent could be found in the complex historical events explained earlier. During the last 
decades, all type of community assets such as the natural, human, social, and physical 
capital from which a community receives benefits and on which the community relies 
for continued existence, were heavily eroded. The region is currently facing an 
enormous challenge to rethink about its development approaches that calls for a 
paradigm shift from reconstruction, sectoral and physical development to build local 
institutional capacity for sustainable development.  
1.3 Research objectives and questions 
The main objective of this research is to analyze the role of existing local institutions as 
part of social capital in the community development process in the rural area of the 
region, and their interrelationships and potentialities in strengthening self-directed 
development. It will be analyzed if there is a consensus-building dialogue between local 
stakeholders to increase the joint capacity and thereby responding more effectively to 
the interests and aspirations of the poorest of poor in the region. Based on social capital 
theories, the strengths and weaknesses of existing institutional norms and structure will 
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be assessed not only to know how they are applied in reality but if they can conform to 
sustainable community-driven development (CDD). The indicators of institutional 
effectiveness for local development to identify and analyse the gaps will be developed. 
Then, the right direction for appropriate solutions will be proposed and it will be 
discussed how to bridge the institutional capacity gaps and facilitate the establishment 
of participatory governance consisting of local network institutions for sustainable 
CDD. The final objective is to contribute to the knowledge of social capital theories for 
sustainable local development.  In addition, the research tries to answer the following 
questions: 
a) Which are the main obstacles to establish participatory governance consisting of 
local institutions for sustainable CDD?  
b) How is the stock of social capital and how is the interplay among different types of 
social capital to promote CDD?  
c) Are there effective institutional interaction and coordination mechanisms to gain 
synergy effect?  
d) How do civic social capital and institutional social capital get together? 
e) Are there appropriate supporting polices to participatory local governance and 
sustainable CDD? How to bridge the gaps? 
f) How far can the generated ideas from the observed data be generalized and how this 
contributes to the development of social capital theories? 
To summarize, the main focus of this research is to show how well the local system is 
dealing with the sustainable development issues; analysing institutional obstacles to 
CDD; and thereby proposing what direction to take in order to find appropriate 
solutions.  
1.4 The structure of the work  
The work consists of four parts: theoretical context; research design; empirical evidence 
including interpretation and generalization; and recommendations/general conclusions.  
Chapter two is aimed to give conceptual guidance and lessons from accumulated 
experiences and practices with the purpose of creating a deeper and integrated view of 
conceptually related development topics of sustainable development, community driven 
development and participatory governance. Particularly, the role of social capital, as a 
broad concept and as a comprehensive approach to build intuitional capacity in the 
society, is discussed. A framework has been developed to easier comprehend the link 
between different types and dimensions of social capital on three levels of micro, meso 
and macro, which is manifested through building different formal and informal 
institutions and their interrelationships for common good. Based on the inductive 
methodology, more adaptable concepts and theories to the research area were identified 
and developed during the entire learning process of the dissertation especially after 
conducting the empirical work and continual revision of the guiding concepts.  
Chapter three highlights the link between conceptual and methodological framework. 
The reason to make the best of methodological pluralism by combining a number of 
approaches, e.g. deductive and inductive approaches appropriate to the context of the 
research area is explained. In addition, the reasons to avoid conventional field study 
methods and, instead, applying triangulation as a tool to cross-check the reliability of 
the obtained data, are discussed. A sampling framework was designed to select 
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representative sites and selection criteria of rain-fed area of the Kurdish region as 
research area including decision-making levels (household, group, community and sub-
district). To provide a broader insight into the development problems in the research 
area and to increase the chance for analytical generalization, a comprehensive 
comparative case study of two contrasting rural sub-districts including two different 
communities from each one was conducted.  
Chapters four and five provide base for empirical evidence, interpretation of data and 
analytical generalization.  
Chapter four discusses a service provision profile of the targeted communities that 
includes quality assessment of the existing public services; and past experiences with 
CDD including the impact of reconstruction and development projects implemented 
after 1991 to know if the development actors have succeeded to encourage local 
participation and to initiate a CDD. Then, the existing stock of social capital; the 
institutional arrangements on local level; and the policy framework as an enabling 
environment to solve the community development problems and to initiative CDD, will 
be presented. Finally, the gaps to implement the existing institutional norms and 
structures will be identified to explore how they are applied in reality and how they 
conform to sustainable CDD. Particularly, the current system of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) is targeted for an in-depth investigation.  
In chapter five, a more in-depth analysis of the institutional gaps to CDD from a 
more “participatory governance” perspective is carried out by pointing out the 
interrelated obstacles to CDD on both local and policy levels. Then, it will be 
highlighted if there is a strong link between civic social capital and institutional social 
capital as a solid base to good governance and communicative planning system. In the 
conclusion part, the degree of analytical generalization and major obstacles to 
participatory local governance and CDD in the Kurdish region in Iraq is presented. 
Finally, the limitations in the research area to apply the data collection methods will be 
critically evaluated and discussed.   
Chapters six and seven consist of proposals for fundamental change and general 
conclusions to improve the situation on the ground.  
The chapter six is aimed to bring together both conceptual and evidence-based 
analysis. The attempt is to contribute to creation of a new institutional and policy 
framework within which problems involving community development might be 
examined and solved and thereby creating a sense of right direction for appropriate 
solutions. The main recommendation is to stimulate the creation of different types of 
social capital to CDD according to strengths and limitations both on local and policy 
levels. Some appropriate strategies and necessary actions are proposed to provide a 
space for discussion and key challenges for the future with the aim of trying to remove 
the obstacles to sustainable CDD. Especially, the importance of taking incremental but 
secure steps towards a real democracy and local governance in the Kurdish region is 
emphasized.  
In chapter seven, first, the challenges for institutional capacity development as 
comprehensive social capital-building in the Kurdish region are discussed. Then, the 
contributions of this thesis to the current academic debates about the role of social 
capital and institutions in local development are highlighted. Finally, related to the 
development topics examined and developed in this dissertation, the aspects for future 
research will be recommended.  
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2 Social capital  for sustainable Community-Driven 
Development   
For achieving sustainable Community-Driven Development (CDD), the locally-based 
institutions must be in place to make effective use of the available capital assets 
(natural, social, human and physical). The term “local institution” is interchangeably 
used with “local association” or “local organization”. This follows the practice of most 
social science literature, but there is a slight distinction between the two concepts. 
Uphoff (1993) stated that: 
 “Institutions, whether organizations or not, are complexes of norms and 
behaviours that persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes, while 
organizations, whether institutions or not, are structures of recognized and 
accepted roles” (Uphoff, 1993:614).  
Examples of institutions are money, the law and marriage. Organizations are e.g. 
workers’ unions and rotating credit associations. In some cases, the two terms overlap: 
the army is an institution as well as a group of soldiers; the parliament is a lawmaking 
institution as well as an association of law makers. The difference is a matter of degree, 
and organizations can become relatively “institutional” over time (ibid).  
A pressing problem has been how to adapt the institutional strategies to local 
development, which has been relatively successful in the developed countries than in 
the rural areas in developing countries.  
In fact, most organizational models reviewed throughout the literature are not very 
helpful in designing appropriate institutional structures for rural community 
development in the Kurdish region in Iraq as also in other developing countries and 
regions. For example, the decentralized organizational structure and learning 
organization models require high educational rate and self-motivation behaviour of the 
civilians which is mostly appropriate to advanced systems and effective organizational 
culture of some organizations in developed countries. These organizational models 
simply ignore the value of existing institutions and roles, socioeconomic, cultural and 
political realities of the rural areas in developing countries. These models are all built 
out of the western experience, which to begin with, was confined to well-defined 
organizational activities in a relatively democratic and decentralized planning system as 
an enabling environment. Under those conditions, it was relatively easy to develop an 
organizational theory capable of analyzing through both inductive and deductive 
systems and the various organizational issues (Singh 1986:299).  
The structure of local institutions in rural areas of many developing countries is very 
different that makes it difficult to propose general strategies for making certain 
structural improvements in the institutions. The organizational models serve 
considerable purpose in their applications only to some rural activities such as those 
relating to fertilizer production, power generation, irrigation etc. In these activities, the 
performance of functions and tasks can be accurately measured and identified that make 
it easier to prescribe what is to be done to effectively and efficiently achieve the 
organizational objectives. Therefore, the research for appropriate institutional designs 
and structures for rural community development in developing countries still continues 
(Uphoff, 1986: 145-150).  
The Kurdish region in Iraq is tremendously different regarding cultural, 
socioeconomic, political and physical (topography, soil, temperature, and water) 
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circumstances as mentioned partly in chapter one and can be seen on the topography 
and land use maps on page 69. Based on the research methodology, more adaptable 
concepts and theories were identified and developed during the entire learning process 
of the dissertation especially after conducting the empirical work and continual revision 
of the concepts.   
This chapter is aimed to review and synthesize the existing knowledge and 
accumulated experiences of the conceptually related development topics, which are 
discussed within the framework of social capital as a long-term asset of a society. It will 
be discussed what kind of approaches and strategies are needed to build social capital on 
different levels of micro, meso and macro. In the context of the research area, it is 
necessary to take a locally-based and integrated view in the process of social capital 
building to create an enabling environment for sustainable Community-Driven 
Development (CDD). 
2.1 Sustainable Community-Driven Development 
Earlier references to sustainable development focused on the preservation of natural 
resources for present and future use. Thus, it was defined as development which meets 
the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs. The contemporary definition of sustainable 
development is more as a continuing process of social, economic, and environmental 
needs where the economic development should not undermine the ecological and social 
systems upon which communities and societies are dependent. UN (2004) states that: 
“the lack of integration between the objectives of economic and social policies has 
become increasingly more evident and a more urgent issue”(UN, 2004:3).  
The process of sustainable development involves a balance between human-made assets 
(physical capital), natural capital, social capital, and human capital and priority is 
neither given to the spatial demands of the economy and society nor to the demands of 
ecological protection. Depending on local circumstances there are different definitions 
and interpretations of sustainable development. Kamara and Kargbo (1999) state that:   
”Sustainable development can mean different things to different people. In 
industrial countries, focus is on environmental management with as little negative 
impact on economic development as possible. In developing countries, focus is on 
economic development with as little negative impact on the environment as 
possible” (Kamara and Kargbo, 1999:108)   
For example, in Germany, sustainable spatial development, is meant to bring ecological 
considerations in line with the social and economic demands on space which equal 
opportunities e.g. for education, medical care, housing, jobs, good environmental 
conditions and recreational activities are relatively guaranteed in a community or 
region. In most other developed countries in Europe bringing, the ecological capacity of 
space in line with the demands on space made by the economy and society is an 
important prerequisite for securing the quality of life (Lutter, 2001:5).   
In some developing countries like the oil-rich Gulf States, the main focus has been to 
develop only one sector of the economy without considering fair share of benefits 
among different groups in the society and sustainable use of natural resources. 
Moreover, it is now widely recognized that sustainable community development in the 
developing countries cannot be achieved by the development of only one sector such as 
agriculture. Even if the agricultural sector is generally of prime importance in livelihood 
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development for many rural communities, the aspects of other sectors of social, 
ecological and non-agricultural economic development must be included in a truly 
integrated approach (Austin, 1981:1).  
In ecological terms, the carrying capacity of an ecosystem is the size of the 
population that can be supported indefinitely upon the available resources and services 
of that ecosystem, for example, food and water as the natural capital of the community. 
Living within the carrying capacity means using those supplies no faster than they are 
replenished by the community's environment. A community that is degrading or 
destroying the ecosystem on which it depends is using up its community capital and is 
living unsustainably (Hart, 1999: website).  
The sustainable community is not only about the carrying capacity of natural capital. 
Equally important to community sustainability is living within the carrying capacity of 
the community's human, social and physical capital. Carrying capacity is much harder to 
measure for human and social capitals but the basic concept is the same - are the 
different types of capital being used up faster than they are being replenished. Some 
examples will be given here: a community that allows its children to be poorly 
educated, undernourished, and poorly housed is eroding its human capital; a community 
that allows the quality of its social interactions to decline through lack of trust, respect, 
and tolerance is eroding its social capital; and a community that allows its buildings, 
roads, parks, power facilities, water facilities, and waste processing capability to decay 
is eroding its physical capital (ibid). 
 Thus, in the context of sustainability, carrying capacity is the size of the population 
that can be supported indefinitely upon the available resources and services of physical, 
natural, human and social capital. Sustainability can also be viewed from different 
levels: international/global, national, regional, provincial, municipal, community and 
individual level. These levels are interrelated and interdependent. For example, global 
events and trends can affect what happens in a small town within a province of a 
country. However, at whatever level sustainability involves an inherent or local capacity 
to initiate, manage, and pay for change.  
To sum up, the best indicators for the sustainable community development are those 
which: 
• address the issue of the community's carrying capacity relative to different types of 
community capital(physical, natural, human and social);  
• fit the community in question and link the community's social well-being, economic 
development and environmental protection together; and  
• Focus on a long range view and measure local development that is not at the 
expense of sustainability on the local, regional, national and global levels.   
Traditional tangible indicators e.g. rate of literacy and infant mortality rate focus only 
on a single part of the development without considering the intangible indicators of 
social interaction, interpersonal relationships and institutional coordination to link all 
parts and sectors together, which is essential to achieve sustainable Community-Driven 
Development (CDD). They do not consider the important role of social capital to 
establish effective interactions among local people and institutions with shared vision of 
what the community should be.  
The achievement of sustainable CDD requires balancing many different needs within 
the community which can be met by promoting effective interactions among people and 
institutions in the community on the one hand and with neighbouring communities and 
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institutions on higher levels on the other hand as part of social capital investment, which 
includes:  
• Social relationships: sharing, cooperating, and solving common problems together. 
• Economic transactions: buying and selling goods and services to each other. 
• Environmental interdependence: relying on common resources or the services of 
common ecosystems like farmlands, forests and water supplies.  
Community-driven development  
A fresh look on sustainable development concept is provided in this thesis by 
introducing the concepts and strategies of Community-Driven Development (CDD)6, 
which emphasizes the integration of all activities including all the target population, 
men, women and children in the present and future generations. The community 
members need to be the driving force behind becoming a community with a sustainable 
quality of life for all members, now and for future generations (Dongier et.al, 2002:303-
304).  
Simply defined, CDD gives control of decisions and resources to community groups. 
In other words, the CDD is an approach that gives control over planning decisions and 
investment resources to community groups and local governments. CDD strategies 
operate on the principles of local empowerment, participatory governance, 
administrative autonomy, greater downward accountability, and enhanced local 
capacity. It is evident that the CDD can only be reached by taking a participatory and 
integrated approach of development where many social groups and disciplines with 
different interests and activities contribute to positive changes in a community (Ibid;  
Mansuri and Rao, 2004:2; Malombe, 2000:3-15).  
Indeed, CDD treats poor people as assets and partners in the development process. 
The CDD builds on the institutions and resources of the poor in partnership with 
Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), demand-responsive support organizations 
and service providers including elected local governments, the private sector, NGOs, 
and central government agencies. Broach participation of local stakeholders in the 
process of the CDD often requires decentralization reform and promotion of a 
favourable legal and regulatory framework. Furthermore, the CDD is a strategy to 
effectively and efficiently provide social and infrastructure services; organize economic 
activity and resource management; empower poor people; improve governance; and 
enhance security of the poorest. Support to CDD usually includes strengthening 
inclusive community groups; facilitating community access to information; and 
promoting an enabling environment for participatory local governance through the 
policy and institutional reform which will be discussed later in this chapter. Therefore, 
the fundamental elements of CDD are actually political in nature (UN, 2004:4; Dongier 
et.al, 2002:304-325).    
The CDD has also been shown to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of poverty 
reduction efforts. Experience demonstrates that by directly relying on poor people to 
drive development activities, CDD has the potential to make poverty reduction efforts 
more responsive to demands, more inclusive, more sustainable, and more cost-effective 
than traditional centrally led programs. Well-designed CDD strategies are inclusive of 
                                                
6
 In the rest of the paper, the “CDD” will be used as shorthand for its sustainable form. 
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poor and vulnerable groups, build positive social capital, and give people greater voice 
both in their community and with government entities (Dongier et.al, 2002:304-315).  
To conclude, the CDD is defined as community control of investment and 
management decisions to achieve sustainable socioeconomic and environmental 
protection in a certain community. 
The main benefits of the CDD approach 
The CDD empowers poor people, builds social capital, and strengthens governance 
The objective of development is not merely to increase incomes or to improve poverty 
indicators but also to expand people’s real freedoms. These are the choices people make 
between different valuable beings and doings such as being nourished; being educated; 
and participating in public debate. Community-driven approaches will devolve control 
and decision-making to poor people and empower them immediately and directly. Sen 
(1999) notes that: 
 ” freedom is not only the basis of the evaluation of success and failure, but it is 
also a principal determinant of individual initiative and social effectiveness. 
Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and also to 
influence the world, and these are central to the process of development” 
(Sen,1999:18). 
Furthermore, control over decisions and resources give communities the opportunity to 
build social capital; to increase the ability of individuals; and to secure benefits as a 
result of membership in social networks by expanding the depth and range of local 
networks. This kind of network expansion as part of social capital can have a positive 
effect on household welfare and can be critical for long-term growth and development 
in developing countries (Grootaert and Narayan, 2000:54-61).  
The creation of networks and social capital also helps to reduce household exposure 
to risk. For example, in rural communities of many developing countries members of 
rotating saving and credit associations on the basis of reciprocity and mutual trust can 
save and lend among themselves for the case of emergencies. Hence, development 
strategies that strengthen CBOs and build social capital can also strengthen the safety 
net for poor people and reduce their exposure to risk (Grootaert, 2001:40). 
Finally, strengthening local associations that are inclusive increase poor people’s 
voice in local political processes and governance. When poor communities are trusted to 
drive development and are given appropriate information, support, and clear rules, a 
system can be put in place to facilitate their active and ongoing role in local 
development. Because CDD devolves responsibilities and resources to the local level, 
activities can occur simultaneously in a large number of communities without being 
constrained by too much central bureaucracy (Narayan and Ebbe, 1997:33). 
Furthermore, about the positive impacts of broad participation of local people as part of 
CDD, UN (2004) states that: 
 ”CDD and its institutionalization can represent a driving force towards more 
open and responsive political systems while improving the quality and level of 
social development outcomes. The principle informing this approach is simple yet 
powerful: allowing for broader participation in policy identification and decision-
making improves the effectiveness of projects and, therefore, the development 
outcomes of social policies” (UN, 2004:5).   
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The CDD approach fills the gaps  
The potential for CDD is greatest for goods and services that are small in scale and not 
complex and that require local cooperation such as common pool goods (for example, 
management of common pasture and surface water irrigation systems), public goods 
(for example, local road maintenance), and civil goods (for example, public advocacy 
and social monitoring). Similarly, private goods or toll goods are often better provided 
using a market-based approach, relying more on individual enterprises than on 
collective action.  
CDD can, however, fill the gaps in the settings similar to the Kurdish region in Iraq 
where markets are missing or imperfect, or where public institutions or local 
governments fail to fulfil their mandates. Accumulated experience has shown that the 
market alone cannot provide all essential services and goods for community people. The 
market often provides insufficient public goods e.g. roads, education, and health care for 
poor people while over-harvesting common pool goods e.g. forests, watersheds, and 
fishery resources. About the need to enhance the complementary role of public, private 
and voluntary sectors in order to support CDD, Dongier et.al (2002) state that: 
” Market- and state-run activities can be effectively complemented by community-
driven solutions that engage CBOs, local governments, NGOs, and the private 
sector” (Dongier et.al, 2002:305).  
The CDD improves efficiency and effectiveness of development investments  
Many studies suggest that CDD can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of services 
in many sectors and contexts. For instance, a recent study by Hoddinott et.al (2001) in 
South Africa shows that when CBOs are responsible for all aspects of a development 
project (design, management, and monitoring), costs per beneficiary is less than half. 
The study concludes that: 
”These analytics suggest that because communities possess informational 
advantages not available to outsiders, community participation offers the prospect 
of lowering the cost of antipoverty interventions. In cases where the outcomes of 
interventions are difficult to measure, community participation is attractive 
because it is more likely to produce a set of outcomes actually desired by the 
community” (Hoddinott et.al, 2001:57)   
The CDD improves efficiency and effectiveness in the provision and maintenance of 
many community services. Examples of these benefits for irrigation, education, 
microfinance, and natural resource management are given below.  
– Irrigation: Community management of development investments usually results in 
lower costs and more productively employed assets. Studies of community-
organized irrigation systems in Asia and Africa have repeatedly found that systems 
constructed and operated by the farmers themselves, often without much external 
assistance, generate a higher level of agricultural productivity than more modern 
systems constructed by government agencies with substantial external assistance 
(Reidinger and Meinzen-Dick, 1995: 5-10). 
– Education: There is empirical evidence that community management and 
accountability can improve education outcomes. Results from El Salvador shows 
that greater parental involvement in children’s education can inspire children to 
attend school and put pressure on providers to deliver better services. Communities 
that oversee school management are also more willing to assist in financing school 
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activities and hold the costs lower while holding enrolment and quality constant 
(Jimenez and Sawada, 1998:19). 
– Microfinance: Evidence suggests that certain models of both individual and group-
based microfinance can extend the reach of financial services and achieve high 
repayment rates. Group-based microfinance tend to do particularly well where the 
screening and monitoring costs of credit are too high for the lender and when the 
group approach reduces the cost of information gathering and creates incentives at 
the local level. Usually in the big cities, access to information for both lender and 
clients matters and information on branches, financial products, clients and loans 
must be provided on a timely basis. This requires using a computer-based 
information system to which the poor people in rural communities of many 
developing counties have no access. Seibel (2005) explains that:  
”but in small institutions and remote areas, manual processing of information can 
be far more effective. Cost and benefits of information processing have to be 
balanced. In rural microfinance, personal relations with clients can be very 
important and cannot easily be replaced by a computer”(Seibel, 2005:40). 
– Natural recourse management: During the last decades, several countries have 
moved from state to community management of natural resources. For example, the 
joint forest management program in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh shows how 
community management and effective collaboration among local stakeholders can 
increase the effectiveness of services and lead to sustainable forest management. It 
has brought many positive results e.g. degraded forests have sprung back to life; 
timber smuggling has almost been stopped; cattle grazing are under control; soil 
conservation has saved local water resources; and village labour is more gainfully 
employed and as a result out-migration has declined (Venkatamaran and Falconer, 
1998: website). 
The CDD approach enhances sustainability 
The community members are the most legitimate, informed, and reliable source of 
information about their own priorities. The CDD can make services responsive to 
demand expressed by poor local people and as a result can enhance sustainability. 
Community-developed facilities such as health centres, schools, and water supply 
systems tend to have higher utilization rates and better maintenance when investment 
decisions are made by actors inside the community. Experience also demonstrates that 
demand is better articulated, when communities contribute to investment costs and 
control investment choices ensuring that they get what they want. Households are 
willing to pay for and to maintain services only when the services are tailor-made to 
their needs (Azfar et al., 1999:3).  
Critical reflections on the CDD approach  
For all its potential benefits, CDD also presents risks especially in the absence of 
effective and accountable Community-Based Organizations (CBOs). If CBOs are not 
appropriately strengthened or exclude the poor; if they cannot finance recurrent costs; 
and if they crowd out local government or are manipulated by elite interests, then CDD 
may not be the optimal development approach. Moreover, there is a risk of undermining 
CDD where the development efforts are not built on the basis of interaction and 
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coordination between local people and institutions as part of social capital (UN, 
2004:5).   
In any context, the CDD needs a long-term support to grow up where the central 
government is responsible to create an enabling environment for CDD. But, at the same 
time there is a dilemma with the CDD concept. For instance, in the context of rural area 
in the Kurdish region in Iraq the grassroots people and institutions lack necessary 
human and organizational capacities to design their own concepts and drive the 
sustainable development of their own community. Therefore, on the initial stage, they 
are highly dependent on the central capacities regarding the provision of training and 
education. There is simply a risk for the domination of top-down approach when the 
support is from central bodies. But even during the process of capacity-building of local 
people, the risk of being manipulated by governmental institutions and NGOs, which 
sometimes have a hidden agenda, is not excluded.  
2.2 Social capital  
There is growing evidence in the literature that differences in economic outcomes, 
whether at the level of the individual or household or at the higher levels of decision-
making, cannot be explained fully by differences in traditional inputs such as labour, 
land, and physical capital. During the last decades, increasing attention is given to the 
role of social capital in affecting the well-being of households and the level of 
development of communities and nations (Steger et al. 2002:85).  
It is now recognized that social capital is an input in a household’s or a community’s 
production functions and the acquisition of human capital and the establishment of a 
physical infrastructure need to be complemented by locally-based institutional structure 
as part of social capital  to reap the full benefits of these investments. For instance, a 
well functioning parent-teacher association may be a necessary complement to building 
schools and training teachers in order to provide a higher quality of the education 
services in a community. Another example is that the promotion of social interaction 
among poor farmers may need to complement the provision of seeds, fertilizer and other 
inputs to efficiently and effectively increase the agricultural production.  
Social capital is less tangible than traditional forms of capital such as physical or 
human capital for it exists in the relations among people but shares a number of features 
with them (Coleman, 1988:S100). For example, social capital, like physical capital, 
accumulates as a stock that produces a stream of benefits in the form of information 
sharing and collective decision-making. Like physical capital, social capital stock 
requires an initial investment and regular maintenance in the form of repeated social 
interaction or trust-building behaviour. Social capital also exhibits several features that 
set it apart from physical and human capital. First, and by definition, social capital, 
unlike human capital, cannot be built individually and it can take years to build and is 
more easily destroyed than built or rebuilt. Second, unlike physical capital, but like 
human capital, the stock of social capital does not decrease, and can actually increase as 
a result of its use (Ostrom, 2000:172-176).  
Observation levels and types of social capital  
Each country or region consists of specific socio-cultural, political and economic 
settings and thus there are different meanings on social capital. On the one hand, social 
capital must be revised and redefined in any given situation. On the other hand, there is 
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an increasing need for some generalizations about the concept as a highly complex 
issue.  While there are many definitions and interpretations of the social capital concept, 
there is growing consensus for a common definition. Portes (1998) states that: 
“social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of 
membership in social networks or other social structures” (Portes, 1998:6). 
 If one takes a broad view of what is comprised by these “other social structures,” then it 
is relevant to observe social capital at the micro, meso, and macro levels. In the context 
of the Kurdish region in Iraq, the social capital is broadly classified into three main 
groups, namely, cognitive, structural and bridging which are highly overlapping each 
other in each spatial unit and level of decision-making. It is, therefore, very tricky to 
classify them according to territorial units or decision making levels but it is likely to 
analyse the way of their interplay in each level of analysis (micro, meso and macro) 
including the spatial unit.  
Micro-level (community) 
Social capital at micro level refers to strong cognitive and intangible elements such as 
common values, norms, attitudes, mutual trust and networks that govern interactions 
among individuals, in a certain group, organization or community. On community level, 
cognitive social capital is defined as connections and the ways in which people interact 
and relate to each other in a cognitive way and on an equal basis. This consists of 
horizontal and informal relationships among community people and simplest 
connections are those to family, friends and neighbours. Cooperation between 
neighbours in a community can be based on a personal cognitive bond that may not be 
reflected in a formal structural arrangement. Social capital is here understood as features 
of social organization such as trust, norms, and networks, which is a precondition to 
facilitate coordinated actions and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
development activities within the community.  
Such networks are often, but not necessarily, given structure through the creation of 
community institutions and volunteer organizations in order to deal with common 
problems. When the community people are capable to form organizations to create 
goods and services, cognitive social capital is converted to structural social capital. But, 
it is important to note that cognitive social capital is still embedded in the organization’s 
structure such as informal links and bonds among members of a community 
organization. Community organizations can be a manifestation of structural social 
capital, but social capital can exist outside the context of community organizations, 
whether formal or informal. For example, a group of friends or relatives who help each 
other in times of trouble have cognitive social capital but may never embody their bond 
in an association as structural social capital. However, social interaction can become 
capital through the persistence of its effects which can be ensured through both 
cognitive and structural channels. For example, a sport association embodies the values 
and goals of the social interaction that initiated it but the cognitive social capital created 
by the repeated social interaction can survive the end of the sport season and have 
lasting effects among and even beyond the original members (Grootaert, 2002:3-9).  
Putnam’s seminal analysis of civic traditions in northern Italy focused primarily on 
“horizontal” institutions in which members relate to each other on an equal basis. But 
on the other hand, community organizations can be of little use for development if they 
lack external links and influences even if their structures are complemented with strong 
cognitive elements, such as common values, norms and mutual trust. In the literature, 
many authors highlight the importance of social networks for self-reliant actions both as 
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horizontal networks among family, friends and neighbours in a certain community and 
as vertical networks up through the social hierarchy that give household access to other 
forms of power and resources (Putnam, 1993 quoted in Grootaert, 1998:2; Friedmann, 
1992:68-69).  
Coleman (1990: 65-90; 1988:S101) suggests a new approach to describe both 
stability and change in social systems by linking the behaviour of individuals to 
organizational behaviour and then to society as a whole. In this manner the social 
capital include “vertical” institutions as well, characterized by hierarchical relationships 
and unequal power distribution among members which is defined as bridging social 
capital. “Horizontal” bridging social capital will appear when there is an effective 
interaction and cooperative behaviour among community-level organizations to solve 
the common problems. “Vertical” bridging social capital is produced when the 
organizations individually or commonly interact with an institution on higher level of 
decision-making to obtain assistance on issues, which are far beyond the capacities in 
the community (Grootaert, 2002:3-5). 
Thus, when the community institutions, as part of structural social capital, are 
enabled to effectively interact with the higher level institutions on meso and macro 
levels, the bridging social capital is produced to satisfy the community needs. This is 
close to Coleman’s definition of social capital, which includes also the vertical links 
with the institutions on higher levels.  
This form of interplay between different types of social capital can be found on meso 
and macro levels as well but with more complexity as the actors and groups to produce 
a certain type of social capital are increasing both in number and scale. 
Meso level (sub-district) 
On meso level, the social capital begins to be more tangible and structural which 
facilitates information sharing, collective action and decision-making through 
established roles and social networks supplemented by rules and procedures. The 
interaction between people and institutions at community level and the local 
government and line agencies at the sub-district level is more defined as “vertical” 
bridging social capital. This level functions as a link between community and policy 
levels. Therefore, as main element of bridging social capital it is vital that the sub-
district institutions are provided adequate human and organizational capacities and 
decision-making power to establish participatory local governance for CDD.  
Macro level (policy) 
On the macro level, in addition to the largely informal and structural relationships at 
micro and meso levels, social capital includes most formalized institutional 
relationships and structures such as political regime, the rule of law, the court system, 
and civil and political liberties. These elements of social capital are very important for 
providing an enabling environment for participatory local governance and CDD.  
Governmental organizations represent structural social capital in which the cognitive 
element is not necessarily present (Grootaert, 2002:3).  
Complementarity and substitution of social capital among different levels  
There is overwhelming evidence in the literature that building different types of social 
capital on all levels of micro, meso and macro has a significant impact on national 
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economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1997: 1283). Furthermore, Olson (1982) 
notes that: 
“There is a parallel between the individual in a group that would gain from 
provision of a collective good and the organization for collective action within the 
society. The organization that acts to provide some benefit for the society as a 
whole is, in effect, providing a public good for the whole society, and it is 
accordingly in the same position as an individual who contributes to the provision 
of a collective good for a group of which he or she is a part” (Olson, 1982:43).  
The strength of such a broad concept is that the inclusion of micro, meso, and macro 
levels of social capital allows for important effects of complementarity and substitution 
between different types of social capital. For example, national institutions can provide 
an enabling environment in which local associations can develop and flourish and local 
associations can, in return, sustain regional and national institutions and add a measure 
of stability to them. Furthermore, a certain level of substitution is present among the 
levels of social capital. For example, communities in developing countries often rely on 
social pressure and reputation to enforce agreements between individuals or groups. 
When institutional development strengthens the rule of law and the court system, local 
informal arrangements for dispute resolution usually become less relevant and may lead 
to the weakening of the social bonds. Hence a concept of social capital that 
encompasses the micro, meso and macro dimensions will be better able to capture the 
counterbalancing effects of structures and attitudes at all levels of society (Grootaert, 
2002:6).  
The need to convert cognitive social capital into local institutions  
There are growing evidences that the problem of underdevelopment is to a significant 
extent a problem of underdeveloped institutions. North (1990) argues that: 
“The evolution of institutions that create a hospitable environment for cooperative 
solutions to complex exchange provides for economic growth” (North, 1990: vii).  
The literature contains an impressive and still growing number of case studies which 
document that local institutions as part of social capital play a key role in the success 
and sustainability of development activities. This has been demonstrated in almost all 
parts of the world and many case studies are cited by Uphoff (1993:the entire book) and 
Narayan (1995:5-33) in sector settings, ranging from irrigation and water supply, to 
management of forests and wildlife resources, to the provision of credit to the poor, and 
the implementation of health service programs. The way local institutions perform their 
useful role is centred on three mechanisms: the sharing of information among 
association members, the reduction of opportunistic behaviour, and the facilitation of 
collective decision making (Collier, 1998:4).  
A study has been conducted by Narayan and Pritchett (1997:35) which demonstrated 
that the ownership of social capital by households in Tanzania has strong effects on 
households’ welfare. The study found that the magnitude of the estimated effect exceeds 
by far that of education and physical assets owned by the household, but it does not 
address whether social capital is an asset which primarily helps the poor.  
However, in the Kurdish region in Iraq converting cognitive social capital into the 
local institutions and networks as part of structural social capital needs an enabling 
environment to produce bridging social capital necessary for participatory local 
governance and CDD. In fact, developing a framework for analysing and building social 
capital on all three levels of micro, meso, and macro is the main contribution of this 
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research to the existing social capital theories. The elements of social capital on the 
three levels are overlapping each other, expressing a relation of power between different 
actors and between different levels of decision-making in a society (see Figure  2.1 on 
page 25).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2.1: Building social capital for sustainable CDD  
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Conceptual and practical limitations of social capital  
Social capital is commonly defined as the ability of individuals to build bonds within 
their own group and create bridges that link them with other groups on the assumption 
that such networks are a source of strength and improve existing social conditions and 
economic opportunities. It is true that social capital can be used constructively to 
facilitate collective action for the common good. But, as social capital is embedded 
within the structures of power and social construction, it can be used destructively as 
well to continue domination and violence against others. For example, within a 
community, the rich and elite groups usually possess better networks and can use these 
networks to establish an unequal system of domination and control. Therefore, the 
conceptual and practical limitations of social capital especially the existing power 
relations within the community or between the central and local authorities must be 
carefully examined before using social capital for local development (UN, 2004:4).  
Friedmann (1992) highlights the power sharing problem between the three levels, 
which sometimes leads to many unavoidable conflicts in a society: 
“….the interests, concerns, and values arising from within the micro sphere of 
households, with their legitimate political claims for economic and political 
inclusion, penetrate the meso-and macro spheres of social practice and thus also 
the spheres of established relations of power. This penetration is bound to be 
conflictive” (Friedmann, 1992:53). 
Furthermore, the mere presence of an association in a community does not prove the 
existence of social capital. It must be emphasized that social capital, sometimes even 
when its main purpose is good, can generate harmful outcomes for non-included groups 
and even for society as a whole. For example, local branches of political parties with 
mandatory membership are institutions which may display little or no social capital. For 
that reason, it is important to look at membership conditions (voluntary or not, payment 
of fees, etc.) and the degree of effective participation in institutions before making any 
conclusion about the social capital effects. The members of a special-interest 
organization, for example, by building cartel or monopolistic behaviour can increase the 
income of its members while reducing society’s output (Olson, 1982:44-45). 
To summarize, excessive strong ties in form of high bonding and cognitive social 
capital often prevents people from making connections outside their small world of 
friends and family. If this form of social capital is not linked to structural and bridging 
social capital in an appropriate way, the society can not be stable. Furthermore, power 
struggle and conflict in a society can be managed by empowering the grassroots people 
and civil society. They must be involved in strengthening the rule of law and a 
regulatory framework where the rights and obligations of all individuals, groups and 
institutions are clearly defined. In addition, there must be sanctions capacities and 
enforcement mechanisms against any misconduct and opportunistic behaviour.   
2.3 Building social capital on micro level 
A further contribution of the research will be exploring the value of existing and 
traditional institutions, roles and leaderships as part of social capital on micro level to 
mobilize the local people for self-reliance and Community-Driven Development (CDD).  
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CBOs as the driving force behind the CDD   
Throughout history, communities have organized themselves to address collective and 
individual needs. Community Based Organizations (CBOs) are made up of a group of 
individuals in a self-defined community who have joined together to achieve common 
goals. They can also be groups of people who are united by a common interest but do 
not live in the same geographic community. The common interest might be related to 
production, consumption, the use of common pool resources, or the delivery of services. 
Examples include women's groups, credit circles, youth clubs, cooperatives and farmer 
associations, irrigation associations, forest and watershed management groups, artisan 
groups, fishery associations, and school-parent associations. CBOs can be informal or 
formal. Informal organizations such as women’s and men’s clubs and community 
groups pursue joint interests and often appear more accessible to the poor than formal 
organizations which have legal status, formally stated rights and responsibilities, and a 
legally binding government structure for recruiting members, selecting leaders, and 
conducting affairs (Konteh, 2000:57-63). 
It is worth to make a distinction between a CBO, an NGO and a local government. A 
CBO is considered to be a membership organization aimed at furthering the interests of 
its members. But one of the characters of an NGO is having a broader scope of activities 
that might assist CBOs and pursue commitments that do not directly benefit NGO 
members. CBOs differ from elected local governments in that they are voluntary and 
choose their own objectives. In contrast, local governments are mandated to be 
responsible for revenue collection and for the delivery of a variety of infrastructure and 
services. CBOs may interact closely with local government, central government 
agencies, private sector, and NGOs in a local network (Malombe, 2000:23-28). 
 CBOs as part of a local network can act as the mediators to effectively and 
efficiently coordinate external support in the community and in this way the bridging 
social capital necessary to support CDD is produced. Through a learning process within 
the local network, CBOs and other local institutions can increasingly build up their 
capacities and those of their communities. Where the traditional institutions exist and 
are not biased obviously in favour of privileged interests, they should be engaged in the 
development activities (Motee and Namazi, 2000:7-14).  
Traditional arrangements and endogenous institutions that are not organizations (e.g. 
traditional birth attendant, setting broken bones, traditional rotating credit arrangements 
etc.) but are directly accountable to community people, should be integrated into an 
effective local network that facilitates the vertical assistance from higher decision-
making bodies and thereby enhancing the bridging social capital to CDD. Pre-existing 
institutions for all their faults have the advantage of being familiar with the local 
problems and of having accumulated some local legitimacy, support and commitment 
over time. Traditional institutions in any case are able to make important social and 
psychological contributions and therefore deserve acceptance as a necessary and helpful 
part of village society’s network of institutions even if they appear irrelevant to some 
development activities. Hence, the emphasis should be on trying to increase their 
capacities and work through them. To introduce modern institutions, which compete 
with traditional ones, even if necessary in some cases, is usually unlikely to be 
successful (Motee and Namazi, 2000:14). 
Lutz and Linder (2004:3) note that: “traditional structures are often more legitimate 
than the modern state” because unlike modern structures, the legitimacy of traditional 
leaders is deeply rooted in historical and cultural values and is not based on 
constitutions and electoral processes.  
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The value of traditional institutions and roles as accumulated social capital of the 
community has played an important role in the process of local development and is 
highly appraised by many cases in the literature. The informal local institutions, if 
accountable to grassroots people, should be respected and preserved as they are very 
important for CDD. For example, introducing formal financial institutions in the rain-
fed area of the Kurdish region in Iraq, where risks and variability are so great, would 
probably not succeed because consequences become practically uninsurable. Therefore 
the strategy for the capacity development of local institutions and networks should build 
on any capacities that exist (Uphoff, 1986:147).  
A study conducted by Dürr (1998:25-56) emphasizes the potential of the traditional 
savings group, which has enhanced social and economic security within a rural 
community in Thailand. The services of the savings group cover much more than just 
savings and credit operations. Besides the direct improvements in the financial status of 
the members, a social welfare system, including various funds, provides a social safety 
net. It includes redistribution mechanisms that particularly benefit the poorer members. 
This has enhanced the social integrity and cohesion in the community and now the 
group is recognized as a widely accepted “social institution”. The development process 
has been strongly shaped by the personality of the leader who is highly accountable to 
the community.  
Representative CBOs can provide voice and empowerment to groups that are 
typically excluded from the development process. The interests of women, indigenous 
groups, ethnic minorities and the disabled people might not be effectively expressed 
through centralized political and economic structures. If these minority groups are 
actively involved in CBOs, they will help make development processes more inclusive. 
In the absence of reliable information to allow means testing such as for household 
income, involving CBOs directly in the targeting process can improve the efforts to 
target the poorest and most marginal individuals and groups. For example, the parent-
teacher association in a given community might be in the best position to determine 
which children should receive tuition or school lunch subsidies (Swamy et.al, 1999:28). 
Existing institutions and roles should be involved in planning and implementation of 
community development efforts. Through enhancing a learning process among different 
individuals, households, institutions and networks, it will be possible to modify the 
traditional and endogenous institutions and integrate them in a workable, accountable 
and sustainable system of local development. Lutz and Linder (2004) note that: 
“Following the CDD approach, control over development is often given to local 
community groups, where traditional leaders would be one among many other 
actors, such as elected or non-elected officials, local governments, agency 
representatives, CBOs and NGOs. One of the core elements of CDD is to 
strengthen local groups and facilitate information both from the national and local 
level, and among different groups within a community” (Lutz and Linder 2004:35). 
This will further call for establishing a transparent and accountable local network of 
institutions that constantly reviews the management style and organization structure of 
the institutions to increase flexibility to external change and demand of local people. 
The rural communities should increasingly direct and manage their own development, 
adapted to their specific local conditions and needs. Anyway, the most effective 
institutions will be those in which the technology, the organizational structure and the 
social process in an enabling environment are designed to fit together (Grootaert, 
2001:44-48).  
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Social and gender inclusion 
Any CDD approach must consider the potential to increase the power of poor 
communities to negotiate with government, the private sector and civil society 
responsive to the priorities of all poor groups. Especially, when the community is not 
homogeneous, the CDD approach needs to be socially inclusive, giving voice and 
decision-making power to women, the elderly, disabled, youth, religious and cultural 
minorities, indigenous and other ethnic groups. When the CDD does not pay attention to 
issues of social inclusion, groups of people may be excluded and as a result investment 
choices may not reflect the true needs of all people. A typical example of negative effect 
of social exclusion is when cultural practices restrain women from attending or speaking 
at community meetings, often resulting in underinvestment in health services, literacy 
programs, water supply systems, and other interventions typically more valued by 
women. Another example is when input and participation from indigenous groups are 
imperfect because information materials and planning discussions are in languages 
unfamiliar to them (Fong et al., 1996:2).  
Various participatory methods can facilitate the inclusion of marginal groups. As 
gender cuts across other forms of exclusion, specific gender-sensitive approaches are 
needed to ensure the participation of women from all groups. It is important to 
understand existing community decision-making process and the often complex local 
political and social context. According to World Bank (2007: website), some general 
guidelines for building in social inclusion include:  
– identifying subgroups among the poor especially those at risk of exclusion;  
– where existing systems of social organization are highly inequitable, new groups 
may need to be created to enable excluded groups to participate; 
– ensuring that intermediaries (NGOs, local government, and so forth) have expertise 
in working with these groups and using participatory techniques;  
– investigating how local institutions can be made more responsive and inclusive of 
these groups; and  
– Provide necessary capacity building of these groups.  
Also, when the social organization of a community is highly inequitable, new groups 
may need to be created to promote the participation of disadvantaged people and 
thereby achieving sustainable development objectives. Both new and special-purpose 
organizations are more effective when they build on positive organizational traditions of 
a community. This is the case for the Moldova Social Investment Fund (2006: website) 
where traditional decision-making mechanisms are used to establish community 
priorities. Inclusion also requires that scarce public resources be targeted to groups that 
most need them.   
Community access to information  
An essential component of any CDD strategy is to provide community members with 
knowledge and information useful to conduct transactions with both the government 
and market organizations thereby facilitating linkages of community groups to both 
government and markets as part of bridging social capital. Support to CDD is as much 
about facilitating flows of information among all groups in a community as it is about 
facilitating flows of funds. The lack of information is often the most significant 
limitation on CBOs’ capacity to play a part in the development process. Community 
organizations need information on market opportunities, on what support resources are 
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available and on how to use these resources productively and efficiently. A variety of 
free media may be used to facilitate access to and stimulate flows of information in the 
community. Information technology and the Internet, adapted to community needs, are 
playing a growing role in this process and can dramatically accelerate local learning and 
connections with a wide range of opportunities (Mozammel and Schechter, 2005:3-6; 
Dongier et.al, 2002:325).  
Access to information on the actions and performance of government is critical for 
the promotion of government accountability. Communication channels, which provide 
wide public distribution of the information materials can place control in the hands of 
communities only if the information is understandable for poor local people. The 
information must be also free of propaganda and not subjected for manipulation by 
politicians, government officials, contracting agencies, and local elites who have usually 
their own language. Only enabling communities to be involved in decision-making is 
not sufficient to achieve sustainable outcomes. The decisions of each option need to be 
based on accurate information about how fairly the costs are shared and the benefits are 
distributed among different social groups. Communities and stakeholders should have 
access to sufficient information to make realistic investment choices from a range of 
options that meet their needs and fit local conditions, culture, values, and available 
operation and maintenance capacity. Furthermore, a free and independent media can 
play a vital role to facilitate community access to information (Azfar et al., 1999:12).  
Simple rules and participatory evaluation   
Sustainability and effectiveness of CDD strategies are enhanced when processes are 
simple and transparent and when actors have strong and consistent incentives for 
performance. Regular monitoring and participatory evaluation then provide the 
necessary information to ensure that the integrity of the system is maintained (Narayan, 
1993:1-9). 
Community access to resources needs to be governed by simple rules that are easy 
for participating communities to interpret and apply. Clearly defined procedures, 
outlined and widely circulated, help to avoid confusion and minimize administrative 
complexity. To maintain the credibility of the system, these rules should be monitored 
and transparently enforced. Key actors at all levels should be rewarded for performance 
through objective evaluation based on clear criteria. For example, payments to 
intermediaries and support organizations could be tied to their performance against 
indicators of access to service and of the institutional sustainability of the CBOs 
(Narayan, 1995:16-17). 
Most successful development programs routinely conduct beneficiary assessments, 
focus group interviews, client surveys, and other forms of evaluation that provide 
policymakers and program managers with information on whether investments reflect 
community priorities, the level and type of participation they have used, their 
sustainability, and their impacts. Flexibility in design, often through piloting, is essential 
to allow systems to evolve and adapt better to local demand and capabilities. Systematic 
monitoring and evaluation of the CDD activities and outcomes are critical to ensure that 
activities continue to grow and adapt to changing conditions. This is particularly 
important where the CDD activities are being scaled up, which monitoring systems 
supply the necessary information and feedback to ensure that processes are 
appropriately modified to the needs of different localities and that potential bottlenecks 
or problems are identified and overcome early, before they become constraints to 
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expansion. Not only the physical and financial progress, but also the quality of 
participatory processes and effectiveness of local institutions and economic impact of 
the activities must be monitored. Participatory monitoring and evaluation is also a 
useful tool for evaluating how the activities are seen and valued locally (Chambers, 
1994:1445-1446).  
Subsidiarity principle 
Subsidiarity means to delegate control to the lowest appropriate level in the community. 
Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (2006: leaflet) notes that: 
“Freedom and responsibility are inseparable and only those who are free to decide 
and act can be held responsible for their actions. Individual responsibility is a 
fundamental requirement in a liberal society and as far as possible decisions 
should be taken by the citizens themselves as they have to bear the consequences“.  
Based on the idea of subsidiarity, the CBOs themselves must drive the development 
process especially for those goods and services that are best handled at the community 
level. This means that for some types of goods or services, local governments should 
focus on resource allocation across communities, and the CBOs should then be 
entrusted with resources and making the key service provision decisions, seeking 
support from local government and other service providers as they require (Malombe, 
2000:29). 
Tasks and roles about the provision of social services can also be delegated 
horizontally among local actors. For example, in Germany the subsidiarity means not 
only to delegate tasks and decision-making power vertically from federal government to 
the local government Gemeinde, but also from local government to the community 
groups and private sector, where appropriate, to increase the accountability, 
effectiveness and efficiency in the provision of social services.     
Flexible development planning and decentralized decision-making mechanisms 
situated as close to the community as possible, would facilitate quick response to 
change and increase more direct capacity building and integration of local governments 
in the project cycle, as the accumulated experiences from many developing countries 
show. As part of this learning process, direct feedback from the community on the 
performance of development activities is essential.  
2.4 Building social capital on meso level 
Building social capital on meso level is a further attempt to create an enabling 
environment for the CDD. Interaction and cooperation across local people and 
institutions in a participatory “learning process” will build more trust and in this manner 
producing bridging social capital for CDD. CDD will be achieved through a series of 
trials and errors which involve interaction of local people and institutions and gathering 
as much information as possible. The learning process approach aims to orient the local 
institutions to a problem-solving approach, recognizing that often more can be learned 
from failings than from apparent successes. “Learning by doing” is an appropriate 
strategy to the capacity development of local institutions (Uphoff 1986:200).   
The CDD itself is the most demanding learning process which is achieved by 
consensus-building and collective action among different individuals, groups, 
institutions and networks at local level. The effective transformation of the cognitive 
social capital into the structural social capital is a vital precondition to produce bridging 
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social capital necessary to set up effective system of behaviour and appropriate 
institutional arrangements to CDD. 
Towards participatory local governance 
Usually “government” refers to state structures and institutions while “governance” is a 
broader concept and goes beyond political institutions, which is broadly defined by the 
UNDP (1997) as:  
“comprising the complex array of mechanisms, processes, relationships and 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
rights and obligations and mediate differences” (UNDP, 1997: ix) 
Furthermore, UNDP cited in Lutz and Linder (2004) defines local governance as 
follows: 
“Local governance comprises of a set of institutions, mechanisms and processes, 
through which citizens and their groups can articulate their interests and needs, 
mediate their differences and exercise their rights and obligations at the local 
level. It requires partnership between local governmental institutions, civil society 
organizations and private sector for participatory, transparent, accountable and 
equitable service delivery and local development” (UNDP in Lutz and Linder, 
2004:16).  
In search for a non-western approach for local governance, Lutz and Linder (2004) 
propose that:   
“Development can build on existing structures and different countries can find 
their own model of development and social and political engineering at the local 
level” (Lutz and Linder, 2004:29). 
The shift in policy-making for a sustainable local development is characterised by a new 
process of governing, from government to governance.  Here the term governance is 
used with reference to the development of governing styles in which boundaries 
between and within the public, private and voluntary sectors have become unclear. The 
participatory governance structure is more likely to be self-selecting than designed 
through authoritative relationships. However, from this perspective, it becomes logical 
to better empower local communities to oppose the dominant vertical and instrumental 
power structure.  This involves the strengthening of horizontal power structure on local 
level by activating civil society, elected representatives, and through the local 
embedding of private businesses. In this way, horizontal political power can be 
organised to supplement and oppose the sector dominated and vertical power structure. 
The aim is to reach sustainable local development by promoting local institutions that 
take more responsibility for development of their own community (Bonfiglioli, 
2003:41-54).  
In this perspective local government is not a fixed structure. It must be more flexible 
to enter in a process of partnership, network and coalition with other local institutions. 
Thus, the new local political institutions need a political process to make them 
legitimate political actors. Historically the term “region” (sub-district in the Kurdish 
region in Iraq) as a political actor has been used in two connections. In the “top-down” 
tradition, regions are a part of the nation-building process and a tool to decentralise 
power and responsibility to territories within the nation. In the “bottom-up” tradition, 
regions are arenas of social mobilisation which is taking an institution-building process. 
Elements or phases in the later are: the localisation of organised social practices; the 
formation of identity; the emergence of institution
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administrative status as an established spatial structure (Perotti and Bortolotti, 2005:14-
18).    
A legitimate local political institution in the participatory local governance must be a 
fruitful combination of nation-building and local mobilisation, of “top-down” and 
“bottom up” politics, of government and governance, and of instrumental and 
communicative rationality. Only within a framework of local governance based on both 
top-down and bottom-up, the carrying capacities of the local community can be 
effectively enhanced. This means to create an effective institutional framework and 
enabling environment for sustainable local development, which during last decades has 
taken form of participatory planning and decision-making in many developing 
countries. Friedmann (1992) justifies the need for participatory local governance: 
“By differentiating territorial needs, as well as the special needs of different social 
groups, particularly the disempowered, it argues for a decentralized, participatory 
mode of decision-making in development” (Friedmann, 1992:35).  
Participatory local governance as a missing link for CDD 
There is an ambiguous definition about the “region” or “local” in the literature. 
According to the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (1993:18), region as 
frame of reference of regional rural development is “a cohesive spatial unit above the 
local and below the national level”. The shaded area in the following figure is defined as 
“local rural area” and administratively as “sub-district” in the Kurdish region in Iraq and 
can be compared to “locality level” in international context (Esman and Uphoff, 1985 
quoted in Kroës and Kokor, 2001:4) or “county”  in Norway (Amdam, 2004:3).  
 
 
1. Global level 
↕ 
2. National level – Iraq 
↕ 
3. Regional level – Kurdistan 
↕ 
4. Provincial level – Erbil, Sulaymaniyah 
↕ 
5. District level –Shaklawa, Chwarta 
↕ 
6. Sub-district level – Harir, Seweil 
↕ 
7. Community level 
↕ 
8. Group level 
↕ 
9. Household level 
↕ 
10. Individual level 
 
 
Source: Mahzouni, 2007 (Adapted from Uphoff, 1993) 
Figure  2.2: Local rural area in the Kurdish region-Iraq 
Anyway, the idea behind the regional or local approach is that the situation of the 
population in an area is influenced by common natural and socioeconomic 
characteristics that need tailor-made development policies.  
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Role of local government in a local governance structure  
Local government in a local governance framework will have actually a double role 
both as a “public service producer” and as a “territorial network builder“. On the one 
hand, the local government is to carry out planning and development work within the 
field of welfare state services for which the organisation has responsibility and is 
integrated into the national state welfare production. On the other hand, as a formal 
political institution it has to be a network builder to coordinate both vertical and 
horizontal interaction among local institutions. This means that the local government 
must be accepted and enjoy legitimacy from both above (policy level) and below 
(community level) with a well-defined role and function in relation to other formal 
levels of government (Amdam, 2004:6).   
Regardless of the mode of the CDD approach, which much depends on the local 
circumstances, local government can be critical to the success and sustainability of any 
CDD. Empowered local governments are often well positioned to facilitate coordination 
across communities and allocate resources. Local governments can interact with 
community groups in a participatory way to achieve economies of scale in producing 
and providing goods and services that could not be achieved by CBOs operating 
independently.  
Mechanisms must be established to foster organized community voice and 
participation in local government decision-making. More open and more accountable 
local government is likely to be more responsive to local needs and more involved in 
finding solutions to community problems which in turn generates greater trust on the 
part of civil society and thereby producing bridging social capital. More accountable 
governments also tend to encourage community-wide participatory initiatives such as 
the formation of groups and associations and thereby providing an enabling 
environment for structural social capital (Bærenholdt, 2002:48-49). 
Moreover, local governments are more likely to be responsive, accountable, and 
transparent in relationships with their constituents if there are mechanisms through 
which CBOs can express their priorities and concerns and monitor local government 
processes. These mechanisms include: centrally mandated or supported local elections 
including open list elections; municipal oversight councils with CBO representation; 
and participatory planning and transparent budgeting. But, the local capacities must be 
in place to establish a successful and sustainable partnership between CBOs and local 
government. In a local governance structure, the local governments have to cooperate 
and compete with other established actors and agencies in order to become political 
legitimate institutions. Thus, it becomes important for different public units to produce 
satisfactory services at a low price in order to legitimate themselves in a local 
governance structure (Amdam, 2003:9-11). 
Indeed, local governments are generally more responsive and accountable to CDD 
where complementary forms of decentralization (spatial administrative, political, 
market, and fiscal) on macro level as an enabling environment are created, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter.  
Local network institutions  
There is growing recognition in the literature that participatory and interdisciplinary 
institutional arrangement leads to increasing bridging social capital and thereby 
strengthening common action to alleviate poverty while ensuring sustainable use of 
natural resources. The main idea of local governance should be to work out a network of 
different channels and disciplines, which will enhance each other’s effectiveness in their 
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respective tasks. A great potential for CDD is attributed to locally-based institutions and 
their networks, which take advantage of what each channel can do best. There are three 
domains of governance that contribute to achieving sustainable development. This 
includes the public sector (political and governmental institutions), the voluntary sector 
(civil society organizations) and the private sector (Penalba, 2006:4). Furthermore, 
Friedmann (1992) emphasizes that:  
“A dense network of civic organizations strengthens community. It channels new 
information and resources to the community. It increases the community’s stock of 
knowledge and makes it more adept in using it. It augments its political voice and 
increases its capacity to quickly organize around issues when they become critical. 
Building civic organizations is an empowering social process”(Friedmann, 
1992:161). 
In a local network of institutions, each actor with its particular knowledge and 
experience can provide input into the network. Therefore, it is very crucial to develop a 
network of multi-disciplinary and complementary local institutions and roles that results 
in synergy effects for all parts and target the poor in rural communities (Goldman et.al. 
2006:2; Konteh, 2000:126-131). 
In an effective local governance, the capacity of local government must be in place 
and appropriate political and institutional reforms should be carried out to build network 
and partnership among local institutions in, so called, “communicative planning” as a 
legitimating process that need both trust and resources, and democratic control to 
guarantee openness and transparency. Communicative planning is defined as a social 
interactive process between different actors and interests to build consensus about the 
development course of their society (Amdam, 2004:11-15).   
The main objective to build local network institutions is to coordinate the 
development activities within a particular territorial unit, which can include many kinds 
of horizontal and vertical interrelationships among local actors from public, private and 
voluntary sectors that can make the network very complex. This requires an appropriate 
management and monitoring system to coordinate the activities and prevent any 
corrupted behaviour of the involved actors (Schmidt-Kallert, 2005:10; Amdam, 
2002:107).  
A network of local institutions is able to pool the internal and external knowledge 
and facilitate a learning process through exchange of ideas and draws on external 
resources. Since the members of grassroots institutions and networks know best about 
the local community needs, they can serve as the missing link between community 
people and the administrative and political system on higher levels and in this manner 
establishing a sustainable and trustful vertical interaction and producing bridging social 
capital to CDD. The local institutions have the potential to address the problems not 
sufficiently covered by the government officials, political system and international 
NGOs and to set new topics on the political agenda (Bærenholdt, 2002:36-42).  
Surely, depending on the purpose, local institutions are not equally necessary or 
useful for all tasks. Therefore, different kinds and combinations of local institutions 
consisted of public, private and voluntary sectors are needed that are likely to be most 
appropriate to provide local people with different kinds of services and inputs. 
Comparative advantages of local institutions should be assessed in order to determine 
clear roles and responsibilities of each institution to effectively and efficiently provide 
community people with a certain service and input. Uphoff (1986) sates that: 
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”The principle of comparative advantage proposes that all parties concentrate on 
doing what they can do best or avoid what they do worst in order to contribute to 
the greatest total benefit” (Uphoff, 1986:69).  
The strength of any institutional network is gaining comparative advantages. The 
objectives of CDD are best served by having a full range of institutional capacities from 
the group level up to the sub-district level which the Kurdish region in Iraq like many 
other developing countries and regions is highly lacking of. Local institutions based on 
horizontal interdependence, communication and cooperation among members or 
clientele in a single community should be better able to contribute to mutually strong 
and beneficial interdependence over time. At the same time, in a local governance 
structure, vertical assistance from higher level to local institutions enabling the later to 
function more effectively, and encourage producers to enter into more horizontal 
cooperation and thereby strengthening the capability of local institutions to effectively 
support CDD(Malombe, 2000:23). 
The principals for alternative institutional arrangements to CDD, however, will 
depend on the existing local capacity, and the amount and type of social capital on 
micro, meso and macro levels. There are growing evidences that the macro-level social 
capital is needed to create an enabling environment for participatory local governance 
and institutional capacity-building for CDD (UNDP, 1997: 21-40). 
Institutional capacity building  
The elements of organizational effectiveness include governance, management capacity, 
human resources, financial resources, service delivery, external relations, and 
sustainability. “Institutional capacity building” is defined as the provision of any 
assistance to strengthen one or more elements of organizational effectiveness. Like 
trees, the institutions need a long time horizon to grow and bear fruit. In the literature, 
earlier references to “institutional development” are more about enhancing a process 
where the institutions are capable to make effective use of the human and financial 
capitals available, which can be internally generated by the staff of an institution or 
induced and promoted by the government or NGOs (Israel, 1989:1, 11). But, Narayan 
and Ebbe (1997) link the institutional capacity development to common action and trust 
between people as part of social capital:  
“Local organizational capacity is the ability of people to work together, trust one 
another, and organize to solve problems, mobilize resources, resolve conflicts, and 
network with others to achieve agreed-upon goals” (Narayan and Ebbe, 1997:33).  
Based on synthesized results from a comprehensive and cross-sectoral study in many 
developing countries, Spector (2005) concludes that the weak human and organizational 
capacity of the institutions creates an enabling environment for corruption: 
 “Lack of competence and capacity including insufficient educated and skilled 
staff; lack of adequate equipment, research materials and data; and poor working 
conditions all combine to create the enabling environment for corruption” 
(Spector,2005:160)   
An organization’s effectiveness depends largely on the ability and willingness of its 
staff to carry out the tasks of the organizations, which the skills and values of staff play 
a key role in this process. In contrast to skills, values cannot be learned quickly because 
they change slowly over a long time span. Therefore, the appropriateness of any 
organizational or management strategy largely depends on how well it accord with the 
dominant cultural values. Culture and values affect the ways in which the individuals 
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perceive the need for change and how to respond to change and therefore the 
organizational structures and management process must be compatible with cultural and 
social factors. Otherwise, adequate resources must be in place to reorient people toward 
organizational behaviours and working methods demanded by the new management 
strategies. However, changing the management strategy of an organization requires 
changing the values and beliefs of its staff, and changing the management process and 
organizational structure which can be difficult and time-consuming (Rondinelli et al., 
1990:58-61).  
The main question is how to make an administrative system more accountable. The 
bureaucratic organizational model has an inflexible structure and strict rules that 
constrains the behavior of staff and prevents them from being productive. In an 
accountable, effective and efficient system of administration, the civil servants behave 
less like administrators and more like managers. Cohen and Peterson (1999) state that: 
“it is assumed that the principal task in improving the bureaucratic model is to 
improve accountability which is achieved by monitoring from above by progressive 
political elites and monitoring from below by clients that demand efficient and 
equitable services” (Cohen and Peterson,1999:5).   
In a post conflict society as the Kurdish community in Iraq any form of institutional 
development for community development must consider the existing social and political 
structures. The rural communities have to be integrated in the process of institution-
building in order to foster a sense of identification with the greater whole and a feeling 
of ownership.   
Regional rural planning  
A “small region” as a coherent spatial unit is much stronger than the villages that try to 
develop on their own because they all have some unique potentials and comparative 
advantages which can complement each other and in this manner gaining synergy 
effect. In many cases, local governments are needed to support operation and 
maintenance of services and for continuing funding of community groups (Schmidt-
Kallert, 2005:9; World Bank, 2001: website).  
The regional approach is based on the premise that the situation of a population in a 
given area is influenced by common ecological, socio-cultural and economic features. 
The spatial framework in regional rural development is the “region” as a coherent 
spatial unit located between the local and the national level and consisting of a network 
system of the local inhabitants. “Regional development planning” is defined as a 
communicative process involving all actors from different sectors who collectively 
identify the potentials and constraints of development in the region, and they together 
design appropriate goals and the strategies how to implement the development plans 
(Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 1999:4-6).  
One of the principles of regional rural development is to promote the complementary 
functions of cities and the rural areas. While cities play an important role for providing 
services to the rural areas, the rural hinterlands can provide the industries in the cities 
with different kinds of inputs and capitals such as natural capital and human resource. 
Nevertheless, the framework conditions for rural development have changed over the 
past ten years. Everywhere in the world, global networking is shaping the development 
opportunities of rural populations. While certain regions actively take advantages of 
these chances, the wealth in more backward regions is at risk of falling even further 
behind. Therefore, the concept of regional rural development is now more relevant to 
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strengthen the region and its governance functions. In fact, not all goods and services 
are best managed through collective action on the community level. Public goods that 
cover many communities or that require large, complex systems are often better 
provided by local government in an integrated regional rural development (Gesellschaft 
für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 1999:8-10).  
Regional planning is used to cover both “sectoral” and “spatial” planning. In sectoral 
regional planning, different organisations from the public, private and voluntary sectors 
can provide the region with specific services while they do not have overall 
responsibility for developing the region as a “society”. The planning and development 
work of the organisations is restricted to the service production areas that in the context 
of the Kurdish region in Iraq are the responsibility of the different levels of government 
and line agencies as welfare state service producers. This form of planning could be 
characterised as a sector-dominated and fragmented form of regional planning. But, in 
spatial regional planning, the planning and development work is carried out for the 
whole society in a spatial unit and is concerned with long-term development issues such 
as socioeconomic development, land use planning, transport, communications, and co-
operation among the sectors in the production of services. It is typical for this type of 
planning that in addition to governmental institutions the private and voluntary sectors 
are involved in the planning and implementation of the development activities in a local 
governance structure (Amdam, 2002:106-109).   
Spatial regional planning would thus appear to take place in network organisations 
and on a co-operative basis between organisations from the public, private and 
voluntary sectors, and from the various levels of government. But, sectoral regional 
planning, which in general is carried out within the domains of the public sector 
organisations to provide civilians with public services, has implications for spatial 
regional planning. Therefore the challenge of spatial regional planning is to get service 
providing organisations in a system of participatory governance (Amdam, 2004:9-18). 
The main purpose of regional rural planning is to obtain co-ordination between 
sectors and levels through a broad process of social learning and in a dynamic local 
governance arrangement, which in turn is supposed to stimulate the participation of 
people by creating both local horizontal and global vertical relationships. Many 
researchers, for example, consider the local community with a strong civil society and a 
strong democratic process as the key to dynamic local development (Friedmann, 
1992:133-135). 
To effectively implement regional rural development strategies, a new administrative 
culture and institutional framework is needed where the key elements are democratic 
participation of all relevant stakeholders and transparent decision-making processes. 
Regional development planning is a communicative process involving representatives 
of all local stakeholders, where new partnerships have to be formed between state, 
market and civil society.  
Integrated rural development versus CDD  
The rationale for integrated rural development during 1970s and 1980s was that poor 
communities in developing countries face a multitude of problems, and that poverty 
reduction efforts should attempt to address them at once by providing a package of 
services to the poor at a relatively low cost. It was confirmed that the problems of 
farmers in many developing countries were not due solely to undeveloped agricultural 
technology but influenced by many interrelated factors. The aim was to view rural 
people holistically in all their contexts and with all their needs where social equality and 
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economic and ecological sustainability were considered. Lessons learned from 
accumulated experiences show that the integrated rural development strategies 
implemented by different aid agencies failed mainly because of the reasons described 
below (Wienecke, 2005:21-22; Friedmann, 1992: 93-96; Cohen, 1987:9). 
First, they were often supply-driven planning exercises designed and implemented as 
blueprints with limited flexibility, which planning was often delegated to the regional or 
provincial level and the beneficiaries on community level were generally excluded from 
decision-making. A fixed blueprint approach implemented by a centralized authority 
may be suitable for large infrastructure projects like building large dams or ports but it 
is less suitable for projects spread over large areas with widely differing conditions on 
community level.  
Second, integrated rural development strategies are believed to have failed partly as a 
result of the inability of central government agencies and donors to respond to local 
priorities and to take advantage of local skills. Fund allocations were driven by donors 
and central government which failed to generate local participation and ownership in 
maintaining assets, but instead created dependency on these funding sources.  
Last but not least, the coordination of the required range of different sector practices 
necessary to achieve sustainable services in each sector was a logistical nightmare that 
led to failure.  
Experience has shown that coordination is hard to achieve at central levels and 
therefore it should be fixed on the community or local government level, where local 
actors are empowered and capable to take over the activities. The most appropriate 
institutional arrangement to CDD in any particular region will depend on the specific 
circumstances of that region or location. Favourable contexts of any institutional 
arrangement to support CDD must be carefully studied. For example, some types of 
public goods can only be provided effectively by government, either on the central level 
or by some agent of the central government on the local level. These are often services 
and goods that require large investments in capital equipment and that must be linked 
together in a system to operate effectively. For example, those with strong implications 
for public heath, safety or welfare that has high political sensitivity and if they were 
provided privately, the poor or a minority would be excluded. Anyway, mechanisms 
should be established to prevent “free riders”, which discourage citizens from 
contributing to the cost of goods that are communally shared and serving the 
community as a whole (Montgomery, 1988:44-46). 
Multi-sector versus single-sector planning 
Both multi-sector and single-sector approaches to CDD have advantages, serving 
different objectives in different circumstances. By offering greater choice, a multi-sector 
approach has the potential to respond better to the priority demands of each community 
and thus make services more appropriate, targeted, and sustainable. It can also offer the 
opportunity to share the cost of the outreach, social mobilization, and capacity-building 
support to communities. By sharing investment costs across several sectors, it becomes 
affordable to provide more intensive capacity-building support to CBOs over a 
significantly longer period. Multi-sector strategies encompass a broader range of issues 
and, therefore, the appropriate mechanisms for participatory planning and coordination 
across sectors must be in place.   
On the other hand, single-sector strategies offer greater opportunities to effectively 
respond to a specific service demanded by the community and ensuring more 
sustainable operation of services. For example, electricity distribution or water supply 
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tends to have greater revenue-earning potential than natural resource management or the 
provision of primary health and education on community level. This calls for different 
financial policies with respect to minimum amounts of community contributions and to 
credit financing. Similarly, the relevance and competitiveness of CBOs relative to other 
institutions will vary across sectors (World Bank, 2001: website).  
During recent years, many education projects as single-sector CDD by World Bank 
have been supported in various developing countries, where reform was achieved by 
transferring responsibility for school management to the community level and where 
new school financing was done as part of a single-sector investment program. The CDD 
may also be supported through multi-sector approaches, systematically applied to 
broader national policies and investments across sectors as in the case of the 
comprehensive decentralization in Bolivia in the mid-1990s which responsibilities and 
funds for a wide range of activities encompassing numerous sectors were transferred to 
local governments and ,where appropriate, to the CBOs (Dongier et al., 2002:317).  
It is clear that sectoral approaches are not sufficient to resolve the multi-faceted 
problems of the rural population in a holistic manner. Therefore, efforts should be made 
to ensure cohesion and consistency between investment policies and the ways the 
instruments work with local institutions. As a holistic approach to go far beyond 
conventional service delivery by sector agencies, “micro-regional planning” can be 
helpful to coordinate the common efforts and create  horizontal and vertical links among 
all stakeholders within a spatial unit (Schmidt-Kallert, 2005:7-12).  
However, the most appropriate strategy could be the integrated planning but sectoral 
implementation in an effective regional planning framework or what Amdam 
(2002:108) describes, “We need both sectoral government planning and territorial 
governance planning”. CDD requires different institutional arrangements for different 
sectors but the integrated and coordination policies among sectors for sustainable spatial 
development must be ensured. 
Good practice for sustainable rural development and CDD 
In 2001, the Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture in 
Germany started a pilot project entitled “Regionen Aktiv”. The project within the 
framework of national sustainable strategies should present new methods for rural 
development. The idea was to promote a more consumer-oriented agricultural 
production by increasing competition. One of the main reasons for announcing the 
competition was the need to rebuild consumer trust in the safety and quality of the food 
products through greater transparency and stronger consumer focus on how agricultural 
products are produced and processed. The project, which is still ongoing, is divided in 
three phases (Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture, 2002:5-
9) 
In the first phase of the competition, besides the consumer organizations, key 
regional interest groups from all sectors (e.g. agriculture and forestry, environment, 
craft, retail trade, health, education, local government, science, etc.) were asked to 
develop a joint vision for the future development of their own regions. The main criteria 
for selecting best regions were to present visions that describe: 
• How to strengthen the identity of the region and creating additional sources of 
income in the region;  
• How to promote nature-friendly and environmentally compatible agriculture 
production; and 
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• How to strengthen farmer-consumer relations and promote a more sustainable 
and consumer-oriented farming. 
Based on these criteria, in the second phase of the competition, 18 model regions were 
selected by an independent jury from a total of 206 submissions. The winning regions 
represented a vast diversity from both remote and relatively developed rural areas across 
Germany.     
In the third phase of the competition, the selected pilot regions were required to put 
their integrated development plans into practice and implement strategies through 
building network of local institutions and regional partnership. They had to ensure that 
all social groups are included in planning, implementation and assessment of the 
development process and in the use of available funding. The actors formed regional 
partnership as an integrated part of the competition and presented innovative ideas how 
to promote regional rural development and link rural-urban economies. One of the keys 
to success in implementation and participation process has been professional 
management on local level, where communication skills, organizational talent and the 
ability to mediate have been essential in each model region within the funding period 
(ibid).  
New control and funding approach  
New control mechanisms of the project planning and implementation were established. 
The agreement between the Federal Ministry and the model regions provides the 
framework for the overall project, where the regional development plans are binding for 
the allocation and use of funding. The Federal Government’s role is thus limited to 
setting the goals, decision-making structures and self-assessment mechanisms. But, the 
regions have been required to set up a support and self-assessment system in order to 
draw conclusions from their own successes and failures and make corrective actions in 
line with the objectives. In addition, a public body in the region assumes responsibility 
for financial management and budget administration. The funding policy was to 
gradually reduce the dependency of the regions on central funds and to encourage the 
regions to relay more on their own financial means. In initial stage in 2005, the project 
was up to 100 percent supported by the central funds, in the second stage in 2006 was 
reduced to 75 percent and in 2007 to 50 percent. The new funding policy was to use 
public resources more effectively and make the development project more community-
driven and sustainable over time. In addition, the main focus has been to conduct 
structural change of the existing administration and management culture in order to 
effectively respond to the local needs (Elbe, 2007:41; Federal Ministry of Consumer 
Protection, Food and Agriculture, 2002: 9).  
Lessons learned from the Regionen Aktiv 
The “Regionen Aktiv” is a new approach to self-determined regional development 
where competing goals of sustainable development are to be balanced and harmonized. 
The focus is on consumer protection, quality in agricultural production, enhanced 
regional added value, employment opportunities, and ecological protection. An 
integrated approach to regional rural development focuses on developing new sources 
of income both in agriculture and other sectors of rural economy like tourism, craft and 
commerce. The local people and actors are engines in the development process of a 
certain region and enhancing their participation would bring many benefits such as:  
• To develop new ideas, perspectives and know-how;  
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• To create synergies by bringing together the interests of consumers, producers, 
retailers in accordance with environmental protection; and  
• To better exploit the local resources.  
Existing network of rural actors from all public, private and voluntary sectors must be 
reinforced to provide the basis for successful development in the region. The process 
has been supported by effective project management, intensive public relations work 
and participation of local people. Regional marketing structures and closer producer-
consumer relations as part of social capital also play a key role. The 18 model regions 
present a new approach where cooperation among regional economy, environmental 
protection, and education creates new sources of income and new opportunities for 
development. They provide also best practice models for recreating regional identities, 
sustainable rural development and thus strengthen the region in a rural-urban 
connection.  
Indeed, many developing counties and regions can draw lessons from the “Regionen 
Aktiv” concept. But this concept should be carefully examined and modified as the 
communication infrastructure, the individual and organizational capacities, and the 
leadership quality in many developing countries, especially in the rural areas, are highly 
missing.  For example, in the context of the Kurdish region in Iraq this concept as a 
CDD pilot project can be successfully implemented only if there is an enabling 
environment in form of effective policies and regulatory framework for sustainable 
local development. In addition, the capacities of local people and institutions to 
independently design and implement the appropriate development strategies of their 
own communities and regions must be in place.    
Critical reflections on participatory local governance   
To sum up, one of the central issues in establishing participatory local governance is to 
empower local governments with authority and resources and building their capacity to 
be more responsive and accountable to the concerns and needs of all local people. Local 
governance is also about strengthening grassroots democracy and empowering citizens 
and their organizations such as CBOs and NGOs to participate as equal partners in local 
governance and local development process.   
The concept of participatory governance has recently gained widespread currency 
across many of the social sciences but warns that the growing obsession with 
participatory governance mechanisms, as a solution to market failure or state failure, 
should not lead to a neglect of participatory governance failure. One should avoid 
seeing participatory governance as being a necessarily more efficient solution to the 
problems of economic or political co-ordination than markets or states. There is no 
linear drift from centralized system of governance to participatory local governance. 
Governance still operates in the shadow of centralized system and governance processes 
and institutions tend to lack democracy and transparency even in most developed 
countries (Amdam, 2004:7-10).  
In addition, participatory local governance requires democracy and individuals rights 
that are hard to achieve in many developing countries and can takes years or even 
decades to establish. Linder (2004) gives two arguments for this: 
“The first is: there is strong empirical evidence that democracy and individual 
rights require some advanced level of socio-economic development, such as basic 
education, or some economic, social and administrative capacity to become 
effective. Traditional segments of societies in developing countries may often still 
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lack these criteria. The second is: our definition of democracy corresponds to 
western philosophies of enlightenment which see the individual and his 
fundamental rights as the highest value. This may not correspond to other cultures, 
valuing duties for the community equally or even higher than the individual's 
personal rights. These community-based values must be respected, the more as 
they are functional for these societies' socio-cultural and economic structures” 
(Linder, 2004:30).  
But, a sustainable CDD can not happen in isolation. It requires that the community-
based values and action of plans are integrated in regional, national and global 
development policies.  
2.5 Building social capital on macro level 
Creating an enabling environment for participatory local governance and Community-
Driven Development (CDD) requires long-term investment in different types of social 
capital. On macro-level social capital includes most formalized institutional 
relationships and governance structure such as political regime, the rule of law, the 
court system, and civil and political liberties. Social capital building on macro level 
often demands fundamental change in cultural, organizational, political and economic 
elements in a society.  
Large programs of support to CDD will not be sustainable without the policies, laws, 
systems and governance processes that encourage effective collaboration among local 
governments, central government, civil society, service providers, and CBOs. The CDD 
involves more than strengthening CBOs and funding their projects. It also requires 
active measures to establish an enabling environment for participatory local governance. 
As mentioned on meso level such an environment should include a responsive elected 
local government which is responsive to the constituents and is empowered to serve 
them. Other necessary actions undertaken on macro level are discussed here to create an 
enabling environment for local governance and CDD.   
In this section the local planning and CDD is discussed in the context of “political 
will” seeing it as a legitimate process, focusing on the interaction between the higher 
levels of decision-making and the local people and institutions. An effective framework 
of regional rural planning implies that the local planning and development work is done 
in a collaborative process between the international, national, regional and local levels, 
and between the public, private and voluntary sectors based on participatory governance 
where the local government is not the only actor. In addition, success of CDD depends 
highly on an enabling political and institutional environment where the government is 
committed to transparent, accountable and democratic governance and the line 
ministries are responsive to the needs of community people (Mansuri and Rao, 
2004:31).  
 However, supporting local governance and CDD a long array of cultural, political, 
institutional and organizational changes, which are highly interrelated in any society 
must be carried out. They are discussed thoroughly in the following sub-sections.  
The incremental change in culture, society and institutions  
Local culture influences the institutional structure and management capacities in any 
society.  Cohen and Peterson (1999) highlight that: 
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 “in those late developing countries where the administrative culture is not 
supportive of the legal-rational structure of bureaucracy, it is also not supportive 
of an alternative method of organization that would promote accountable, efficient, 
and effective use of resources ” (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:57). 
Here some cultural and socio-economic issues that influence management and 
organizational culture in many developing countries are discussed.   
Bridging the structural gap between tradition and modernity   
In the industrial societies, the family and clan system have already begun to lose their 
significant role and function. The institution of family has been reduced into single 
households and the state has become a substitute for the family system because the 
market-based economy in these societies requires commonly agreed law on national 
level. The welfare state has been established to take over those responsibilities 
previously within the domain of the family system such as taking care of the elderly, 
disabled and unemployed citizens. Therefore, the state must ensure that it receives 
adequate fiscal revenues from industrial market production. The individuals in the 
industrial societies have to adopt different roles such as producers, consumers, citizens 
and family members in the context of a modern economy and social system. Their roles 
in the modern economy system are built on professionalism and in such a situation the 
manager of an enterprise is obligated to fire the unqualified employees no matter if they 
are close relative of her or him (Lutz and Linder, 2004:8-9). 
On the other hand, most developing countries are usually divided into traditional and 
modern segments, above all, due to means of production. In these societies, the market 
economy is relatively weak and the proportion of industrial manpower small, then the 
state lack sufficient fiscal revenues to carry out its “modern” functions. As a result, it 
may be able to deliver services only for elite groups in urban areas and the mass 
population especially in the rural areas must rely on their family and tribal bonds as they 
are excluded from employment within the modern economy and have no or inadequate 
access to basic social services. Moreover, the less people are integrated into a modern 
market economy, the deeper the division is between rich and poor people, between 
urban and rural areas, and between educated and less educated civilians (ibid: 9-10). 
Institutionalizing co-operation among local actors may diminish these gaps between 
tradition and modernity. It can ensure that political, social, environmental and economic 
priorities are based on broad consensus in the society and the voice of the most 
vulnerable groups is heard in decision-making over the allocation of available resources. 
This is a precondition for good local governance necessary to achieve CDD.  
Informal constraints versus formal rules  
Understanding informal constraints as part of cultural heritage is important for study of 
human and institutional interaction. Informal constrains in a society such as the socially 
sanctioned norms of behaviour through specific sanctioning capacities or information 
networks may make the internally “enforced standards of conduct” effective (North, 
1990:40-48).  
 On the other hand, formal rules include a hierarchy of rules such as political, judicial 
and economic rules ranging from constitutions and common laws to specific bylaws and 
individual contracts in order to facilitate the political and economic exchange. While the 
political rules define the hierarchical structure of the state, the economic rules define the 
property rights and the ability to alienate an asset or a resource. The remarkable decline 
in interest rate in some European capital market during last centuries was a result of the 
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increasing security of property rights, which in turn was a consequence of the effective 
interaction among a variety of both formal and informal institutional constraints. In this 
case, the formal law was included into the self-imposed codes of behaviour from the 
merchants. Increasing specialization and division of labour in Western world have been 
the main reason for moving from unwritten traditions and customs to written laws, 
which have made the societies more complex. But at the same time, the technology 
advancement led to lower information, monitoring, enforcement and transaction costs 
and in this manner formal rules could easily complement and increase the effectiveness 
of informal constraints (ibid) 
It is evident that cultural features have persistent survival ability because they change 
incrementally over time. Therefore, it is naïve to believe that informal constraints that 
are culturally derived will change immediately in reaction to changes in the formal 
rules. Institutional change is tremendously incremental where the institutional context 
makes possible new bargains and compromises between the players. In fact, the political 
institutions can provide a favourable framework for evolutionary change where actors to 
an exchange can easily settle disputes (North, 1990:89-90).  
An example of the need for incremental change in institutions is in the post-Saddam 
Iraq, where a foreigner power has tried to rapidly change the formal rules not in line 
with the informal constraints. As a result, there has been an ongoing tension between 
informal constrains and the new formal rules, which has caused sectarian violence and 
disobedience of civilians against the new order as we are witnessing on the daily basis. 
Simply, the religious and cultural norms of Iraqi people are not compatible with 
democratic traditions and values imposed by a Western power. By a regime change in 
Iraq, the deep-seated cultural inheritance that underlies many informal constraints was 
ignored. Now, the informal constrains and norms have to gradually come in a new 
equilibrium with the formal rules. But this depends also on how much the new formal 
rules largely imposed by a foreigner democracy can resist the traditional norms and 
informal constraints in the Iraqi society. For example, despite fundamental change in the 
formal rules after the creation of a new Iraqi constitution, many informal constraints 
have resisted to alter because they still resolve basic social, economic, and political 
exchange problems among the civilians. In an optimistic scenario, an incremental 
change and restructuring of both formal and informal constraints can produce a new 
equilibrium and thereby bringing security, stability and democracy to Iraqi people.  
Good governance  
Broadly defined “governance” is about how power is exercised and how important 
decisions in a society are made where not only the state institutions but also other actors 
from private sector and civil society are participating in the local development process. 
Good governance implies effective political institutions and the responsible use of 
political power and public resources by the state. It is about the interaction between 
democracy, social power and management of welfare and the rule of law. Democracy 
requires a rule of law framework in order to govern the interaction and co-existence of 
all citizens (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2007a: website). 
Good governance thus extends beyond the public sector to include all other actors 
from the private sector and voluntary sector (civil society) as Friedmann (1992) states 
that:  
“Most important, an alternative development involves a process of social and 
political empowerment whose long-term objective is to rebalance the structure of 
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power in society by making state action more accountable, strengthening the 
powers of civil society in the management of its own affairs, and making corporate 
business more socially responsible” (Friedmann, 1992:31).  
A good system of governance is characterized by the presence of local institutions that 
promote inclusion, efficiency and participation as well as decision-making systems and 
processes that uphold accountability and transparency. Government institutions should 
be efficient and effective in carrying out their functions responsive to the needs of 
people; facilitate and enabling rather than controlling and commanding; and operate 
according to the rule of law (Penalba, 2006:5).   
In the United Nations' Millennium Declaration, the international community reached 
a consensus that good governance is not only an aim in itself but also a key factor in 
attaining human development and in successful poverty reduction and peace-building. 
As part of good governance, enhancing democracy and rule of law are essential to use 
the public resources effectively and efficiently. Achieving good governance needs 
government and administrative reforms; decentralisation and regionalisation of state 
power; and promoting civil-society actors (UNDP, 1997:3).  
Furthermore, good governance is the most important vehicle to promote a sustainable 
socioeconomic development within the scarce resources that are available to 
government in any country or region. As part of good governance, effective economic 
and financial management in the public sector stimulates the promotion of efficient 
institutions that are responsive to the public interest ensuring social and economic 
equity. Conversely, corruption as a result of lacking transparency and accountability of 
government performance, especially in public financial management, can cause a fast 
decline of governance (Spector, 2005:79). 
The principles of good governance  
According to Lutz and Linder (2004:17), any local governance must fulfil at least four 
criteria before calling it “good”: 
• People who are governed must accept the decisions of the authorities as legitimate. 
• There must be social inclusion and empowerment, equal voice, and participation 
regardless of gender, youth, social class, ethnicity or religion. About the importance 
of social inclusion and participation for successful local governance,  Linder (2004) 
states that: 
”Effectiveness for participation in modern governance can be expected if the 
principle of inclusion is respected. No group and no segment of society should be 
discriminated, or excluded from the right to organise in groups and to participate 
in collective bargaining and decision making“(Linder, 2004:31).  
• Basic human rights need to be respected, as well as the rule of law and the division 
of power.  
• Local governance must be responsive and transparent. The leaders are to be 
accountable, which means that it should be possible to penalize corrupted behaviour 
and action. 
The social inclusion and participation as dimensions of social capital necessary to 
achieve local governance and CDD were discussed earlier in this chapter. Here, the 
accountability and transparency of the institutions to civilians are discussed.   
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Accountability   
The specificity of the tasks within an organization affects the degree of accountability. 
The more specific task, the more specific the role, and the easier it is to evaluate the 
performance. As the specificity of a given task decreases, the need for accountability 
will increase. When the task is highly specified and the accountability high, it is 
inefficient to have a variety of actors competing for the provision of public services. 
Indeed, most important tasks performed by public sector institutions in rural areas of 
many developing countries such as  the provision of basic health care and education 
facilities are not specific, which require high level of accountability to ensure adequate 
delivery of these services (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:93, 97).  
Transparency of rules, regulations and processes 
Enhancing transparency in administrative procedures and decision-making processes 
within an entity is essential to reduce opportunities for abuse of power and manipulation 
of rules and regulations for private interests. Citizen watchdog groups consisting of 
professionals have proved to be very effective in dealing with this kind of corruption by 
monitoring decisions made by government and keeping officials accountable for their 
actions (Spector, 2005: 112-114). 
The dramatic improvement in the administrative capacity is now possible by new 
management techniques and the application of information technology, where civil 
servants can do their tasks more efficiently. Since the 1980s, there has been a growing 
recognition that information technology-based reforms can dramatically increase the 
capacity of public sector bureaucracies to perform the tasks efficiently and effectively. 
In addition, information technology can allow to reduce those middle-level managers 
whose tasks is to broker information from lower levels to higher level and in this 
manner to reduce hierarchy and to better mange information flows (Cohen and Peterson, 
1999: 59-60).  
For instance, computerization of court files can significantly reduce the labour-
intensive workload of court personnel, especially those who are still handwriting their 
work of compiling case files and in this manner enhancing the quality of judicial 
administration. Furthermore, computerization of the administrative works  prevent 
documents or case files from being “lost” or “found” for a fee. In the case of Supreme 
Administrative Court of Bulgaria, the computerization of court files and providing a 
website for detailed information about each case have increased the transparency of 
court proceedings and the opportunity to observe the consistency and application of 
temporal standards of each case (Mahzouni, 2007:10; Spector, 2005: 24).  
The tasks can be efficiently carried out using a mix of personnel, information 
technology and appropriate management strategy and organization structure where by 
institutionalizing the roles the corruption is far more difficult to sustain.  
It is obvious that information technology can increase the transparency of 
administrative tasks within the public sector and thereby reduce corruption. But, 
investment in information technology needs to be grounded in broader institutional 
reforms. For example, the introduction of an education management information system 
in Gambia helped to reduce the role of favouritism in teacher assignments. The new 
system has made the information transparent and available necessary to constrain the 
assignment of teachers on the basis of such factors as tribal and family connections, 
personal friendships, or other forms of illegal personal influence (Department of State 
for Education of Gambia, 2001 quoted in Spector, 2005:74).  
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To summarize, as one of the principles of good governance, government should 
regularly publish accurate and complete information on the distribution of public 
revenues and expenditures. The application of computer technologies to coordinate 
operations of government e.g., taxation operations, budgeting and making the public 
budgets accessible and transparent to the public, have shown to be useful. Furthermore, 
the use of information technology in governmental functions e.g. court records and 
drugs procurement has been demonstrated to be an effective tool in limiting and 
preventing corruption (Spector, 2005:174).   
The link between poor governance, corruption and poverty  
Today “good governance” has got into the top of the development agenda in many 
developing countries and increasing attention is paid to the relationship between 
governance, corruption and poverty. It is now recognized that corruption is a critical 
indicator of poor governance and state failure to be accountable and responsive to the 
needs of grassroots people. Corruption is contributing factor to poverty and 
consequently to conflict and global insecurity. In other words, corruption in a society 
undermines governance, economic growth, and consequently the stability of that 
society. USAID (1999) gives a broad definition of corruption: 
“corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain. It encompasses unilateral 
abuses by government officials such as embezzlement and nepotism, as well as 
abuses linking public and private actors such as bribery, extortion, influence 
peddling, and fraud. Corruption arises in both political and bureaucratic offices 
and can be petty or grand, organized or unorganized” (USAID, 1999:5).   
Focus of this study is more on corruption within the political sphere and public sector 
institutions as the private sector is still very weak in the Kurdish region in Iraq. It is now 
evident that the poverty in developing countries, to a large extent, is caused by 
widespread corruption in the society. Based on the synthesized results from a 
comprehensive and cross-sectoral study in many developing countries, Spector (2005) 
highlights the causes of corruption and its negative effects on the poor: 
“Corruption flourishes when the public is poorly informed, apathetic, cynical, 
tolerant, or so politically weak as to be unable to protest. The most vulnerable 
individuals in society are the poor, and they often encounter petty corruption on a 
daily or regular basis: for example poor patients who must pay fees for “free” 
government health services. The poor also bear the heaviest burden from the 
larger economic and societal impacts of corruption: the slowing of development, 
the dissipation and wastage of public resources, the erosion of formal sector 
employment, the decline in investment, and the loss of government legitimacy 
through poor governance” (Spector, 2005:158).    
The corruption is not only a result of poor governance but also a direct consequence of 
an uninformed and uneducated civilian population and weak civil society. 
Institutional and organizational change for good governance  
Institutional and organizational development has always been important for the long 
term functioning of a society. It is sometimes difficult to make a distinction between 
institutions and organizations as they are highly interrelated. Similar to institutions, 
organizations provide a structure to human interaction. Indeed the actions and results 
that arise as a consequence of the institutional framework, in many cases, are the result 
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not only of that framework, but also of the organizations that have been developed in 
consequence of that framework. Conceptually, the rules (institutions) from the players 
(organizations) must be clearly distinguished.  For example, in the ministry of education 
in a country the purpose of the rules is to define the way how to provide the education 
services but the objective of the different departments within that set of rules is to 
supply services effectively and efficiently by a combination of skills, strategy and 
coordination. Institutions may be created, as was the case of new Iraqi constitution in 
2005 or they may simply evolve over time, as did the Iraqi common law combined of 
English common law and Islamic and traditional rules. Changing the later is much more 
difficult. 
Simply defined, an “organization” is a group of individuals who work together to 
achieve common goals. The existence and evolution of organizations over time is 
largely determined by the institutional framework and governance structure within a 
given society. In turn, the organizations have an impact on the gradual evolution of the 
institutional framework and in the course of attempts to achieve their objectives can 
play a vital role as agent of institutional change. Therefore, it is important to study the 
interaction between institutions (underlying rules) and organizations (the strategy of 
different players) within the institutional framework in a certain country or region 
(North, 1990:4-5).  
The establishment of appropriate institutional framework is critical for the legitimacy 
of government and the support of participatory local governance for CDD. Spector 
(2005) states that: 
“Institutional weakness however surfaces again and again as a fundamental 
contributor to embedded corruption and a resulting low level of legitimacy for the 
government. Without strong government legitimacy, all development aspirations 
are hindered, and the resources allocated to development assistance are of 
questionable efficacy” ( Spector, 2005:160)   
Institutional change involves a long process of (1) creating awareness or perception 
among civilians that changes are needed ;( 2) promoting widespread acceptance and 
legitimization of change; and (3) adapting and institutionalizing changes. Promoting 
change is especially difficult in the developing countries with unstable political, 
economic and social circumstances. Most developing countries are lacking strong 
institutions and organizations to institutionalize and carry out changes. Especially, the 
experienced and skilled professionals to efficiently perform the tasks are often missing 
(Rondinelli et al., 1990:10).  
To summarize, the key role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by 
establishing a stable structure for human and organizational coordination and 
cooperation. Organizations in the course of pursuing their objectives incrementally alter 
the institutional structure. They are entities designed to maximize wealth, income, or 
other objectives defined by the society. In this process, the kind of knowledge and skills 
that are acquired by the organizations to further their objectives will in turn play a major 
role on the change of institutional framework and the society as a whole.  
The impact of knowledge and skills on institutional change  
A successful achievement in institutional and organizational changes demands 
continuous development of knowledge and skills of civilians. Through history 
knowledge and skills, as main competitive advantages among organizations and 
societies, have played a vital role. The institutional context is very essential not only for 
organizational development of entities but also for the development of appropriate 
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knowledge and skills demanded from that context. North (1990) highlights the 
importance of institutional context for acquiring appropriate knowledge and skills in a 
society or organization: 
“The kinds of information and knowledge required by the entrepreneur are in good 
part a consequence of a particular institutional context. That context will not only 
shape the internal organization and determine the extent of vertical integration and 
governance structure, but also determine the pliable margins that offer the greatest 
promise in maximizing the organization’s objectives” (North, 1990:77). 
Indeed, there is a need to examine the institutional context to know what kinds of 
knowledge and skills are demanded. The incentives embodied in the institutional 
framework play the decisive role in shaping the kinds of skills and knowledge needed 
for long-run development of a society. Within the institutional framework the economic 
organizations invest in the kinds of skills and knowledge that will pay off. Such 
investment in skills and knowledge, to a great extent, will shape the long-term 
development of institutions and organizations and the whole society in which they are 
operating (ibid: 81).   
In this process, a society that permits the maximum generation of trials and errors 
will be most likely to solve problems over time. Evidently, political competition and 
institutional pluralism that promote decentralized decision-making are crucial to 
effective institutions and organizations in a society.   
Political competition  
Increased political competition is essential to good governance. The creation of 
legislation is needed to define the scope of activities and authority of political parties 
and facilitate the development of a competitive and democratic regime where there is no 
space for monopoly party authority. Political party laws covering party registration, 
finance, and general operation are crucial in framing the context in which political 
parties can operate. This, in turn, could provide legitimacy to party activities that go 
beyond the election campaigning to create a solid institutional base for party 
competition that can reduce opportunities for corruption. Creation of financial 
legislation is another step toward a more competitive environment for political parties, 
which can lead to a fair distribution of political funds and increase equality in political 
competition. A high degree of transparency in political finance reduces the opportunity 
for parties to build secret campaigns (Spector, 2005: 37-38). 
A classic explanation for relative success of Western world in institutional 
development and sustainable development contrary to Asian and Middle East is 
providing competition not only among private organizations but also among political 
units. In other words, a significant factor to the economic growth in Western world was 
the reinforcing role among political and economic organizations. An institutional 
framework was evolved to achieve synergy affects in the society where the economic 
organizations induced incremental change and the political organizations provided an 
enabling environment for economic organizations to flourish (North, 1990:130, 137).  
Political parties play a key role in linkages between the state and the society as the 
activities of political parties relate both to the political world and to society. Therefore, 
lacking fair competition among political parties in a society, one-party political system 
can create an enabling environment for corruption and thereby spreading corruption to 
both spheres of society and state. In some developing counties with insecure political 
and economic institutions, the patronage and clientele structures can be used as means 
for political parties to maintain themselves in power. For local poor, the patronage 
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networks are sometimes the only way to access basic services. In fast growing 
economies in East Asia like China, political party control over society is weakening due 
to economic liberalization. In these counties, the private sector is gradually taking over 
most of state’s business activities but there is no effective monitoring system to ensure 
the transparency in the relationship between economic and political organizations 
(Spector, 2005: 35-36). 
Multiparty systems with active party competition can generally be considered less 
exposed to corruption. Party competition provides voters with an alternative when they 
do not approve of the ruling party’s politics.  It is evident that most industrialized liberal 
democracies are characterized of a relatively high party competition; a clear separation 
of power (legislative, executive and judiciary); efficient monitoring system; and a 
vibrant civil society. As a result, corrupt actors in these countries face a higher risk of 
exposure and being driven out of power, which increase transparency and 
accountability. Linder (2004:31) highlights the “political pluralism” as a main criterion 
of modern local governance where “No single group should have the power to dominate 
the others”.   
To summarize, the structure of political parties is critical for improving democracy in 
developing countries. It is obvious that the risk of corruption is higher in political 
systems where the institutional structure to enforce government accountability is weak 
and where there is lack of mechanisms to limit the corrupt behaviour of government 
officials. In order to eliminate corruption in political parties, the reforms have to address 
both the governing regime with which parties interact and internal party governance. 
Parties can lead the transition to greater democracy but when there is no competition 
and monitoring system to put any corrupt behaviour and action on high risk, democratic 
reforms and the efforts to achieve sustainable socioeconomic development are likely to 
fail.  
Institutional pluralism 
Cohen and Peterson (1999) relate institutional pluralism more to accountability, where 
besides the government other actors from voluntary and private sectors are involved to 
increase the accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of social 
services: 
 “Institutional Pluralism strategies that allow non-central and private sector 
institutions and firms to carry out task-related roles more accountably, effectively, 
and efficiently than governmental institutions holding monopolies over public 
sector tasks ” (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:53).  
The institutional pluralism implies a network of different organizations from public 
sector (central, non-central), private sector and voluntary sector that share roles and 
tasks relative to the production and provision of public goods and services, where the 
public sector institutions play as “brokers”. By increasing the number and diversity of 
institutions involved in providing services, accountability is increased, risk is reduced, 
and service delivery is more efficiently managed and tailored to local needs. In this 
manner, it breaks the monopoly of the delivery of public goods and services; creates a 
market for the management and provision of public goods and services; and promotes 
accountability where the government is only one actor among many (ibid: 86).  
It is now evident that monopoly, either within the public or private sector, delivers 
services at high costs, less efficiently, and less accountable. In administrative strategy of 
institutional pluralism, the tasks and roles are not monopolized but are shared between 
central and non-central public and private levels. This can promote administrative 
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accountability through competition, which in turn can promote democratic process and 
civic participation. In institutional pluralism, the role of state is redefined from a 
“producer” to a “provider” of public goods and services. It will increasingly be 
concerned more with the marketing, negotiation, management, and funding of contracts 
with private firms and NGOs than with the direct production of goods and services. 
Anyhow, in an institutional pluralism, the state is still needed to ensure coordination 
between the broad array of institutions and for stabilization and distribution policies 
(Cohen and Peterson, 1999:61)7. 
Appropriate management strategies to good governance   
Rondinelli et al. (1990) define a management strategy as: 
“a particular pattern of management processes and organizational structures that 
enables an organization to accomplish specific tasks in a given environment” 
(Rondinelli et al., 1990:33). 
The standard operating procedures and blueprint designs are only efficient for providing 
routine and repetitive services. They are ineffective and inflexible for people-centred 
services and activities e.g. education and health care that are constantly changing and 
need to be tailored to the needs of different groups in different areas. The quality 
perception of these services depends heavily on the values, attitudes, and behaviour of 
intended beneficiaries which is largely different from region to region, from group to 
group, and even among individuals. Therefore, a contingency analysis is needed where 
the level of innovation in performing the tasks and the degree of uncertainty in the 
environment in which they are carried out are main determinates to apply an appropriate 
management strategy. It is clear that each country’s socioeconomic environment is 
different and that adjustments in tasks, organizational structure, and management 
processes evolve incrementally from learning and experimentation. Innovative tasks that 
are carried out in fast changing environments have to be managed differently than 
routine tasks in stable environments (ibid: 1-8).  
Depending on the tasks and the degree of uncertainty in the environment in which 
the organization is operating Rondinelli et.al (1990:73-84) defines some management 
strategies among which the two most contrasting are discussed here: the mechanistic 
management strategy and the adaptive management strategy.  
The mechanistic management strategy is relevant for tasks and activities that have 
relatively low levels of innovation and that are implemented in relatively stable 
environments. This classic bureaucratic management strategy is typically characterized 
by: 
– Blueprint planning procedures and centralized decision-making; 
– Hierarchic leadership and administrative structure;  
– Top-down and one-way communication structure;  
– Commando-based coordination;  
– Standard and rigid operating procedures; and 
– Rule-based jobs where staff are motivated through a combination of monetary 
rewards and threats of punishment.  
Organizations using mechanistic management strategy attempt to control staff 
performance by rigid procedures. This strategy has been justified in most developing 
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countries especially for budgeting and expenditure functions as the only way to prevent 
corruption and inefficient use of public resources.   
Conversely, the adaptive management strategy is usually more suitable for tasks and 
activities with high levels of innovation that are implemented in relatively uncertain 
environments. The adaptive management strategy is usually characterized by: 
– Participative decision-making and planning, where there is a constant adjustment of 
strategies and tactics to the new circumstances in the environment;  
– Regular monitoring and evaluation to learn from experience;  
– Decentralized structure and participatory leadership;  
– Collegial leadership style based on trust between supervisors and subordinates;  
– Open and interactive communication where coordination is achieved through 
negotiation and facilitation; and  
– Objective-based jobs where supervisors give the subordinates more responsibility 
and control over their own activities and where staff is motivated by achievement 
awards, participation, continuous competence development, and monetary 
compensation.  
In this strategy, the objectives and performance criteria is more emphasized rather than 
function, where employees are expected to take initiative, solve problems, find 
appropriate ways to meet objectives, and are more allowed to self-control. In this case 
the employees must be able to work independently and flexibly without strong central 
controls. 
It is obvious that one management strategy is not necessarily better than another. 
Today, most organizations, wherever, have to perform both routine and innovative 
tasks. Therefore, depending on the tasks each organisation must apply some 
combination of mechanistic and adaptive management strategies. For example, in a 
certain university, routine tasks such as procuring instructional materials, paying 
lecturers, and collecting enrolment statistics will usually require a mechanistic strategy 
of management. But, the curriculum that should be flexible, innovative, and responsive 
to the new demands of the environment, may require an adaptive management strategy.     
The fundamental question in local governance is how to make the public sector more 
accountable, effective, and efficient.  There are growing evidences in the literature that a 
pluralistic rather than a monopolistic organizational design promotes good governance 
principles. Designing an administrative framework for public sector institutions three 
principles must be considered: accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness to optimize 
the mobilization of public resources. The weak management and organizational system 
of many developing countries is a direct consequence of weak or absent of these three 
principles of which accountability is the most important and when achieved it promotes 
the efficient and effective mobilization and management of resources and thereby 
sustainable development. One reason of using roles rather than structure in designing a 
new framework for public sector as Cohen and Peterson (1999:71) emphasis is that “it 
gives important insight into the level of accountability”.   
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (1999) emphases the need for an 
effective management and organizational culture to successfully implement the regional 
rural plans: 
“To plan and implement regional rural development activities, you need an 
organizational and institutional framework that is geared to development. At the 
administration level, new communication and management structures need to be 
introduced.Planning procedures that involve the target group, transparent 
decision-making processes democratic participation- all these are elements of an 
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administrative culture that regional rural development can help support. It is 
equally important though to know how to efficiently manage limited financial and 
human resources” (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 1999:7) 
To sum up, there is growing recognition that the creation of an appropriate management 
and organizational strategy can help to reduce corruption in public sector administration 
in many developing countries. Corruption can be reduced by creation or modification of 
organizational structure and administrative procedures intended for breaking the system 
of corrupt behaviours within the society. An appropriate management strategy and 
organizational structure must be established to increase the accountability of the system 
where: the rules and procedures are clear; the mechanisms for monitoring compliance 
are in place; the consequences for non-compliance are specified; and the consistency of 
enforcement mechanisms is ensured. Accountability in the systems can only occur when 
the procedures and laws are transparent to all civilians.   
Decentralization as a strategy for participatory local governance  
In many developing countries local services and infrastructure are either provided by 
central governments inefficiently or by community organizations and intermediary 
support organizations (NGOs and private firms) irregularly as there is no coordination 
mechanism and local capacity to make the service provision more sustainable over time. 
Local institutions often lack decision-making power, technical expertise, management 
capacity and adequate funds to provide services. The problems of providing and 
maintaining public services and infrastructure have brought increasing calls for 
decentralizing responsibilities for service and infrastructure provision, financing and 
management. Service provision and maintenance can often be improved by devolving 
responsibilities to local governments or administrative units (Rondinelli et.al, 1984:3).  
There are a variety of definitions of decentralization that makes a vague perception 
of the concept. But there is a growing consensus that “decentralization” is any act in 
which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower 
levels in a political, administrative and territorial hierarchy. The main objective is to 
promote accountability by tailoring services to the variations of local needs. 
Decentralization promotes efficient decision-making and local participatory governance 
through institutional pluralism and competition (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:77; 
Mawhood, 1985:1-5). Furthermore, the benefits of decentralization to sustainable local 
development are highlighted by USAID (2000) as follows: 
“By bringing government closer to citizens, decentralisation allows people to 
participate more effectively in local affairs, including identification of community 
priorities. Local leaders and institutions can be held increasingly accountable for 
decisions and actions that affect citizens’ lives. Citizens and their elected leaders 
gain experience in the practice of democracy” (USAID, 2000:5). 
Participatory, well-functioning and responsive local governance needs necessary human 
resources and organizational skills on local level to effectively perform the delegated 
tasks. Local governance needs to be tailored to the local power structure both vertically 
and horizontally and adequate time and patience to flourish. It also requires shifting 
power from the central to local level because the centralist approach has showed poor 
results in poverty reduction especially in rural areas where poverty is greatest.  
Some studies identify the empirical links between decentralisation and various 
dimensions of governance. Shah (2000: 22) finds that in decentralised countries, citizen 
participation (political freedom and stability), judicial and bureaucratic efficiency, 
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human development, and income equalities become higher, and corruption becomes 
lower. In a management system based on institutional pluralism consisting of different 
actors with complementary task-related roles where the outcome is constantly 
monitored, the accountability is higher and the rate of corruption lower.  
Decentralised governance structures working closer to the grassroots people are more 
cost-efficient and flexible. However, a transparent regulatory framework must be in 
place to know which government level should perform which task and what 
competencies do the local authorities need in order to promote local development. This 
also means involving representatives from the regions and municipalities, civil society 
and the private sector in decision-making process (Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit, 2007b: website). 
 To summarize, the main benefits of decentralization are: 
a) Decentralization increases responsiveness to local demands as the central 
government might not be adequately informed about the local needs and 
preferences;  
b) Decentralisation increases accountability and transparency and enables citizens to 
oversee the performance of local government as the system of checks and 
balances works better at the local level; and as result  
c) Better and more effective management of local resources and revenue collection 
can be achieved as decentralization is supposed to make local government more 
responsive to local needs and in this manner to increase the willingness of the 
beneficiaries to make contributions in the provision and maintenance of local 
services. Local governments may also be more willing to increase revenue 
collection if they can determine how the revenues are to be used.  
Institutional arrangements for decentralization  
Despite vague definition of the decentralization concept, there is growing consensus in 
the literature about some complementary forms of transferring power and resources 
from central government. Among those that are most clearly identified and elaborated to 
create an enabling environment for participatory local governance and CDD are: spatial 
administrative, political, market and fiscal, which are described in the following sub-
sections.  
Spatial administrative decentralization 
“De-concentration” of power within the public sector can be considered as the weakest 
form of decentralization in which the central government has still monopoly over 
competencies and resources on local level without any participation of local people and 
organizations in decision-making process. In this case, the central government agencies 
on local level have the authority or at least have a say in co-decision with their 
ministries to appoint or dismiss the staff of local administration (Linder, 2004:7, 30; 
Rondinelli et al., 1984:10).  
“Administrative” decentralization has a spatial dimension when public sector tasks 
are moved geographically away from the centre to local level. “Spatial” decentralization 
is a term used by regional planners that aim at reducing extreme urban concentration in 
a few large cities in order to promote local economy and regional growth. Effective 
spatial decentralization usually requires administrative decentralization, which means a 
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hierarchical and functional distribution of power and functions between central and non-
central governmental units (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:22).  
To some degree, de-concentration as a limited form of decentralization can allow 
efficient and effective management of many routine functions. For example, de-
concentration of responsibilities to regional, provincial, and district agencies of 
education ministry in Thailand have allowed responding more effectively to the local 
needs of education and making the curriculum and content more relevant to the desires 
of local people (Rondinelli et al, 1990:129).  
To summarize, when powers are transferred to lower-level actors who are 
accountable to their superiors in a hierarchy up to central government, the reform can be 
termed as administrative decentralization or de-concentration. In other words, the 
authority for making decisions is transferred from persons who are located at the central 
line ministries to other persons within the bureaucratic structure on local level. The aim 
is to enable the governmental institutions on local level to undertake development 
activities in line with local needs and priorities. In spatial administrative form, which 
requires major changes in management processes, decentralization as an innovation 
must be introduced into organizations slowly and incrementally allowing staff time to 
adjust and providing them with the necessary capacities and authority to manage the 
delegated tasks efficiently and effectively. Therefore, decentralization strategies must be 
planned and implemented on a small scale and it should be kept simple and appropriate 
to the capacities of the organizations or units to which responsibility are transferred in 
order to expand incrementally and obtain sustainable results.  
However, in spatial administrative decentralization the focus is on the spatial 
relationships of institutions and firms rather than on how specific task-related roles are 
shared between them. This form of decentralization does not make systems more 
accountable because task-related roles are not delegated to actors from private sector 
and civil society and the responsibility for the roles is only spatially distributed and still 
monopolized by public sector. Nevertheless, spatial administrative decentralization is a 
step towards political decentralization. 
Political decentralization 
Political decentralization means “devolution” of legislative decision-making power 
from central governments to autonomous, lower-level assemblies and local councils that 
have been democratically elected by their constituencies (Cohen and Peterson, 1999: 
22).  
 Political decentralization is also called “democratic decentralization” or “democratic 
local governance” by some authors. The attributes of democracy and rule of law such as 
local election or the right to levy taxes are supposed to be the main principles of this 
from of decentralization. The main objectives of elections are to legitimise public 
authority and to mandate elected officials. But, additionally to elections, more directly 
mode of participatory mechanisms should be used to enhance the involvement of civil 
society in policy-making and implementation of local activities and thereby improving 
local governance. Most justifications of political decentralization are built around the 
assumption that by bringing government decision-making closer to the citizens, 
efficiency, equity and accountability in the public resource management is increased 
and thereby an enabling environment for CDD is created (Linder, 2004:7, 39).   
There is a close relationship between centralized system of governance and 
corruption. In a centralized system such as the Kurdistan Regional Government, 
decision-making is controlled on the top and there is no transparency how the public 
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resources are used and distributed. Especially when a system lacks appropriate oversight 
mechanisms, the corruption is embedded and pervasive. In such situations it will be 
difficult for economy to flourish and for democracy to grow strongly. As a result, the 
quality of life will erode; underdevelopment becomes persistent; and the government 
legitimacy remains weak. Through transferring more decision-making powers and 
resources to local level, transparency can be enhanced and accountability might be 
achieved as one of the main principles of good governance.   
To sum up, at its most basic, decentralization aims to achieve one of the central goals 
of just political governance (democratization), or the desire that civilians should have a 
say in their own affairs. In this sense, decentralization is a strategy of governance to 
facilitate the transfer of power closer to those who are most affected by the exercise of 
power. Political decentralization is different from administrative decentralization since 
powers in this case are devolved to actors or institutions that are accountable to the 
population in their jurisdiction. Devolution requires that local governments be given 
clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise 
authority, and within which they perform public function in coordination with central 
government. Typically, elections are seen as the mechanism that ensures accountability 
in political decentralization but more the “accountability structure” in which actors are 
located will determine if the form of decentralization is political or administrative. This 
is true whether lower-level actors are appointed or elected because elections can still be 
structured in ways that make elected officials upwardly accountable. When powers are 
transferred to lower-level actors who are downwardly accountable, even if they are 
appointed, the reform may be categorized as political decentralization (USAID, 2000:6-
7; Azfar et.al, 1999:12-14).  
Market decentralization  
Often the organizations to which functions and decision-making power are transferred 
are not located within the regular government structure which are representing specific 
interest groups in the society and are established and operated by members of those 
groups. These include farmers, cooperative organizations, women and youth association 
(Mawhood, 1985:4).  
Concerns in the early 1990s about inefficient administrative capacity on central level, 
fiscal constrains, and limited accountability on all levels of government provided the 
basis for a third phase of decentralization strategy based on “delegation” to the private 
sector firms and civil society organizations. Grassroots participation was pushed as 
much for its potential to make the public sector more accountable and as for its 
relationship to participatory local governance. Understanding that the role sharing of 
public sector tasks promotes competition and accountability, this form of 
decentralization has become more prevalent due to recent trends toward economic 
liberalization and privatization (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:5).  
The main objective of market decentralization is to create conditions that allow 
goods and services to be produced and provided by market mechanisms tailored to the 
needs and preferences of individuals where small and large firms, community groups, 
cooperatives, private voluntary associations and NGOs are collaborating. In this case 
the government is not obliged to provide services but to ensure that they are provided 
and distributed fairly among the civilians. The evidence of recent economic growth in 
developing countries, such as Asia’s Tigers shows that the task of state should be 
limited to provide infrastructure and promote human capital and financial markets.  To 
limit the role of government in economic activities can increase competition and 
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accountability and thereby reducing corruption (USAID, 1999:7; Cohen and Peterson, 
1999:23, 52).  
Decentralization and privatization of some public services can increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of provision as well as maintenance of those services. For example 
education managed by voluntary organizations has a long history of tradition in some 
developing countries, which has shown many potential benefits. It promotes closer 
relationships between the schools and the community people and gives parents a greater 
opportunity to participate more directly in the educational process as well as in fund-
raising activities. It can also increase the ability of teachers, administrators, and parents 
to tailor school programs to community needs and to set standards of quality for 
education of their children (Rondinelli et al., 1990:128) 
The role shift of state from “controlling” to “brokering” is to do less but facilitate 
more. The brokerage role is the crucial feature of the administrative strategy of 
“institutional pluralism”, which means that both central and devolved local-level 
governmental institutions delegate roles (related to the provision of collective goods and 
services) to private sector firms, community organizations and NGOs8. This means to 
induce private investment and empower civil society organizations in order to find 
complementary roles and create the enabling environment for CDD. But, it needs a 
capable and committed leadership and central government to create the enabling 
environment needed for local public agencies to perform a brokerage role (Cohen and 
Peterson, 1999: 171). 
To sum up, the market decentralization calls for institutional pluralism strategy 
where roles related to a specific task within public sector can be shared by two or more 
governmental institutions and/or private sector firms or civil society organizations. The 
logic of the institutional pluralism is to increase accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness in use of public resources through promoting multiple actors, where public 
tasks are gradually transferred to private sector and civil society organizations. For 
example, within the education system citizen involvement can consist of parent-teacher 
associations not only to deal with the problems of pupils but also to monitor the quality 
of the education system and ensure that there is no space for favouritism and 
discrimination. Institutional pluralism is an evolving strategy of redefining the 
boundaries of the public, private and voluntary sectors. But the public sector monopoly 
will continue for the provision of those services and goods that require economies of 
scale and are not suitable for a private firm to supply. While the spatial administrative 
decentralization is focusing on de-concentration of only structure, the market 
decentralization on delegation of tasks and roles to increase efficiency, equity and 
accountability in the provision of public services.  
Fiscal decentralization 
Making the decentralized local governance successful, requires that local governments 
have the authority to enforce and collect local taxes and user fees to finance their own 
activities and delegated tasks and, if necessary, to obtain funds from central government 
and aid agencies. In principal, fiscal decentralization is an integrated part of any form of 
decentralization. Financial authorities must include in any decision-making power 
passed to local government and community institutions. 
There are growing evidences that decentralization policies in most developing 
countries have not been implemented successfully because the fiscal aspects were not 
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seriously incorporated in the design of decentralization. For example, in Kenya despite 
decentralization reform the public services are still provided centrally partly because of 
the insufficient allocation of funds to the local government bodies (Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit, 1999:17). About fiscal problems faced by the 
decentralized local governments in developing countries, Lutz and Linder (2004) note 
that: 
“It is often the case that power and responsibilities have actually shifted, but 
without reliable resources and transfer mechanisms. The new local governments 
are established without obtaining the necessary resources to function as expected. 
Even where there are clear rules of inter-governmental fiscal transfers, central 
governments do not transfer financial resources regularly or reliably. This 
insecurity hinders proper and sustainable planning at the local level” Lutz and 
Linder (2004:48). 
Indeed, many central governments in developing countries lack financial resource and 
therefore there are not enough funds to distribute among different local governments. 
Socioeconomic, political and institutional factors are generally important for the 
analysis of fiscal decentralization. The institutional context of fiscal decentralization 
entails: the overall economic development; the nature of the legal system; ongoing 
process of economic and political reform; and the organization of monetary and 
financial institutions which determines the design of intergovernmental financial system 
and ultimately affects the outcome of fiscal decentralization reform. However, local 
government must have authority and control over own fiscal resources to carry out their 
delegated responsibility efficiently, otherwise most advantages of decentralization may 
not be sustainable (Wildasin, 1997:19; Esmail, 1997:12; Linder, 2004:11).  
To summarize, the main idea behind fiscal decentralization is to provide an 
institutional framework for jurisdiction in a certain geographic area to effectively and 
efficiently internalize benefits and costs of public services. The key element underlying 
the interest in fiscal decentralization is to achieve economic stability, sustainable 
growth, and provision of basic public services efficiently and equitably across people 
and jurisdictions. In a fiscally decentralized system, the policies of sub-national 
branches of governments are permitted to differ in order to reflect the preferences of 
their residents. Furthermore, fiscal decentralization brings government closer to the 
people and a representative government works best when it is closer to the people.  
However, much of the established theoretical literature of fiscal federalism has been 
based on issues within the developed countries. The definition and implementation of 
fiscal decentralization differ greatly across developing countries due to differences in 
economic and political structures and the capacity of local institutions to take over the 
delegated tasks (Azfar et al., 1999:10-12).  
Critical reflections on good governance and decentralization  
There is a dilemma of good governance and fighting corruption. The power-sharing 
among different local actors to build local governance can be an apparent problem in 
any given context especially in the Kurdish society in Iraq, which still consists of 
traditional structure. Therefore, a careful examination of the structural divide between 
traditional and modern institutions is essential, where appropriate mechanisms are 
created to bridge the gaps and promote mutual respect, recognition and confidence 
between them. In this process of consensus-building for fundamental change in a 
society, Linder (2004) emphasises the role of modern institutions:  
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“the modernist side has to think of much broader concepts of some key notions as: 
statehood, democracy, participation, gender politics and governance” (Linder, 
2004:28). 
Politicians are most unlikely to engage in corruption when there is a high risk to be put 
on trial, punished, or to loose the position and seat, therefore, to prevent corruption, it is 
necessary to increase the risks. However, the creation of monitoring and auditing 
institutions in government and parliament to fight corruption can only be effective if 
they are independent, represent all parties in parliament and have authority to prosecute 
and sanction misbehaviour. The most serious consequences of corruption is not only the 
waste of the public resources that get misdirected but also a misallocation of talent due 
to promotion being awarded on the basis of bribery, family and party political 
connection rather than merit. As a result, generations of students come to believe that 
personal effort and merit do not count and that success comes through manipulation, 
favouritism and bribery. This could encourage a negative value among young 
generation; lead to ineffective use of human capital and “brain drain”; and as a further 
consequence losing both social capital and human capital necessary for sustainable 
socioeconomic development. 
Furthermore, this study attempts to avoid normative bias toward decentralization that 
extreme devolution and delegation combined with political empowerment at the 
grassroots is the only way to produce and provide collective goods and services on an 
efficient, effective, equitable basis. Decentralization is a political, cultural and 
socioeconomic issue by itself and requires a long time horizon to achieve and therefore 
it has its protagonists and opponents. Linder (2004) proposes that: 
“in countries with a history and culture of a central state, decentralization of the 
administration is a process that takes time: professional resources and skills must 
be developed at the local level; relations between central and decentralized 
authorities must change, as well as mentalities of the old bureaucratic elite. In this 
learning process, occasional distrust between the central and the local authorities 
must be overcome” (Linder, 2004:9).  
It is obvious that successful decentralization is more than just strengthen the public 
sector institutions. By enhancing the participation of local people and institutions and 
their inclusion into decision-making process, the transparency, accountability and 
responsiveness will be more fostered to achieve a sustainable local development (Lutz 
and Linder, 2004:2) 
The questions of which services should be decentralized; how they should be 
financed; which institutional arrangements are most feasible and effective; and how 
decentralization policies can be better implemented, however, remain open and in some 
countries hotly debated. Nevertheless, an integrated approach exploring the political, 
economic and social dimensions of the decentralization policies in the local context 
must be taken in order to provide an appropriate approach to decentralization reform. If 
decentralization policies are to be implemented successfully, they must be designed 
carefully, in particular the services to be decentralized; the characteristics of users; and 
financial and institutional alternatives. Moreover, the capacities of local people and 
institutions to take over the delegated responsibilities must be systematically analyzed 
and grounded in an integrated framework. Decentralization is viewed as an incremental 
process of building the capacity of local institutions to assume greater responsibility for 
development planning and management (Linder, 2004:50; Rondinelli et.al, 1984:45). 
It is imperative that the legal form of decentralisation is an element of constitutional 
law and less subject to change by political changes of central government. The aim is to 
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ensure that no influential actors (political parties, central government or the elite of 
central administration) can be opposed to decentralisation reform.  
Different institutional arrangements for decentralization, which were described 
earlier, are highly interrelated. Indeed, the failure to distinguish these arrangements is 
one of the major reasons for the confusion on decentralization concept in the literature. 
For example, effective “spatial administrative decentralization” usually requires both 
administrative reforms within the public sector and a political commitment from the 
central government to transfer decision-making power and promoting democratic 
elections of low-level officials and councils in form of “political decentralization”. In 
developing countries usually there are great urban-rural disparities regarding economic 
growth and the public sector is usually incapable to provide rural poor with basic public 
services, which in turn calls for “market decentralization”. In this case the task-related 
roles to produce and provide collective goods are delegated to the private firms and 
NGOs, where appropriate. However, certain political conditions need to exist before 
devolution or delegation can be promoted as a strategy. Fragile states with weak 
bureaucracies have shown incapable to introduce, implement, and monitor the 
decentralization strategies. Moreover, a strong commitment from the centre is needed to 
create an enabling environment for enhancing the organizational capacity of those 
actors which are granted responsibility and task-related roles (Cohen and Peterson, 
1999: 23, 62).  
The objectives of decentralization are not achieved when the central government fails 
to monitor the integrity of lower and decentralized governments, or fails to establish 
transparent linkages between the different levels of government. In such a scenario, the 
decentralization can favour the interests of powerful local elites who find new 
opportunities to search for illegal benefits though pressuring local government officials 
when the oversight from the central government is absent (Spector, 2005: 155).  
For a successful implementation of decentralization reform, Rondinelli et al. (1990) 
emphasises the need for a greater role of central bodies to support the capacity building 
of local government:     
“Decentralization is more likely to be successful if programs are carefully 
supervised and administrators make an effort to teach lower-level officials and 
organizations how to handle new responsibilities. Projects that transfer large 
numbers of tasks or greater responsibility all at once without sufficient technical 
assistance are likely to fail. Plans for decentralization should include training for 
both central administrators and lower-level implementers. In a decentralized 
organizational structure the role of high-level administrators is to provide 
guidance and assistance rather than to exercise stringent controls. Technical and 
managerial training must be provided not only for those to whom responsibility is 
being transferred, but also to central officials who will have to learn how to 
support local implementers more effectively” (Rondinelli et al., 1990:155-156).  
To summarize, decentralization reform is not a condition but a process which needs a 
long time span and incremental change in management and organizational culture in a 
certain society. Therefore, a precondition to achieve the goals of decentralization is to 
take a more realistic view of decentralization’s potential and limitation in any given 
society with particular political and cultural features. Especially, it is important 
understanding the organizational and management requirements for carrying out 
decentralization reforms.   
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2.6 Conclusions  
There is actually a dilemma with social research. On the one hand, an in-depth analysis 
of only one theory can isolate it from other important interrelated theories. On the other 
hand, presenting and analysing different interrelated theories will exclude the possibility 
to conduct an in-depth analysis of each theory usually because of the limited time. In 
this chapter, the conceptual framework was actually designed and developed as 
guidelines to answer the research questions. A full study of the closely related theories 
to social capital such as CDD, community empowerment, participation, institutional 
capacity building, local network institutions and good governance has been done. These 
theories are so interlinked that it makes no sense to study them separately.  
The Figure  2.1 on page 25  illustrates the link between different elements of social 
capital necessary to achieve sustainable CDD, where the integration of all social, 
economic and environmental activities including the target population is needed. This in 
turn demands building social capital on macro, meso and micro levels in form of 
effective and efficient horizontal and vertical interaction between institutions preferably 
in an established system of participatory local governance. On micro level the driving 
forces behind any CDD are empowered CBOs and village council and on meso level is 
the local government which plays as a network-builder to link the institutions from all 
levels. Therefore, on macro level appropriate political and institutional reforms should 
be conducted to produce different types of social capital necessary for creating an 
enabling environment for local governance and sustainable CDD.  
But, a concept like social capital that encompasses too much is at risk of explaining 
nothing. Therefore, the challenge for the author was to give meaningful and pragmatic 
content to the rich notion of social capital in the context of the Kurdish region in Iraq 
and to define different types and dimensions of social capital necessary to build 
participatory local governance for CDD. It is supposed that a complementary local 
network based on public, private and voluntary organizations can best meet the needs on 
community level, which requires capacity development of people and institutions 
producing different types of social capital.   
The CDD approach is more sustainable where community decision-making and 
management of resources are supported by a favourable legal and regulatory 
framework. This means that appropriate policies and law enforcements must be in place 
to support local initiatives and to protect community rights. For example, CBOs should 
be easily able to obtain legal status and own assets. Procurement and contract laws may 
need to be changed to enable direct resource transfer from local governments to CBOs. 
An overall freedom of information act including legal protections for the press, free 
speech, and the right to organize as part of structural social capital is also essential for 
effective community action. Finally, readily accessible dispute resolution mechanisms 
are required as key legal and regulatory policies that support CDD. Systems may need 
to be developed to hold both local governments and CBOs accountable for their actions.  
The support to CDD will not be sustainable without the policies, laws, systems, and 
governance processes that encourage effective collaboration among local governments, 
central governments, line agencies, civil society, service providers, and CBOs. 
Specifically, such an environment should include; (a) elected local governments that are 
responsive to their constituents and are empowered to serve them; (b) a conducive legal 
and regulatory framework that supports community action and enforce laws to co-
ordinate activities; (c) intergovernmental arrangements for fiscal flows to local 
governments and CBOs; and (d) well-defined financing rules and task-related 
responsibilities of key players in each sector.  
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Ideally, an enabling environment in form of political, spatial administrative, market, 
and fiscal decentralization should be in place before initiating the CDD efforts which 
makes the local governance more responsive and effective to CDD. This is not always 
possible and where such conditions are not present, the deficiencies in the surrounding 
environment must be addressed. By empowering communities and generating upward 
pressure on governments and agencies, these strategies can serve as catalysts to initiate 
the necessary policy and institutional reforms. 
The question is how to downsize the public sector to make it more efficient and 
accountable. The approach of spatial administrative decentralization is limited because 
this kind of downsizing simply transfers central problems to the periphery and does not 
resolve the core problem. Therefore, the increased attention has been given to the 
delegation of public sector tasks to private sector and civil society organizations in form 
of market decentralization. The aim is to transfer the responsibility for the production 
and provision of many public goods and services, which are handled by central 
government inefficiently or inadequately, to a broad institutional array in order to 
increase competition, accountability and effectiveness in the provision and maintenance 
of the public services. Successful decentralization should be based on any array of 
institutions and organizations performing task-related roles, which is flexible to 
changing political, economic, and social objectives over time. But this also requires 
high inter- institutional and organizational coordination that must be managed in a 
proper way.  
Fundamental institutional change is required to reach participatory local governance 
and CDD. The institutions change in an incremental and complicated process. How fast 
they are changed are determined by informal constrains embodied in customs, traditions 
and codes of conduct, which in any society connect the past with the present and future 
and therefore provides a key to explain the institutional change over time. Unlike 
informal constrains, the formal rules can change overnight as the result of political and 
judicial decisions, but the results may not be sustainable if not supported by informal 
constraints. As the institutional structure and behavior are deeply rooted in the cultural 
values and norms in a given country or region, the institutional arrangement to promote 
local governance for sustainable CDD must be carefully examined.  
Nevertheless, “good local governance” means bringing the government closer to 
local people, which needs new norms and relationships based on mutual respect, 
recognition and trust as part of social capital. Increasing the confidence of civilians in 
the government system, the efficient production and fair distribution of public services 
and goods must be guaranteed. This confidence can be further reinforced if the civilians 
are involved in identification of their own needs and priorities and are empowered to 
make contributions in providing and maintaining the services.    
In the next chapter, closely linked to the conceptual framework the methodological 
framework including different methods of data collection methods will be discussed to 
find appropriate answers to the research questions.  
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3 Research approach and methodology  
The first section of this chapter is about the requirements and justifications to design 
appropriate methodologies and ensuring a strong link between conceptual and 
methodological framework. The strengths of using participatory and interdisciplinary 
methods of data collection in form of triangulation are also discussed to increase the 
validity and reliability of obtained data in the research area9.  
In the second section, the area of analysis is explained which according to the local 
circumstances is classified in micro, meso and macro levels of social capital and the 
need to conduct an in-depth study on local level intuitions is emphasised. Locally-based 
validated indicators that can measure types of social capital in relation to other 
development indicators in the areas of poverty alleviation, inequality reduction, 
environmental protection and economic growth on local level are also described, which 
are somehow linked to the indicators on regional, national and global levels. 
The third section will describe the case study selection and a sampling framework to 
select representative sites on both meso and micro levels. The selection criteria of rain-
fed area of the Kurdish region in Iraq as research area including decision-making levels 
(sub-district, community and household) are explained.  
In the fourth section, the empirical work including a mix of methods highly adapted 
to the local needs and requirements is explained which were applied in many steps 
during two periods of the empirical work10. It will be explained for which reasons and 
how the methods are applicable in the research area. The shortcomings of each method 
and the ways to make them more relevant to the local context are also discussed. The 
aim has been to find and apply the best mix of methods belonging to different 
mythologies to answer the research questions. The events have been explained and 
interpreted from the perspectives of the rural people who are the subject of the research. 
In addition, by intensive and active observation during the continuous learning process 
of the field study, the cause-effect relationship of the events was observed 
systematically.  
In the last section, the test of scientific analysis is discussed to evaluate the applied 
research methodology based on the validity and reliability of the obtained data. The 
importance of triangulation as a tool for cross-checking the obtained information is also 
highlighted.  
3.1 Local approach to research methodology  
The research applies a combination of deductive and inductive research approaches. 
Deductive research moves from general ideas and theories to specific particular 
situation. This approach offers the researcher a relatively easy and systematic way of 
testing general ideas on a range of situation. One hypothesis is that bottom-up local 
development planning and interdisciplinary interactions among well established local 
                                                
9
 A measure is said to be valid to the degree that it measures what it is supposed to measure. The reliability of 
obtained data is high when the probability that other researchers would draw the same conclusions from the same 
information is high. For more about the validity and reliability see page 87.     
10
 Reviewing different information gathering tools used by international development agencies e.g. the Social Capital 
Assessment Tool (SCAT) and the Local Level Institutions Study (LLIS) developed by World Bank (1998) has been 
useful to develop information gathering tools adapted to the local context of the research area.  
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institutions and their networks lead to production of  social capital (trust, common sense 
and collective action) and thereby provide great potentials for sustainable development 
(Chopra, 2001:8).  But this hypothesis is too general and difficult to test in any given 
situation as well in the research area to provide appropriate recommendations for 
political and institutional reforms that can be implemented afterwards.  
Therefore inductive research was also applied which moves from the particular 
situation of the research area to create broad general ideas. This approach was very 
time-consuming and took a lot of efforts, but the reward was in terms of arriving at a 
fresh way of looking at the subject of social capital theories and how far they contribute 
to the building of effective local network institutions for participatory local governance 
necessary for CDD (Bradford University, 2005:3-7).  
Fieldwork requirements  
The research, in general, avoids simple positivist and conventional field study methods 
such as formal sample surveys and inquiry using a tool box of techniques for data 
collection, hypothesis testing because they are isolating the determinants of social 
behaviour and are not in compliance with the effective participatory approach of 
planning. The study of institutions, as part of social capital, is about the human and 
social behaviour and should not be conducted in the same way as studies conducted in 
the natural sciences. Therefore, the research will apply a more phenomenological 
approach from the perspective that human and social behaviours are not as easily 
measured as phenomena in the natural sciences. Human and social motivation is shaped 
by factors that are not always observable e.g. inner thought process and social norms. 
Furthermore, people place their own meanings on events which do not always coincide 
with the way others have interpreted them and can become hard to generalize on (ibid).  
In addition, the local circumstances of the research area e.g. lack of effective 
information and communication infrastructure call for a different mode of investigation 
and analysis. Usually, the information in the research area is more shared and owned by 
local authorities and are not easily accessible and transparent to the public. People on 
low-levels of decision-making do not dare to give out the information even within the 
legal framework. They fear to be fired if they criticize the reliability of the obtained 
information from higher levels, which is an organizational behaviour inherited from the 
former centralized system of Iraq. Therefore, as a principle of research ethics, in the 
case of personal interview, the interviewer ensured that the obtained information would 
be managed confidentially and not used for other than the research purpose.  
Last but not least, the political instability in the new Iraq does not allow effective 
information exchange without face-to-face contact and established personal trust. In 
fact, there are many arguments to apply “triangulation” to cross check the data obtained 
from different sources that required dialogue, flexibility and social interactions between 
different interests and actors at different local levels of decision-making in the research 
area.   
Triangulation  
Triangulation is an approach to acquire reliable data by cross-checking obtained 
information through the application of different interview techniques, using different 
sources of information and different perspectives (Mikkelsen, 2005:96). Furthermore, 
Golafshani (2003:603) explains that “Triangulation is typically a strategy (test) for 
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improving the validity and reliability of research or evaluation of findings”. In social 
science you can never verify the obtained data, but you can reconfirm that the data 
would not be false. When emphasizing qualitative data some selected methods could be 
criticized for the limited objectivity, reliability and validity. In order to minimize such 
shortcomings, the triangulation is applied to ensure that the obtained data would not be 
false and thereby increasing the validity and reliability rate of the obtained data. Four 
basic types of triangulation were used in this research: 
– Methodological triangulation involved “between-method” triangulation when six 
different methods were used to analyse the selected households, organizations 
communities in one sub-district as a single case study and “within-method” 
triangulation when a certain method, for example, the integrated interview guide, 
was used to analyse all selected households in both sub-districts as two different 
case studies. In another word, the between-method triangulation was applied when 
for instance the information obtained from the group interview of the key informants 
in a targeted community was cross-checked later by obtained information from the 
focus group discussions in the same community. The within-method triangulation 
was applied when for example, the group interview of the key informants, was 
applied on all investigated communities in both sub-districts. While the between-
method triangulation was mainly designed for data collection purpose, the within-
method triangulation was more for comparative analysis of collected data; the 
sensitizing findings and results; and thereby increasing the chance of analytical 
generalization.  
– Data triangulation means that primary and secondary data were cross-checked 
through the entire process of the research. The research applied more qualitative 
methods of primary data collection e.g. workshop, seminar, focus group discussions, 
semi-structured interview, active observation, etc. The only quantitative method to 
collect the primary data was integrated interview guide (see Table  3.3 on page 80) 
which was also semi-qualitative while the local context and the requirements of the 
target group called for more face-to-face modes of communication and questioning.      
– Hierarchical triangulation means that the data was obtained from different decision- 
making levels of the public administration and civil society organizations which 
have access to different types of information. In this way, the obtained information 
would be understood and analyzed from different points of view that will provide a 
comprehensive view and reliable context about the nature of the institutional 
problems to development in the research area.  
– Discipline triangulation means that the data was obtained from different disciplines 
to consider social, ecological and economic aspects of the development problems on 
local level and thereby providing more reliable information about the core problems 
to CDD.    
3.2 Area of analysis 
The research strategy is in accordance with the millennium development goals accepted 
by international community e.g. decreasing the growing gaps between rich and poor 
countries and regions by enhancing local institutional capacity. The new challenge to 
the Middle East region to promote democratic values and increase the participation of 
grassroots people in decision-making process is also considered, which is supposed to 
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be achieved by finding locally adapted approach to a more decentralized and democratic 
planning system in each country. For the purpose of conducting an in-depth study on 
local level institutions, the variables at national level are, in principle, excluded from the 
analysis. In fact, the Kurdish region during 1991-2003 has been independent from the 
former central government and after the fall of Iraqi dictatorship in 2003 has developed 
very differently in comparison with the rest of Iraq. But somehow the effects of national 
policies on the Kurdish region were analysed e.g. through semi-structured interviews 
with key informants in sector institutions, review of document sources and local media. 
In fact, in the new context of Iraq one of the important policies is supposed to be 
decreasing regional disparities and promoting local level development. However, three 
major levels of analysis (micro, meso and macro) including different levels of decision-
making are defined in the research area, about which an in-depth analysis was 
conducted (see Table  3.3 on page 80).  
The macro level is consisted of both regional and provincial levels and to some 
extent the district level, which were not systematically investigated because they were 
not a major focus of analyzing the local institutional arrangements for CDD. But they 
are, somehow, influencing the variables on both meso and micro levels and it made 
sense to investigate the whole system as an enabling environment for development of 
local institutions. Therefore, the major focus of the first period of the empirical work 
was to investigate the macro variables. It has to be noted that the district level has no 
role in the analysis as most decision-making power is concentrated on provincial and 
regional levels. Only during the first period of the empirical work, the secondary data 
were collected and the interviews with the line agencies were conducted on district level 
as information basis for selection criteria of a sub-district that faces most development 
problems.  
The study of micro and meso levels, which was done during the second period of the 
empirical work, concentrated more on analyzing the indicators related to social capital 
and institutional effectiveness that may be created by households and institutions on 
community level as micro level and among the institutions on the sub-district level as 
meso level. In another word, the analysis of micro level was more concentrated on 
horizontal interaction of people and organizations on community level, where both 
cognitive and structural social capital play an important role while the meso-level 
analysis focused more on vertical interaction of community people and institutions with 
the higher levels of decision making up to sub-district level where bridging social 
capital plays a significant role and can be further linked to the existing development 
policies as part of social capital on macro level.  
3.3 Case study selection and sampling framework  
As a principal no sample was conducted randomly because this could not guarantee that 
such a sample would represent the main institutional problems to CDD in the research 
area and measure what is supposed to be measured. Locally based criteria were 
developed to select representative sites and making a valid and reliable measurement of 
social capital and local institutional capacities on the levels of meso and micro.   
Site selection criteria  
Due to limited time and resources it was not possible to design a sampling framework 
such that the study would be representative for all rural area in the Kurdish region. 
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Instead, the rain-fed area, which covers the mountainous area in the north-east of the 
Kurdish region bordered to Iran and Turkey, was targeted. Land use categories in the 
Kurdish region are mainly consisted of arable land (rain-fed and irrigated area), pasture 
land, built-up-land and woodland/forest (see the topography and land use maps on page 
69). There are many reasons and criteria to select the rain-fed area of the region as 
research area as follows. 
Low agricultural productivity 
There is usually no assured level of production in rain-fed areas where increased 
agricultural variability creates less predictability and as a result the agricultural tasks 
can become less standardized with less uniform and heterogeneous activities. The 
producers (animal keepers, bee keepers, farmers) in the rain-fed cultivation area of the 
Kurdish region, are generally less interdependent and more dispersed and this effect the 
patterns of local institutional development which demands for more horizontal 
cooperation between locally-based institutions and more tailor-made vertical  assistance 
and inputs from  higher level institutions (Uphoff, 1986:148).  
Poor accessibility 
Existing of great natural barriers and the mountainous character of the rain-fed area in 
the Kurdish region is one of the main reasons behind low access to the basic public 
services, transportation, communication and marketing facilities. In addition, missing 
cross-border spatial development cooperation, make the research area (especially the 
selected sub-district of Seweil bordered to Iran) as hinterland with very poor 
accessibility. The people in this area have less possibility to find a livelihood and cannot 
easily and legally cross the border to search for a job and better quality of life. Their 
main source of income is to import or export goods without paying lawful customs 
charges or duties. 
Less vertical assistance 
Such as financial, technological and managerial capabilities tend to be weakest where 
they are needed most and modern institutions and central government bodies are less 
effective in more remote area. Therefore, in the socio-economic periphery and 
disadvantaged rain-fed area of the Kurdish region, local people are supposed to be more 
motivated to cooperate and take collective actions for solving their own problems. This 
will consequently justify the need of developing local networks based on very strong 
horizontal cooperation among local institutions e.g. member organizations, farmer 
cooperatives, service organizations and local government that should be better able than 
central government ministries to respond to the local variations and needs.  
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Figure  3.1: Land use map of the research area  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  3.2: Topography map of the research area   
Sub-district selection criteria  
In the local context a sub-district is defined as the administrative level above the 
community (see Figure  2.2 on page 33). The centre of the sub-district is usually a rural 
small town with no sufficient access to the basic social services (only the primary health 
care centre and secondary school) that make people migrate to the district or province 
centre as the low quality of the road infrastructure especially in the wet seasons does not 
allow any daily-based commuting. A mix of methods has been used to set up selection 
criteria for two sub-districts in different parts of the rain-fed area as a comparative case 
study, which to a great extent cover the ecological, agro-economic, socio-demographic, 
 
Source: Atlas of the Middle East, CIA, 1993 (modified by Mahzouni, 2007) 
Harir 
Seweil  
 
Source: World Atlas, 2007 (modified by Mahzouni, 2007)  
Harir  
Seweil  
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cultural and political diversities in the rain-fed area of the Kurdish region11. However, 
the main criteria for selection of each sub-district were set up.  
Table  3.1:Sub-district selection criteria 
Sub-district 
 
 Socio-
demography 
 
Dominated 
political 
Party 
Main  
land use 
category   
Agro-economic 
activities 
Road 
access. 
 
Vertical 
assistance 
rate 
Seweil  
 
Municipality: 
Basne  
Province: 
Sulaimaniyah 
-Internally 
 displaced people  
 -Less traditional  
  society 
PUK Woodland 
 
-Fair agriculture 
-Informal business    
 activities12  
-Livestock raising 
-Horticulture13  
-Bee keeping 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Harir 
 
Municipality: 
Harir  
Province: 
Erbil 
 
-No internally  
 displaced people  
-Traditional  
  society 
KDP 
 
Farmland 
-Agriculture 
-Livestock raising 
-Horticulture  
-Bee keeping 
-Tourism 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
Seweil sub-district  
The Seweil sub-district, which is located in the Sulaymaniyah province and bordered to 
Iran, is relatively more disadvantaged by its socio-demographic history (internally 
displaced people), land use (woodland), topography (mountainous), location (remote 
area with low accessibility), less vertical assistance and which calls for a comprehensive 
approach to address the local problems and measure the level of latent social capital as 
an input to local institutional effectiveness14. According to the findings of the first 
period of the empirical work, the out-migration in Seweil sub-district is higher in 
respect of other three sub-districts in the district of Chwarta in the Sulaymaniyah 
province, which was used as one of the criteria to select the sub-district for investigation 
(Semi-structured interview with the head of the agricultural agency in the district centre 
of Chwarta, 25 June 2005).  
The history of the Seweil sub-district goes back to Islam time. Umar who was the 
second caliph after the death of the Islam’s prophet Mohammad, led the Moslem troops 
to conquer the mountainous Kurdish region in Iraq during 634-644 A.D which faced 
tremendous resistance from the Christians and other local religious groups. Some ruins 
and mass graves of those who died in the battle are still around many villages among 
other in the selected communities. As mentioned in chapter one, tremendous 
demographic changes in the rural area of the Kurdish region have been conducted 
during the last decades, especially in those areas bordered to Iran including the Seweil 
sub-district. In 1978 after an agreement between Iran and Iraq all Kurdish villages from 
the border 15 kilometres inside Iraq were burned to the mark in order to cut support for 
Kurdish peshmerga forces. Consequently, all the people in the sub-district were 
                                                
11
 The obtained documents e.g. rapid district and sub-district summery from UN Joint Humanitarian Information 
Centre in Erbil (2003, 2004) and the information from the ministry of agriculture in both Erbil and Sulaimanyah have 
been very useful to select the representative sub-districts (see the “Map of the research area including the selected 
communities” on page 74 ). According to a brochure from the Ministry of Agriculture in Erbil (2003:5), the selected 
sub-districts are considered as secured raining areas with an annual raining rate above 400 mm. 
12
 Import or export of goods without paying customs duties.  
13
 In the local context, horticulture is a simple form of agriculture cultivating plants, especially fruit and vegetables 
based on working small plots of land without using draft animals or irrigation.  
14 See the land use and topography maps on page 69  and the “Map of the research area including the selected 
communities” on page 74.  
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displaced to the small collective towns far from their farmlands and livestock and the 
local culture, society and economy was subjected for tremendous changes. Before 1978 
the sub-district consisted of a strong feudal system which collapsed after the displacing 
of people to the collective towns.  
In 1991, after the Iraqi army withdrawal from the Kurdish region, most of internally 
displaced households went back and started to reconstruct their own village but the 
traditional culture and society could not be restored as the community people were 
already accustomed to the urbanized life style. Poverty in the region increased as a 
result of economic embargo, first by international community on Iraq and then by Iraqi 
central government on the Kurdish region. A third economic embargo was imposed on 
the region a result of the outbreak of factional violence between the main political 
parties (the PUK and the KDP) in 1994 that made an economic embargo on their 
respective areas. This caused extreme poverty in the region especially in the urban area 
which forced the people of Seweil to stay in their villages working with agricultural 
related activities that provided them a relatively secure livelihood sources15.  
The synthesized results from the empirical work and observable facts shows that the 
implementation of the oil-for-food programme in 1998 has had long-term negative 
effects on the livelihood sources of people in both investigated sub-districts. As part of 
the programme, the food grains were imported and distributed free to improve the 
situation of Iraqi people. As the imported food grains competed with the domestic ones, 
the rural people could not sell their food grains anymore and therefore they shifted their 
role from producer to consumer. The people in the Seweil sub-district like all other rural 
people in the region started to leave their farmland and livestock and migrate back to the 
urban area in searching for income sources.  
This negative trend was reinforced in 2003 after the fall of Iraqi central government 
following by enormous demand of manpower for reconstruction boom and physical 
development in the urban area of the Kurdish region. The rural people whose livelihood 
has already been negatively influenced by the implementation of the oil-for-food 
programme were now more convinced to migrate to the cities. In the Seweil sub-district 
the farmland remained uncultivated and the livestock were sold to the Iranian villagers, 
which had negative impacts on local economy. The agricultural related activities, which 
are usually the principal ways in which people make a living have significantly 
decreased during recent years and is now only for the household’s own consumption. 
The synthesized results from the empirical work and observable facts shows that only 
those who had already a house or relatives in the cities could out-migrate. The 
remaining  households in the targeted communities in the Seweil sub-district (in April 
2006) are considered as poorest of poor, who are periodically working with livestock, 
horticulture and small scale agricultural activities mostly for household’s own 
consumption (Focus group discussions with male and female groups in separate 
meetings in Bewre, 8 April 2006).  
However, the society in both targeted communities in the Seweil sub-district is very 
homogenous without any social hierarchy and everybody in the community lives on 
equal basis and lives together peacefully. The community members belong to the same 
ethnic, linguistic and religious group, which could be an indicator for high sense of 
collective action among people in the community. 
                                                
15
 For more information see the sub-section of “Imposition of triple embargo” on page 8 in chapter one. 
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Harir sub-district  
The Harir sub-district is located in the province of Erbil, which is one of the three main 
fertile flat terrains for agriculture in the Kurdish region16. The history of the sub-district 
goes back to pre-Islam time and there are many historical ruins as a potential for 
tourism development.  
There are many reasons that people in the Harir sub-district, in opposite to the people 
in the Seweil sub-district, were not displaced internally by former Iraqi government 
during the last decades. The people in the Harir sub-district are largely belonging to the 
Sorchi tribe which refused to support the Kurdish liberation movement during 1970s 
and 1980s and as a reward their villages were not subjected for Anfal campaign during 
late 1980s. Anfal campaign was fulfilled by the former dictator of Iraq to displace rural 
people of the Kurdish region of political reason (see chapter one). Moreover, thanks to 
sub-district location that is far from the Iranian border, the villages were neither 
destroyed by former Iraqi government in 1978 nor subjected for the Iraq-Iran war 
during 1980s. As a result, the people in Harir have not been subjected to big changes in 
demographic, cultural and social structure during the last decades and have remained a 
society of a strong tribal system until now. The people belong to the same ethnic, 
linguistic and religious group and this could increase the sense of collective action on 
community level as part of cognitive social capital.  
The people except those in the sub-district centre are less accustomed to the 
urbanized life style. After the Iraqi army withdrawal from the region in 1991, the KDP 
as the dominated political party in the region has tried to integrate the tribal groups into 
its political system, which make them still powerful in the area with a continuous strong 
role of tribal system in local culture and behaviour. Particularly, the leaders of Sorchi 
tribe, who possess high position and influential power within the KDP and the 
government, are still very strong in the area. 
The major livelihood sources of the people in the sub-district are crop production; 
livestock raising; and working as civil servant and construction worker in the urban area 
as the relatively high road accessibility does allow daily commuting. The 
implementation of the oil-for-food programme in 1998 and the reconstruction boom in 
the urban area after 2003 had a negative effect on the livelihood sources of the Harir 
people as well. But people of Harir in contrast to the people in Seweil, who had already 
a house or social network in the urban area, could not easily abandon their community 
to look for income sources in the cities. The synthesized results from the empirical work 
and observable facts shows that only people who were in better economic conditions 
could move to the city of Erbil and the rest are, in general, considered as poor who are 
usually working with small scale agricultural-related activities. In addition, during last 
years many of people in this area have got the chance to work as civil servants in 
different governmental institutions (Focus group discussions in Jamasor, 20 April 2006; 
Group interview of the key informants in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).  
Comparative case study  
The described differences between the two sub-districts made a great sense to conduct a 
comparative case study in order to provide a broader insight into the development 
problems of rain-fed area of the Kurdish region as the research area. In addition, there 
are two main political parties in the region, which have had different courses and 
                                                
16See the land use and topography maps on page 69 and the “Map of the research area including the selected 
communities” on page 74.  
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strategies to develop their respective ruling area during the last 15 years. Therefore, it 
was also justified to explore the political diversity influencing the development policies 
of the research area; find out the rate of analytical generalization; and thereby making 
political recommendations to promote participatory local governance and CDD,  
especially now when a regional unity government has recently been formed by the KDP 
and PUK.   
Community selection criteria 
The terminology of “community” in this thesis is considered as a territorial (social) unit 
including a decision-making level (see Figure  2.2 on page 33). In the local context, a 
rural community is defined as a group of people often clan members or relatives to each 
other living within a specific geographic area whose main livelihood is based on 
agriculture and livestock raising  without any sufficient access to the most basic social 
services.  
Appraisal of all communities of a sub-district was, clearly, an impossible task. 
Instead, the selected sub-districts were structured according to demographic, socio-
cultural grouping, road accessibility, natural resource heritage and economic features to 
select two contrasting communities which highlight the key issues in the sub-district and 
represent different amount and type of social capital that can be linked to other 
development indicators. The development problems and causes of poverty in each 
selected community were somewhat different that require different solutions. In the 
following pages, a profile of each selected community including the relevant 
information about location, history, socio-demographic changes and economy is 
presented. The information was obtained and cross-checked during the group interview 
of the key informants and the focus group discussions in each selected community.   
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Figure  3.4: Map of the research area including the selected communities  
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Marwe (Seweil sub-district) 
The village is located on the cliff edge of the Choman River that is the natural border of 
Iraq and Iraq. The village has a strong historical and cultural identity and is famous for 
great hospitality towards strangers. Once the village was so big that was called the city 
of Marwan and some ruins and mass graves of people who died in the battle between 
Christians and Moslems in seventh century are still around the village. In 1975 the 
community consisted of 150 households but the village was destroyed by Iraqi army in 
1978 and all people were displaced to collective towns around the province centre. In 
1991, after the Iraqi army withdrawal from the Kurdish region, approximately 170 
households went back to reconstruct their own village. The main livelihood sources of 
remaining 70 households (in April 2006) are transportation and other business-related 
activities with Iranian dealers on the border (Group interview of the key informants in 
Marwe, 31 March 2006).  
Bewre (Seweil sub-district) 
Like Marwe, the village of Bewre is surrounded by high mountains but enjoys relatively 
high road accessibility as located only one Kilometre from the main road to the sub-
district and the district centres. The community has a strong historical and cultural 
identity and its history goes back 3000 of years. The graves and ruins of the ancient 
Kurds, who believed in Zarathushtra, are still around the village. Like in Marwe, the 
people resisted against the Moslem troops to conquer the village during the seventh 
century and mass graves of people who died in the battle still remained in 15 different 
places around the village. The ruins of the castle from which the Christians defended 
themselves against the Moslems are part of historical heritage of the community.  
Like in Marwe, the internally displacement conducted by former Iraqi army caused 
enormous damages in Bewre. In addition, the village was also a real battle field during 
the Iraq-Iran war in 1980s, which much of its land is still contaminated with landmines 
and unexploded ordnances that has caused social, ecological and economic damages. In 
1991, about 80 households went back to reconstruct their own village.  In April 2006, 
only 43 households remained in the community that are considered as very poor (Group 
interview of the key informants in Bewre, 7 April 2006).  
Jamasor (Harir sub-district)   
The village of Jamasor is located in the fertile soil of Harir flat terrain located about 15 
Kilometres from the sub-district centre. The history of he community goes back to pre-
Islam time but there are no historical ruins remained from that time. Due to less external 
influences the community people are less accustomed to the urbanized life style and the 
society is very homogenous with some social hierarchy but everybody in the community 
lives on equal basis and peacefully together. Not many community people were 
employed within the public sector after collapsing of the Iraqi dictatorship in 2003 due 
to the lack of social networks of the community people within the KDP and the KRG 
(Group interview of the key informants in Jamasor, 20 April 2006).  
Old Batas (Harir sub-district)    
The community of Old Batas is located in the upper part of the fertile soil of Harir flat 
terrain only one kilometre from the sub-district centre. The history of the community 
goes back to 4000 years ago. It is one of the oldest settlements in the Kurdish region 
with historical monuments remained from the Assyrian empire e.g. the Tele Hill and the 
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Kafaran Port, which gives a strong identity to the community and thereby a great 
potential for the development of tourism industry if combined with other local potentials 
for attracting the tourists from south of Iraq and other counties in the Middle East17. In 
1921 after the dissolution of Ottoman Empire and the building of Iraqi nation, Batas 
became the centre of the sub-district but during 1950s, of some political reasons, the 
centre of the sub-district was moved to Harir (Khabat Daily Newspaper, 2005: no. 1847, 
p.12).  
Before 1960s there were some Christian and Jewish minorities. The Jews after the 
establishment of the state of Israel moved to Israel and the Christians after the armed 
conflict between the Iraqi army and Kurdish peshmerga forces moved either to the 
urban area or Western Europe. The reliable data on the reasons for their out-migration is 
missing. It is not clear if their out-migration was due to the pressure from the Iraqi army 
or other local groups. However, the society is now very homogenous consisting of only 
the Moslem Kurds with some social hierarchy 18 (Group interview of the key informants 
in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).  
For the same reasons as mentioned in the case of Jamasor, the people of Old Batas 
were not displaced and not subjected for any war during last decades. As the community 
is located much closer to the urban area and on the main regional road, it was easier for 
the former Iraqi army to control the village. The whole Batas is considered as biggest 
village in the Kurdish region which the number of households has increased by 50 
percent during the period 1991-2005(about 1000 households in July 2005) which about 
one quarter live in Old Batas(Khabat Daily Newspaper, 2005: no. 1847, p.12).  
About 90 percent of the community people belong to the Sorchi clan and only a few 
households are from other local clans that have migrated to Batas long time ago and 
now hold their own land in the community. Anyway, compared with the Jamasor 
community, the social hierarchy in Old Batas has been more weakened by urbanized life 
style. Old Batas has much potential for a diversified economic development. The 
community is located at the foot of Harir Mountain and very close to the natural springs. 
About 80 percent of its agricultural land is irrigated fertile land which makes the area 
very potential for crop production e.g. wheat, barley, pea and rice and horticulture like 
vegetables and fruits (Group interview of the key informants in Old Batas, 25 April 
2006).  
A comparative analysis of selected communities is illustrated in the Table  3.2 on 
page 77 to highlight and summarize the differences among them. The reliability of the 
obtained data was ensured by applying different methods and triangulation during the 
second period of the empirical work in April 2006. Exact figure about the population in 
the selected communities is missing partly because the local authorities are not efficient 
enough to produce the updated statistics and partly due to the fact that usually the rural 
people in the Kurdish region do not have a single or permanent residence. For example, 
in both selected communities in the Seweil sub-district, the pupils during the school 
semesters have to move to their relatives in the urban area as there is no secondary 
school in these communities. In addition, most of the households only during hot 
seasons are occupied with farming and have no permanent livelihood sources all year 
                                                
17
 Currently every summer, many people from the centre and south of Iraq visit the Harir sub-district and other 
neighbouring areas to enjoy the relatively cool climate. 
18
 Based on the information obtained during a preparatory visit of the research area in June 2005, one of the selection 
criteria of the Harir sub-district was to comprise a Christian minority in order to analyse their relations with other 
local groups as part of social capital. But during the field study in April 2006, it was found that they had already 
moved out.  
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around. Some people during off-farm seasons move or commute to other places to work 
as construction worker. Therefore, it is very difficult to estimate the population of a 
rural community in the research area (Group interview of the key informants in Marwe, 
31 March 2006; in Bewre, 7 April 2006).  
Table  3.2: A comparative analysis of selected communities  
Selected communities in the  
Seweil sub-district 
 
Selected communities in the 
Harir sub-district 
 
 
Marwe Bewre Jamasor Old Batas 
Number of 
household  
 
70 43 150 225 
Location  On a hill and isolated from roads 
On a low land closed 
to the main road 
On a low land 
relatively closed to 
the main road 
On a low land 
very closed to 
the main road 
Distance to the sub-
district centre (km) 
  
28 7 15 1 
Travel time to sub- 
district centre 
(minute) 
 
60 25 20 5 
Road accessibility  
 
Very low Medium Medium High 
Access to 
communication 
infrastructure 
 
Very low Medium High Very high 
Access to basic 
social services 
 
Medium Low 
 
Medium 
 
High 
Vertical assistance 
rate  
 
Low Low Very low Medium 
Landmines problems  
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
Household selection criteria 
In the rural context of the research area a household is defined as a related group of 
people who normally live in the same dwelling, share a common economy and eat 
together. The household is the basic economic unit of community which provide 
primary commodities for food sector. It is still usual that the sons remain in the 
household and share the same economy even when they get married and have many 
children. For that reason an average household size is between 5-10 members where 
even the children take an active part in the household economy19.  
Within each community depending on the size of population and covering different 
groups of society, 2-3 households were selected to take a more in-depth look on the 
community development problems and explore the potentials for CDD. Locally 
significant indicators of poverty and exclusion were used to purposely select 
marginalized households who have no sufficient access to the basic social services and 
livelihood sources (e.g. those who do not have electricity/piped water in their home, or 
                                                
19
 For detailed information about the livelihood and welfare of surveyed households in each targeted community see 
the tables on pages 199-201  in the appendix.  
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those who do not own land). The representation of female-headed households was also 
ensured.  
3.4 Empirical work   
The centre of attention of the social capital analysis on macro level was to explore the 
institutional and political arrangements to participatory local governance necessary to 
support CDD. The aim of social capital analysis on micro and meso levels was to 
analyze the local potentials and obstacles to CDD. On micro-level observation, the 
major focus of data collection and analysis were on household, group and community 
levels of decision-making; on meso level on sub-district level; and on macro level on 
district, provincial and regional levels. The applied methods of data collection in each 
level of analysis are presented in the following sections (see Table  3.3 on page 80).  
Methods to analyze social capital on macro-level  
The investigation of macro level, which was principally the objective of the first period 
of the empirical work conducted during June-July 2005, focused more on reviewing and 
analyzing primary and secondary data at regional, provincial and district levels. The 
participatory and interdisciplinary methods of data collection e.g. workshop, seminar, ad 
hoc conversation and active observation were applied to collect the primary data, which 
provided the opportunity to test the relevancy of the research concepts and 
methodologies to the local context of the research area. The secondary information were 
available in published form e.g. documents, statistics, books and newspapers articles, 
which were reflecting the statements and views of local people and institutions, top 
political leaders, different line ministries, international development agencies and civil 
society organizations operating in the research area.  
Indeed, analysing the macro level of social capital as an ongoing task was not limited 
to the data obtained during the first period of the empirical work. The information was 
continuously updated by reviewing the local and international media about the political 
and institutional changes, which somehow would influence the local development in the 
research area. However, the methods that were applied during the first period of the 
empirical work to obtain primary data are described as follows. 
Workshop  
As part of research methodology, a participatory and interdisciplinary workshop 
including focus group discussions in Qaradagh (rural sub-district centre in the 
Sulaimanyah province) on 30th June 2005 was conducted to discuss the reasons for mass 
out-migration of rural people in the region. The main reasons of out-migration were 
discussed and linked to the level of life quality in the most remote communities20. 
Representatives from different ministries, NGOs, research institutions and grassroots 
people and organizations e.g. farmer union and women association were invited and 
organized in four interdisciplinary groups to discuss a case study of a village bordered 
to Iran suffering from low access to basic social services and road infrastructure which 
have caused mass out-migration of local manpower.  
                                                
20
 During the second period of the empirical work, these problems were more analyzed in relation to the social capital 
and local institutions on micro and meso levels. 
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The participants were highly inspired by such methods of discussions and team-
working to achieve common objectives. Most groups were very dynamic in the 
discussions and were convinced that they can only reach a consensus about the 
sustainable rural development strategies when rural people themselves are actively 
involved in the problem definition, planning and implementation of the development 
activities. The groups came out with different plans of action and then all groups put 
together their ideas and recommended some political strategies to solve the current rural 
development problems. The emphasis was to increase public awareness and policy 
making not to take any steps for the urban development at the expense of rural 
development. It was suggested to establish appropriate institutional mechanisms for 
integrated and sustainable regional planning which ensure the balance between rural and 
urban development. However, a strong link between research concepts and 
methodologies and the development problems in the research area was observed. In fact, 
this was an encouraging factor to continue arranging such kind of participatory and 
interdisciplinary methods of data collection during the second period of the empirical 
work for obtaining more reliable local data.  
Seminar 
A seminar at the ministry of agriculture in Erbil on 6th July 2005 was conducted, which 
many local people and institutions were invited in order to explore the connection 
between research topic and the current rural problems. Many positive reactions and 
constructive comments were received from the participants to capture a representative 
picture of the current rural development problems in the research area. Indeed, the 
inputs from the participants helped to select two different rural sub-districts as 
representative sites for further investigation in the second period of the empirical work.  
Ad hoc conversation  
Spontaneous conversation with out-migrated rural people was also useful to know about 
the current economic and socio-demographic situation in the rural area and the reason 
for low incitement to increase the agricultural production. The spontaneous reactions of 
the respondents about the root of the problems would have never come up through a 
planned information gathering method, for example, a structured interview. But the 
reliability of any spontaneous reaction has to be questioned and cross-checked.  
Semi-structured interviews with the district institutions  
Semi-structured interview with the respective head of governmental agencies 
(agriculture, health, education, communication and transportation) in the district centre 
of Chwarta on 25th June 2005 were conducted. The main aim was to obtain relevant 
information for selection criteria of a sub-district that faces most development problems 
in the district.  One of the used indicators was the number of out-migrated people from 
the sub-district during the last years.  
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Table  3.3: Applied data collection methods and triangulation 
Levels of 
social 
capital 
analysis  
Levels of  
decision-
making  
Applied data collection methods 
 
Study issues related to the research questions  
Number of 
interviews and 
focus group 
discussions  
Number of 
questions  
Household 
 
Integrated interview guide 
 
- Local capacities for CDD 
-Stock of social capital and the interplay among different forms of  
  social capital to promote CDD  
-Link between civic social capital and institutional social capital  
10 108 
Group 
Semi-structured interview with the leaders, 
members and non members of community 
organizations 
-Strengths and weaknesses of  community-level organizations to  
  promote CDD 
- Horizontal and vertical relationships among institutions as part of    
social capital 
28 40 
Group interview of the key informants 
-General information about the selected communities and service  
 provision problems, and the role of the community groups in  
 service provision  
-The rate of community participation in planning and   
 implementation process of  the development projects  and past  
 experience with CDD   
4 76 
Micro 
Community 
Focus group discussions with male and female 
groups in separate sessions  
Cross-checking the obtained information from the key informants 
providing a more in-depth and reliable view on the community 
development problems 
6 125 
Semi-structured interview of the sub-district 
institutions  
- Existing institutional structure and coordination mechanisms 
-Organizational and institutional obstacles to establish local 
governance necessary to support CDD 
12 35 
Meso Sub-district 
 
Focus group discussions 
With targeted people and institutions cross-checking the reliability 
of obtained information about the selected communities  and 
initiating the analysis of obstacles to local governance and CDD  
2 3 
Macro 
District, 
provincial and 
regional 
(Policy ) 
Primary data: Semi-structured interviews of 
district institutions, rural workshop including 
focus group discussion, seminar and ad hoc 
conservation.  
Secondary data: newspaper articles, books and 
official documents, internet sources. 
Enabling environment in form of existing polices and institutional 
arrangements for participatory local governance necessary to 
support CDD.  
 
7 - 
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Active observation  
Active observation was conducted during the entire process of the first period of the 
empirical work. One of the lessons learnt was that in the local context there is a need to 
be a very good listener and observer in interaction with local people to find out the main 
trend of institutional problems to CDD.  
Methods to analyze social capital on micro and meso levels  
Different methods of data collection (in six steps) were applied on four levels of 
decision-making during April 2006 (see Table  3.3 on page 80). Ensuring a logical 
consistency of the applied methods, in the following sections each method is discussed 
thoroughly including the way how the method was applied and how the accuracy of the 
obtained data is ensured21.  
Group interview of the key informants 
In a group interview of the community key informants, the general information on the 
community was obtained to know if and how the community people have access to 
basic social services, which institutions provide the services, how the quality of 
available services is, and if there are groups in the community that work closely with the 
service providers to improve the quality of the services. Subsequently, all existing 
groups and institutions in the community and their role in improving the living 
conditions of the people were investigated. In an assessment their origin and link with 
government; their membership and leadership; and their organizational and decision-
making structure were analyzed. The aim was to explore how far the groups are 
community-based; who has the influential power in the community; and what is the role 
of each group to provide services demanded by community people. Finally, the most 
important development and reconstruction projects implemented in the community 
since 1991 were evaluated to find out if they have really contributed to solving the 
community’s development problems in a sustainable manner and if and how the 
community people and groups have been involved in the planning and implementation 
process.  
Focus group discussions with community people  
In focus group discussions with community people, all data obtained from the key 
informants was cross-checked and completed to find more accurate information about 
the community’s perspective on the quality of services available, their experience with 
collective action, their views of community organizations and development projects. At 
the end, the work of most important CBOs was evaluated, if they have really been 
meeting the community’s needs and if they have the capacity to create sustained 
relationships and effective vertical interactions with the institutions outside of the 
community. The most important institutions to the community were ranked by groups 
for a further in-depth analysis in the next method of data collection.  
                                                
21
 For identification of the surveyed households and groups including the date of interview or discussion in the 
targeted communities and sub-districts see the tables on pages 197-198 in the appendix.  
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Focus group discussions were carried out both with men and women in two separate 
sessions as a gender triangulation. Efforts were made to purposely select marginalized 
household members from different settlements and social groups in the community. The 
representation of female-headed households and other vulnerable households was also 
ensured. During the process of discussion, the role of the researcher was not only to 
facilitate the discussion but also to make sure that no one would dominate the discussion 
and every participant had the equal chance to speak out in order to gain a more reliable 
result of the discussion. Less active participants were encouraged to more discussion 
e.g. by asking specific questions to them.  
Semi-structured interview with the community organizations 
In semi-structured interviews, the ranked institutions from the focus group discussions 
were further profiled to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the nature of community 
organizations; their development over time, activities, leadership and membership; and  
to gain a more balanced view on the role of the organizations in the community 
development. Furthermore, it was assessed if the organization has effective and 
complementary horizontal relationships with other community institutions and vertical 
interaction with government institutions and the NGOs and in this manner producing 
bridging social capital.  
Integrated interview guide 
An integrated interview guide of those household members who were politically and 
socially marginalized or of some reasons could not participate in the household group 
discussions was conducted to find more reliable data about the community’s 
development problems, services available, associational life and the situation of poorest 
of poor in the community. It happened that some household members who participated 
in the focus group discussions did not express their views, maybe of the fear to be 
punished if their criticism would direct to a certain person or authority or of other 
personal reasons. Therefore, it was relevant to target them for a more personal interview 
which helped to increase rapport with the most vulnerable households. The strength of 
any face-to-face mode of communication is to avoid misunderstanding between the 
sender and receiver of a message and thereby increasing the chance to obtain more 
reliable information. The questions were asked in local language and were reformulated 
when the respondent did not understand them.  
Other purposes of the integrated interview guide was to explore the nature and extent 
of social relations between the households and associations inside  the community on 
one hand as both cognitive and structural social capital, and the links to markets, states 
and NGOs on the other hand as bridging social capital. Measuring the community’s 
stock of social capital, six dimensions of social capital (adapted from Grootaert et al., 
2004) were analyzed. In each dimension a couple of questions related to the research 
objectives and questions were asked to conduct an in-depth analysis of the role of social 
capital in the community development as follows.  
a) Social cohesion and inclusion: Social cohesion manifests in individuals who are 
willing and able: to work together to address common needs; to overcome 
constraints; and to resolve differences in a civil and non-confrontational way.  
Inclusion promotes equal access to opportunities, and removes both formal and 
informal barriers to participation. The main questions that were asked in this 
dimension are listed as follows.  
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• What is the heterogeneity rate of the community?  
• Do differences among community people cause problems, lead to conflict and 
violence and in this manner influence the sense of common action negatively?  
• Is the homogeneity of groups an important assumption to create and maintain the 
effective interaction and sustained relationship among community people?  
• What is the nature of everyday social interactions in the community? 
b) Trust and solidarity: These informal and subjective elements of interpersonal 
behaviour, as the most important component of social capital, shape people’s 
thoughts and attitudes about interacting with others. When individuals and groups in 
a certain community trust each other, then they can easier reach agreements and 
conduct transactions. The main questions were:  
• What is the solidarity rate among community people especially in emergency 
cases?  
• What is the rate of trust among homogenous group members as cognitive social 
capital and to the other groups and institutions beyond the household and 
relatives as bridging social capital?    
c) Collective action and cooperation: The provision of many services requires 
collective action by a group of individuals. The purposes of collective action may 
differ widely across communities. In some places, collective action consists 
primarily of community-organized activities for building and maintaining 
infrastructure and for providing related public services. In other places, collective 
action is important for achieving improved governance and accountability, and used 
for example to lobby elected officials to provide more services to the community. 
The main questions were:  
• What is the rate of common sense, collective action and cooperation among 
community people to solve their own problems?  
• Which are the local norms to encourage participation or punish those who do not 
participate in the community activities? 
d) Informal networks and associational life: Engagements of people to organize 
themselves and mobilize resources to solve problems of common interest are some 
of the outputs from groups and networks that enhance or build upon social capital. 
The effectiveness of groups and networks and the extent to which they can help 
disseminate information, reduce opportunistic behaviour and facilitate collective 
decision-making depends upon many aspects of these groups, reflecting their 
structure, their membership and the way they function. The main questions that were 
asked in this dimension are listed as follows. 
• Has the household access to informal network beyond the household and 
relatives to turn to for assistance in emergency cases? 
• In general, what is the rate of associational life in the community?  
• Do the household members take an active part in community’s associational 
life?  
• Do they participate in the decision-making process of those groups that are most 
important to the household?  
• What is the organizational capacity of important groups to the household? 
• Which is the main benefit from joining the groups?  
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• How far the groups are democratic and effective regarding decision-making 
process and selection of leader?  
• Finally, what is the capacity of the groups to effectively interact and cooperate 
with the groups inside the community as horizontal bridging social capital and 
with the institutions outside of the community as vertical bridging social capital?  
e) Information and communication: They are central to social interactions. 
Downward flows of information from the policy level and upward flows from the 
local level are critical components of the development process. Horizontal 
information flows strengthen capacity by providing civil society a medium for 
knowledge and idea exchange. Open dialogue fosters a sense of community, while 
secrecy breeds suspicion and distrust.  Enhancing the dissemination of information 
can break down negative social capital as well as build trust and cohesion. The main 
questions were:  
• How is the accessibility of the household members to information and 
communication facilities such as post, telephone and media (television, radio, 
magazines, and newspapers)?  
• Which are the three most important sources of market communication and 
information e.g. about the food prices and what government and other 
institutions are doing?  
• How is the road accessibility in order to communicate and obtain information?   
f) Empowerment and political action: Empowerment refers to the expansion of 
assets and capabilities of people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control 
and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives. Empowerment is thus a 
broader concept than social capital and political action is only one of many activities 
that can be undertaken to increase empowerment. The main questions were:  
• Have the household members enough power to make important decisions over 
issues that affect them in everyday life?   
• Have they impact to change the course of their life and making their own 
community a better place to live?  
• What is the rate of common sense of the community people to jointly request 
government officials or political leaders for something benefiting the 
community?  
• To what extent the local governments and local leaders take into account 
concerns voiced by household members?  
• Did the household members go to vote in last elections?  
• Which are the opinions of the household members about the honesty rate and 
corrupted behaviour of the officials and staff of local institutions?  
Semi-structured interviews of sub-district institutions  
As part of a larger participatory and integrated empirical work and after that information 
was gathered in two different communities, the head of sub-district institutions were 
interviewed to capture more views about the development problems on the community 
level. The objective was also to find out some key information about the whole of the 
sub-district in order to know how the obtained information from the investigated 
communities fits into the larger picture of the sub-district.  
In an interview with the head of the sub-district government , the structure of the 
sub-district government and what powers and responsibilities does it has; the rate of 
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political participation of the people in the sub-district issues; how the community people 
are represented in the government, the main sources of revenue for the sub-district 
administration, were evaluated. 
In an interview with the district head of the Kurdistan Women Union (KWU) as 
largest civic organization in the Seweil sub-district affiliated to the PUK and the head of 
the sub-district organization of the KDP in the Harir sub-district, the general 
information and the history of organization; the role of these organizations in local 
development comparing with the roles of CBOs; the relationship of the organization 
with the government and conditions of the relationship and cooperation; if the 
organization is able to influence government decisions and activities; and the 
relationships of the organization with other civic organizations in the sub-district, were 
assessed. 
Finally, in interviews with managers of the different line agencies on the sub-district 
level, information about the relative role of the agencies in planning, staff management 
and financing of the basic social and livelihood services was obtained. It was also 
analyzed which kind of service by what institution has been provided in the sub-district 
over the last three years and the rate of cooperation among sub-district government, line 
agencies, civic organizations and international NGOs to gain synergy effect and to 
increase the quality of  services.  
Sub-district focus group discussions   
In the final stage of the empirical work, focus group discussions were conducted to 
already present the obtained data and initiate the analysis of the institutional problems to 
community development in consultation with the local people involved in data 
gathering activities. The further objective was to support the generation of visions of the 
participants how to act for participatory local governance and CDD, where efforts were 
made to make the knowledge and experiences of the participants more productive. The 
discussions were structured to assess the key community problems; to collect the 
proposed solutions which were sometimes contradictory; and finally proposing the most 
rationally and agreed solution to the key problems. This was an effective way to make 
the final cross-checking of the obtained information from different sources.  
3.5 Conclusions and critical reflections  
Fundamental to action-oriented research is that it is not just enough to analyse and 
understand the social world. Necessary efforts must be made to change the social world 
where the commitment of any action-oriented researcher is to bring about change as part 
of the research act. Action learning throughout the research process has determined 
most appropriate approaches of the research strategy.  
In the local context, it is very important to establish trustful personal relationships 
with the institutions before conducting any information gathering activity. Therefore, 
during the first period of the empirical work an informal network of institutions and 
individuals was built, not only for the purpose of reliable and valid data collection in the 
second period of the empirical work but also for creating the political and social 
commitment to implement the research recommendations afterwards. Furthermore, a 
wide understanding of current political and institutional arrangements on macro level as 
enabling environment to local governance and CDD was provided; effective local 
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indicators of institutional effectiveness on micro and meso levels were developed22; a 
sampling framework including the case study selection was determined; and a suitable 
and systematic plan was designed for the second period of the empirical work.  
The researcher was already familiar with some local shortcomings in finding reliable 
information, for example, the respondents especially from the government institutions 
would be reluctant to officially leave reliable information because of the organizational 
behaviour inherited from the former Iraqi system. Therefore, during the first period of 
the empirical work, efforts were made to establish personal contact and trust with the 
targeted institutions and local people to facilitate the implementation process of the data 
collection activities in the second period in a relaxed atmosphere.  
Incentives to participation of local people in data collection methods were: a) to 
promise them to communicate their needs and problems in the local media; and b) to try 
to implement the result of the investigation afterwards that might improve their living 
conditions. As one of the principles of the research ethics, keeping the first promise is 
already in the process by highlighting the roots of rural development problems in local 
media and proposing creative ideas and solutions based on existing knowledge. About 
the second promise, after finalizing the doctoral studies it is intended to try to 
implement the ideas of CDD first on the targeted communities as pilot projects.  
Test of scientific analysis  
In contrast to quantitative researchers who try to disassociate themselves as much as 
possible from the research process, qualitative researchers have to play a significant role 
in the research process as the credibility of a qualitative research largely depends on the 
ability and effort of the researchers. Nevertheless, both qualitative and quantitative 
researchers have to test and show that their studies are credible (Golafshani, 2003:600).     
The credibility of this qualitative research would be increased by testing its capacity 
to conduct a scientific analysis. The researcher has been living in different countries and 
has gained considerable amount of experiences from many different systems of 
management and organization. He has also considerable amount of local knowledge and 
personal contacts with local people and authorities, which helped to critically and 
neutrally review the sources of information and bridging the gap of limited access to 
relevant and reliable data as a usual problem in the research area.  
During the second period of the empirical work the researcher lived a few days 
among people in each selected community in order to build confidence among different 
groups of people; to do research with local people and not for them; to take an active 
observation about the situation in the community; and thereby reducing the information 
bias. This actually helped to involve local people and institutions in the investigation 
process.  
It has to be noted that some applied methods were already pre-tested during the first 
period of the empirical work and evaluated as relevant information gathering tool in the 
local context23. As communication between the participating group members had a 
corrective function, it is supposed to increase both validity and reliability of the 
obtained data24.  However, ensuring a scientific analysis of the obtained data the rate of 
validity and reliability must be carefully examined.  
                                                
22
 Mainly as six dimensions of social capital described in the sub-section of “Integrated interview guide” on page 82.  
23
 See the section of “Methods to analyze social capital on macro-level” on page 78.  
24
 See the section of “Triangulation” on page 65 to know how by methodological triangulation the data was analyzed.  
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Can triangulation increase the rate of validity and reliability  
The concepts of validity and reliability are used to clarify the nature of possible 
measurement errors. Hubert and Blalock (1968:13) state that “From a logical or 
theoretical standpoint, a measure is said to be valid to the degree that it measures what it 
is supposed to measure”. Two kinds of validity are concerned in this research.  
First: internal validity in which the degree of validity is determined by the fact that 
the result of the analysis is really true or approximated true. Using a combination of 
different methods that cross-check the truth of the obtained information will increase the 
rate of internal validity (ibid: 390-391). Indicators for measuring six dimensions of 
social capital was developed and used in the integrated interview guide highly related to 
other methods of data collection25.   
Second: external validity is defined by Golafshani (2003:603) as “the ability to 
generalize findings to wider groups and circumstances” which is considered to be quite 
high because the two investigated rural sub-districts are politically, geographically and 
sociologically different from each other and to a large extent cover the main 
institutional problems to CDD in the rain-fed area of the region. Therefore, it is 
supposed that conclusions drawn from the analysis will extend beyond the immediate 
final results in the research area as two different survey systems, to the rest of rain-fed 
area of the region that consists of the same mechanisms and conditions, and 
consequently increasing the degree of analytical generalization. In any case, the degree 
of analytical generalization of obtained data from micro level must be carefully 
examined because of very different local circumstances.  
About the reliability concept, Hubert and Blalock (1968:12) state that:  
“The concept of reliability is built into the notion of an operational definition. If 
the instructions are not clear enough for two different researchers, working 
independently, to get the same or nearly the same results, then they are of little 
use” 
The reliability is also defined as the degree of objectivity that is supposed to be high 
because of combining many methods of information gathering as part of triangulation 
that are balancing and completing each other. Therefore, the probability that other 
researchers would draw the same conclusions from the same obtained information is 
supposed to be high.  
Triangulation, which includes multiple methods of data collection and data analysis, 
is particularly useful in this research work as more qualitative, where the human 
judgment to figure out the development problems in a complex context is very valuable. 
The use of triangulation as a tool to cross-check the reliability of obtained information 
in a post-conflict situation such as in the research area, which lack established 
institutional norms and structures, is highly relevant. In a qualitative research, for 
example, in focus group discussions it is always difficult to find out who says the truth. 
Therefore, avoiding the information bias, it is the task of the researcher to make a fair 
human judgment through cross-checking the obtained information from different 
stakeholders and interests and relying on his own sense after many days staying in the 
research area. Triangulation demands many efforts from the researcher to read between 
the lines when the obtained information is complex and unclear.  
Moreover, applying participatory methods of data collection and triangulation will 
ensure that the target groups would gain a relatively clear understanding about their own 
situation by entering a process of self-evaluation and thereby obtaining feedbacks on the 
                                                
25
 See “Methods to analyze social capital on micro and meso levels” on page 81 .  
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validity and reliability of obtained data and the result. Triangulation can also facilitate a 
learning experience by exchanging the results between different disciplines and levels 
of decision-making. In optimal cases, applying participatory methods of data collection 
can help people to plan and act on their own premises which is in accordance with the 
participatory planning approach.  
In the next chapter, based on methodological pluralism and triangulation using 
different methods of data collection, the institutional gaps to CDD will be analyzed.  
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4 Analysis of existing institutional framework for CDD 
The chapter is structured as following. In the first section, a service provision profile of 
the targeted communities is provided to explain the quality of existing public services 
on community level. In the second section, past experiences with CDD will be analyzed, 
which the impact of reconstruction and development projects implemented by different 
institutions after 1991 will be evaluated to know if the development actors have 
succeeded to encourage local participation in development planning and thereby 
initiating a CDD. In the third section, based on the assessment of service problems and 
past experiences with CDD, the existing stock of social capital to initiative any CDD in 
the targeted communities will be discussed. The focus of analysis is on the six 
dimensions of social capital as the indicators for local institutional capacity. In the 
fourth section, the existing institutional arrangements on local level for CDD will be 
presented. In addition, it will be discussed if there is a favourable policy framework as 
an enabling environment to local governance and CDD. In the fifth section, the existing 
institutional norms will be analysed to explore how they are applied in reality and how 
they conform to CDD. 
In the conclusion, the common issues and phenomena of development problems in 
the research area will be summarized and the existing policies and institutional 
structures to promote regional rural development and CDD will be discussed26. 
4.1 Key service problems on community level 
In this section the accessibility to the basic services in the targeted communities is 
discussed. Available community services were assessed in a participatory approach and 
according to the main criteria of sustainable community development comprising social, 
environmental and economic aspects which are classified in three main groups 
according to the local context and will be discussed thoroughly in the following sub-
sections:  
a) Basic social services (health, education, drinking water and electricity) which are 
the basic elements to live in a rural community in the research area. 
b) Environmental protection services (waste water management, solid waste 
management and landmines clearance) which are preconditions to provide a 
sustainable, healthy, attractive and productive environment in the community. 
c) Livelihood generating services (irrigation water, road infrastructure, land tenure, 
credit facilities and other agricultural and marketing support services) as primary 
production inputs to which access must be in place in order to ensure a sustainable 
livelihood for the community people. 
                                                
26
 According to the research ethics, the name of the respondents or interviewees and other people who have been 
involved in data collection activities will not be mentioned, if not necessary. But upon the request they are available 
only for the research purpose. 
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Basic social services  
The synthesised results from the targeted communities in both sub-districts show that 
everyone has equal access to the school without paying any school fees and as an old 
traditional value the rate of community action for solving the school problems and to 
improve the quality of education is very high and the community people respond very 
quickly to the request of the school. 
 The health care centre provides only basic health services and for every visit the 
community people have to pay a small amount of money which includes the supply of 
medicines and even the poorest of poor can afford it. For more advanced health 
services, the community people have to travel to the health clinic in the sub-district or 
district centre. This would not be a great trouble in the Harir sub-district with relatively 
high road accessibility where people can make a fast move to the nearest clinic in the 
sub-district centre. 
In general, the people in the Seweil sub-district suffer more from the shortages of 
basic social services as it is located in hinterland with low road accessibility. In both 
targeted communities in Seweil, the health care centre has limited capacity and provides 
only the basic services. In addition, the low road accessibility in a community like 
Marwe does not allow easy access to the nearest hospital in the district centre. In the 
group interview of the key informants in Bewre (7April 2006) and focus group 
discussions with male and female groups in separate sessions in Bewre (8April 2006), 
the participants stated that they were not satisfied with the quality of health services 
delivered by the non-inborn officials who lack accountability both downward to the 
community people and upward to the health ministry. This is an example that the 
existing institutional norms and structures, which must ensure the accountability of the 
officials upward to the ministry, are neither applied in the reality nor conform to CDD.     
Furthermore, in both surveys the people in Bewre complained that the ministry of 
education has ignored their need to establish a secondary school in the community. In 
an interview with the head of women association in Bewre (9April 2006), the need to 
establish a secondary school in the community was confirmed. But, the interviewee 
added that the ministry of education did not agree on that because it had already planned 
to build the student houses in the district centre for secondary school pupils from 
Bewre. It is true that any public investment must be viable both economically and 
socially but the core problem has been that community people are usually not involved 
in decision-making process how to improve the access to the social services.  
The bad condition of the road in Marwe is usually the main bottleneck to the supply 
of most public services which especially during the wet seasons is a hinder for the 
pupils to attend the secondary school in the neighbouring village. In most communities 
in the Seweil sub-district, there is no secondary school, which has convinced many 
households to migrate back to the urban area. In a semi-structured interview, the 
director of primary school in Marwe stated that: 
“Immediately after reconstruction of the Marwe village in 1991, the community 
people made efforts to establish a school, which was built in 1992 by UN in 
cooperation with the ministry of education. At the beginning, the teaching Staff was 
only three to serve about 195 pupils but now (in April 2006) has increased to ten to 
serve only 75 pupils. So, while the number of teachers has increased, the number of 
students has decreased due to the latest rural-urban mass migration” (Director of 
primary school in Marwe, 7April 2006) 
Generally, the people in the Seweil sub-district have a relatively low access to vertical 
assistance and therefore they must rely on their own limited capacity. They have built 
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membership users group e.g. for drinking water and electricity supply where a certain 
amount of fees is obtained and a local person is hired to maintain the service supply 
system (Semi-structured interview of leaders, members and non members of water users 
groups in Marwe, 2 April 2006 ; in Bewre, 8 April 2006).  
Among the investigated communities only Old Batas in the Harir sub-district thanks 
to its location close to the sub-district centre and urban area, has a comparatively high 
access to the public services. The community has no water problems; receives regular 
vertical assistance from the municipality in managing the waste water and has very easy 
access to the intermediary school and the secondary school (Group interview of the key 
informants in Old Batas, 25 April 2006; Focus group discussions with male group in 
Old Batas, 26 April 2006).  
Environmental protection services  
In the Seweil sub-district before 1978 the male members in the community used the 
WCs in mosque and the female members the WCs near the “women spring”. But after 
the comeback in 1991 each household in the community has dug a hole in the backyard 
as an outside latrine and make individual efforts to maintain the system which can cause 
the pollution of ground water. The community people are relatively less empowered to 
demand the governmental institutions for assistance in improving the sanitation and 
sewage system (Focus group discussions with male and female groups in separate 
sessions in Marwe, 1-2 April 2006; in Bewre, 8 April 2006).  
The synthesised results from focus group discussions in all targeted communities and 
the personal observation show that in none of the investigated sub-districts, the 
condition of sewage system inside the community is satisfactory. The liquid waste is 
carried away uncovered, through small streams inside the village, into the river that is a 
great danger for public health and hygiene and can in long-term make imbalance on the 
local ecosystem. In addition, it disgusts the tourists to visit the community and thereby 
having a negative impact on the livelihood of the community people. Moreover, the 
investigated communities have no effective solid waste disposal system especially for 
mass animal manure that threatens the healthy environment of the community and again 
distracts the visitors. Only in Old Batas the municipality of Harir takes the responsibility 
to regularly carry away water waste or sewage from the place. The households do not 
need to make individual efforts to maintain the system and there is no risk to pollute the 
ground water (Group interview of the key informants in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).  
During the armed conflict between the PUK and the KDP and triple embargo on the 
Kurdish region during 1990s, which caused lack of fuel for the whole region, the 
villagers carried out massive deforestation both for their own firewood consumption and 
as a source of income. Since 1991, the KRG has legislated law against any kind of 
deforestation. In general, no attempt has been made to make improvements of the 
quality of local ecosystem and it has not been any efforts by the community groups to 
obtain certain environmental protection services e.g. for soil and forest management and 
biodiversity conservation. The rate of environmental awareness of local people is very 
low and they have to prioritise the social and economic concerns. In the Seweil sub-
district, which has faced the problem of landmines, some limited activities of landmine 
clearance have been conducted. Ineffective delivery of the landmines clearance service, 
as a cross-sectoral service, has caused social, economic and environmental problems in 
Bewre (Group interview of the key informants in Bewre, 7April 2006).  
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Livelihood generating services  
In both investigated sub-districts, there are very limited agricultural support services e.g. 
training, technical assistance and credit, except that the agricultural agency in the sub-
district every year sells agricultural inputs like chemical pesticides and fertilizer to the 
farmers on a price not much lower than the market prices. The governmental institutions 
and NGOs have assisted only to reconstruct the streams for irrigated farming. In 
contrast to all other investigated communities, Jamasor lacks natural streams for 
drinking water and irrigated farming according to the focus group discussions in 
Jamasor(20 April 2006) and personal observation. In the research area, there is also lack 
of land titles. The synthesised results from the focus group discussions in all targeted 
communities show that the landlords have no document as evidence to own the land and 
most participants from the focus group discussions believed that this would not cause 
problem and conflict and thereby affecting their sense of solidarity and common action. 
There is a traditional agreement that every land has a name and after the death of the 
owner his/her relatives inherit the land.  
The synthesised results from the integrated interview guide indicate that both 
investigated sub-districts share the same trend about the credit facilities. Most of 
community members are close relatives to each other and if someone needs to borrow 
money for business or other purposes, the friends and relative are helpful. The trust, 
solidarity, and social obligation among the community people to help each other in case 
of emergency are so strong that the borrower does not need to pay interest or leave 
collateral. Usually, the community members collect money for poor members and 
young couples who want to get married without any demand to pay back. There are only 
traditional and informal credit institutions like the Community Fund in Bewre whose 
head in an interview (8 April 2006) stated that the institution “lacks of capacity and 
external link in order to efficiently deliver the services”.   
Ineffective service delivery   
To summarize, people on community level in the research area are facing different 
development problems. While the Seweil sub-district is in more urgent need for 
increasing the road accessibility and improving the quality of basic social services, the 
Harir sub-district need more livelihood generating services except in Jamasor where the 
major concern is access to water. The people of Old Batas demand even for recreational 
services (the group interview of the key informants in Old Batas, 25 April 2006). 
But on the other hand, people in the Seweil sub-district are more experienced in 
building their own membership organizations for public services independently from the 
government and political parties while people in the Harir sub-district lack such local 
initiative (see the tables on the next pages). After the implementation of the water 
project in Jamasor the people took the initiative to create a water users group. But, in 
contrast to the water users groups in the targeted communities in the Seweil sub-district, 
the leader is appointed and paid by the government to coordinate the water sharing 
among the households and no water fees on the regularly basis are obtained. Only those 
households that have access to the piped water are irregularly paying for the reserve 
parts and other operation and maintenance costs (Interview with leaders, members and 
non-members of the water users group in Jamasor, 21April 2006).  
The synthesized findings from the group interview of the community key informants 
show that none of the investigated communities fulfil the requirements for achieving a 
CDD. There is high lack of effective provision of basic social services, environmental 
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protection services and livelihood generating services. The basic social services e.g. 
health, education, drinking water and electricity, which are the basic elements to live in 
a community, are highly lacking. The environmental protection services e.g. waste 
water management, solid waste management and landmines clearance, which are 
preconditions to provide a healthy, attractive and productive environment in the 
community, are missing. In addition, access to an effective irrigation system, passable 
road, marketing facilities and agricultural support services (as primary production 
inputs) are not in place to provide a sustainable livelihood for the community people.  
Indeed, limited livelihood sources are caused by many factors e.g. ineffective 
irrigation system, low access to road and marketing facilities. As a result, the farmers 
cannot compete with the imported food products. Indeed, the decreased demand for 
domestic food grains has been one of the main reasons to recent rural-urban mass 
migration. In addition, the policy efforts have been to create jobs only within the public 
sector in urban area. As a result, most people in both targeted sub-districts feel 
extremely ignored and discriminated by governmental institutions (the workshop in 
Qaradagh, rural sub-district centre in the Sulaimanyah province, 30 June 2005; seminar 
at the ministry of agriculture in Erbil, 6 July 2005).  
Based on the group interview of the Key informants, for each targeted community an 
institutional landscape is illustrated in the following pages. The questions for tabulation 
are: 
1) Could you mention all the groups and institutions which presently exist in the 
community? Examples: religious groups, credit groups, water users groups, 
women’s groups, etc.  
2) What have been the major role and positive impact of these groups in helping to 
improve the people’s well-being in the past 3 years?  
3) Some groups may share the same members, others may have different members. 
Please identify the groups which have the same membership.  
4) Some groups have connections with the government, some don’t. Which groups are 
formally linked with the government?  
5) Which groups are set up because of a government program, and maybe even receive 
money from them?  
6) Government employees are often very active in the community. Which groups have 
leaders who are civil servants?  
7) Do you know which of the groups have elections to choose their leaders?  
8) If you look at the 3 largest groups in the community, has their leadership been stable 
or the leaders whom have been changed because of their behaviour?  
9) Which is the main financial source of the group?  
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Table  4.1: Institutional profile of Marwe  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Institution/group Which role and 
positive impact in the 
last 3 years? 
Same 
membership? 
Formal 
government 
link? 
Set up by the 
government? 
Government 
worker lead? 
Leaders elected? Leaders 
changed? 
Which financial 
source? 
Drinking water 
users group 
Easier access to  clean 
water 
Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Monthly membership 
fees  
Electricity users 
group 
All people have access 
to electricity 
Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Monthly membership 
fees 
Irrigation 
water users group 
Main input for 
livelihood generating 
No No No No Yes Yes 
Rotating-based work 
of members 
Community 
mosque 
 
Burial ceremonies, 
social and spiritual 
meeting 
Yes 
Yes, ministry 
of Islamic 
issues 
No No No Yes 
Government, but 
usually the 
community people 
pay extra to the Imam 
Village council 
 
Informs the government 
about the community 
problems 
No 
Yes, but it is 
elected by 
community 
No No Yes 
Yes, every four 
years 
Community members  
Health care centre 
Provides the basic 
health services  
Yes Yes 
Yes, but the 
community 
proposed the 
foundation 
Yes 
Yes, by the Staff 
members but in 
agreement with the 
ministry  
Yes, but in 
agreement with 
the ministry 
Ministry of Health  
Primary school 
Provides the basic 
education services  
No Yes 
Yes, but the 
community 
initiated it  
Yes 
Yes, by the Staff 
members in agreement 
with the ministry 
Yes, but in 
agreement with 
the ministry 
Ministry of 
Education  
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Table  4.2: Institutional profile of Bewre  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Institution/group Which role and positive impact in the 
last 3 years? 
Same 
membership
? 
Formal 
government 
link? 
Set up by 
government? 
Government 
worker lead? 
Leaders 
elected? 
Leaders 
changed? 
Which financial 
source? 
Community fund As a social institution play an important 
role in emergency cases 
Yes No No No Yes Yes Community properties 
like land and forest 
Irrigation 
water users group 
Main input for livelihood  
generating 
No No No No Yes Yes Rotating-based work of 
members 
Herdsman group  Collective action for livestock raising   No No No No Yes Yes Rotating-based work of 
members 
Drinking water 
users group 
Easier access to  clean water 
Yes No No No Yes Yes Monthly membership 
fees 
Electricity users 
group 
All people have access to electricity 
Yes No No No Yes Yes Monthly membership 
fees 
Community 
mosque 
 
Burial ceremonies, social and spiritual 
meeting 
Yes 
Yes, ministry 
of Islamic 
issues 
No No No Yes Paid by the government 
but usually the 
community pays extra 
to the Imam 
Village  council 
 
Inform the government about the 
community problems 
No Yes, but it is 
elected by 
community 
No No Yes Yes, every 
four years 
Community members 
PUK local 
organization 
Influential  power to inform the 
politicians and governmental institutions 
about the community problems 
No Yes No No Yes Yes, every 
four years 
The PUK plus very 
small amount of 
membership fees 
PUK local women 
group  
Gender equality, awareness  raising of 
women and recreational activities 
No Yes No No Yes Yes, every 
four years 
The PUK plus very 
small amount of 
membership fees 
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Table  4.3: Institutional profile of Jamasor  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Institution 
/group 
Which role and positive impact 
in the last 3 years? 
Same 
membership? 
Formal government 
link? 
Set up by 
government? 
Government 
worker lead? 
Leaders 
elected? 
Leaders 
changed? 
Which financial 
source? 
Drinking water 
users group 
Easier access to  clean water Yes Yes No Yes No No Irregular contribution 
from the beneficiaries   
Community 
mosque 
 
Burial ceremonies, social and 
spiritual meeting 
Yes Yes, ministry of 
Islamic issues 
No Yes No Yes Government. but 
usually the community 
pays extra to the Imam 
Village  
representative 
Moktar27 
Inform the government about the 
community problems and help to 
officially contact the government  
No Yes Yes Yes No No Salary from government  
KDP local 
organization 
Influential power to inform the 
politicians and governmental 
institutions about the community 
problems; maintain the security in 
the community; and solve the 
social conflicts in the community  
No Yes No No Yes28 Yes, every 
four years 
The KDP plus very 
small amount of 
membership fees 
Health care centre Provide basic health services 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No The Ministry of Health 
Primary and 
secondary school  
Provide education services  No Yes Yes Yes No No The Ministry of 
Education   
Parent-teacher 
group 
Joint effort to improve the supply 
of education services  
No Yes No No Yes Yes Community people and 
the Ministry of 
Education   
                                                
27
 In 1997 the Moktar system replaced the village council.  
28
 Usually, the KDP nominate a candidate and the members make a formal decision.  
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Table  4.4: Institutional profile of Old Batas  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Institution/group Which role and positive impact in 
the last 3 years? 
Same 
membership? 
Formal 
government 
link? 
Set up by 
government? 
Government 
worker lead? 
Leaders 
elected? 
Leaders 
changed? 
Which financial 
source? 
Community burial 
fund  
 
Taking the financial responsibility 
for burial ceremonies. 
Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Upon request the 
community people 
are paying a certain 
amount of money  
Parent-teacher group 
Joint effort to improve the supply of 
education services in the community 
No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Community people 
and the Ministry of 
Education   
KDP local 
organization 
Influential power to inform the 
politicians and governmental 
institutions about the community 
problems; maintain the security in 
the community;  and solve the social 
conflicts in the community 
No Yes No No Yes29 
Yes, every 
four years 
The KDP plus very 
small amount of the 
membership fees on 
the monthly basis  
Local organization of 
the Kurdistan 
Farmers Union 
Offering the farmers supporting 
services for crop production and 
other agricultural related activities    
No Yes No No Yes30 Yes 
The KDP plus very 
small amount of the 
membership fees 
                                                
29
 Usually, the KDP nominate a candidate and the members make a formal decision. 
30
 The organization is affiliated to the KDP from which a candidate is nominated and the members make a formal decision.  
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The household participation in groups or organizations in the research area has 
relatively increased during last years but still the most powerful organization is the local 
association of the political parties to which even the civic organizations like women and 
farmers association are affiliated. The membership fee in these organizations is only a 
small amount of money to maintain the contact with members. Usually the household 
members share the same political believes as a strong family or tribal feeling. 
Furthermore, in most community groups one becomes a member of voluntary choice 
but according to the personal observation the social obligations and group pressure in 
the community do exist to join some groups e.g. the community burial group or the 
local political party.  
4.2 Past experiences with CDD  
Community involvement in local development   
Generally, there are no constrains to collective action among community people to 
make improvements of the services but local people have been denied involvement in 
the planning of the public services and reconstruction projects. From the findings, there 
are many cases of low rate of participation of local people and institutions in 
development planning particularly regarding the reconstruction of the villages during 
1990s. Synthesized results from both group interview of the community key informants 
and focus group discussions across the investigated communities show that since 1991, 
many reconstruction projects implemented in the Seweil sub-district have not in a 
sustainable manner contributed to solve the community’s problems. The community 
people and groups have been involved only in the implementation phase of the projects 
without any participation in planning and decision-making process. This has caused 
many maintenance problems and even conflict among local people when an unfinished 
project has been handed over to the community people. There are many cases from the 
findings to prove this, which are discussed thoroughly in the following sub-sections.  
Beekeeping project in Bewre  
In 2002, the World Food Programme (WFP) together with the district organization of 
the Kurdistan Women Union (KWU) affiliated with the PUK and the agricultural 
department in the district centre of Chwarta in the Sulaimanyah province were involved 
in the implementation of a beekeeping project in Bewre to improve the livelihood of the 
poor widows and female-headed households. In an interview, the head of the KWU 
district organization provided detailed information about the project: 
”The aim of the project as part of oil-for-food programme was to increase the 
technical knowledge of the targeted group in beekeeping so that they can run their 
own business. The WFP and the agricultural agency in the district centre selected 
Bewre for the project and our local committee in Bewre helped to identify and 
select the target group which one of the selection criteria of the participants was 
having experiences in beekeeping. The target group was given money and incentive 
enough to cover their daily expenses to attend a 15 days course in the district 
centre. The WFP staff continuously monitored the progress of the project“(Semi-
structured interview with the head of the KWU district organization in Chwarta, 16 
April 2006).  
But the project ended unsuccessfully after one year without reaching the project 
objective. The information about the reasons behind the failure of the project has been 
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obtained from different surveyed groups and has been cross-checked as part of 
triangulation and research methodology. The participants from the focus group 
discussion with female group in Bewre (8 April 2006) mentioned that the target group 
in Bewre were not involved in the planning phase of the beekeeping project and they 
were not properly trained to take over the activity. But, in a semi-structured interview 
with the head of the agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district other reasons behind 
the failure of the project were mentioned: 
“The agency was not involved in the design and implementation of the project 
despite the fact that in the Seweil sub-district is the most relevant agricultural 
institution to the community level. For example, it has more access to local 
knowledge; it has more technically experienced staff in beekeeping; and it is more 
familiar with the potentials and limitations of the agricultural-related activities in 
the area. Instead, the agricultural agency in the district centre was involved in the 
project which usually has less local knowledge about the Seweil sub-
district”(Semi-structured interview with the head of the agricultural agency in the 
Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006). 
The interviewee highlighted another important fact behind the failure of the beekeeping 
project in Bewre: 
“In addition, the bees were brought from the Sharazor area in the south part of the 
Sulaimanyah province with a completely different climate that made it hard for 
bees to survive in the new environment”(Semi-structured interview with the head of 
the agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006).  
Water project in Jamasor  
The results from both group interview of the key informants and focus group 
discussions in Jamasor (20April 2006) show that people in Jamasor have not access to 
clean drinking water. In an interview, the head of agricultural agency in the Harir sub-
district about the drinking water problem in Jamasor stated that: 
”It is true that the community of Jamasor lacks ground water but neither the 
community people nor the agricultural agency were involved in the planning and 
implementation of the water project. It was a central decision without any 
involvement of farmers, agricultural agency, the ministry of water resources, tthe 
geology experts at the university, and other relevant local actors”(Semi-structured 
interview with the head of the agricultural agency in the Harir sub-district centre, 
26 April 2006).  
It is evident that the authorities failed to involve local stakeholders in the planning phase 
of the water project who could contribute with their local knowledge and expertises.   
Drinking water project in Marwe  
Lack of participatory planning has also caused social exclusion. About 30 percent of 
people in the settlements around the Marwe village have no access to the piped drinking 
water. They were excluded from the benefit of a drinking water project implemented by 
a local NGO, the Kurdo Organization. This has caused a division among the community 
people which in long-term may influence the common action negatively and thereby 
degrading community’s social capital (Integrated interview guide in Marwe, farmer in 
the Zeber settlement, 3 April 2006).  
The Kurdo Organization did not evaluate the exclusionary effects of such 
development policy on the community and the sustainability of the project. It has not 
paid attention to issues of social inclusion in the design and implementation of the 
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project. There is no doubt that exclusion of community people in local development 
planning will have a long-lasting negative effect on the whole society.  
In addition, in Jamasor, people were not involved in the decision-making process of 
rebuilding the health care centre except that some community members worked in the 
implementation phase and were offered some money in return (Focus group discussions 
in Jamasor, 20 April 2006). In Old Batas, people usually are not involved in the 
planning process to improve the health activities (Group interview of the key informants 
in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).  
However, a few conclusions from the described cases can be drawn. There is lack of 
mechanisms from the government and NGOs to involve local people and institutions in 
improving the basic social services on the community level and consequently deceasing 
sense of ownership and unsustainable maintenance of the projects. The NGOs in the 
Seweil sub-district have failed to incorporate community initiatives, knowledge and 
preferences in the project design and implementation. The strength of community 
organizations to improve the service provision and to make more effective and 
sustainable use of the resources has not been considered. The development actors 
including the government institutions have not succeeded encouraging local 
participation in the planning and implementation process to ensure the sustainability of 
the implemented projects and thereby initiating a CDD. The existing capacity has been 
undermined rather than strengthened (Group interview of the key informants in Marwe, 
31 March 2006; in Bewre, 7 April 2006).  
But, there are some differences between the two investigated sub-districts. In the 
Seweil sub-district, the community people were at least involved in the implementation 
phase of a project because most project organizers in this area were NGOs that had 
limited financial resources and involved the community people without offering any 
money in return in order to cut the investment costs. On the other hand, the investigated 
communities in the Harir sub-district, which were not targeted for reconstruction efforts 
after 1991, have a relatively low rate of incitement and collective action to work for 
common good.  In spite of facing housing problems in both investigated communities in 
Harir, no common effort has been made to obtain housing services from government. 
Furthermore, in the research area usually women are not directly involved in planning 
and implementation of the projects but informed by their men31.  
However, all surveyed people and institutions across the investigated communities 
believed that it would be better to seriously incorporate the views and knowledge of 
local people into the decision-making process and the planning procedures in order to 
increase the sense of community ownership; to effectively maintain the project; and 
thereby making the projects more sustainable and beneficial to the community people. 
The community people know better their needs and have the local knowledge and 
sufficient expertise to effectively maintain the projects. In fact, there are local potentials 
for CDD especially in the Seweil sub-district where people on the community level 
have built users groups for managing water and electricity supply.  But, there are no 
effective policies to strengthen the participation of community people in local 
development planning and management.  
                                                
31See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the investigated communities based on the information from 
the group interview of the key informants. See also the tables on pages 108-110 on group accessibility of the 
surveyed households in the investigated communities based on the data obtained from the integrated interview 
guide.  
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Community empowerment  
Generally, in the Kurdish region in Iraq, there is a traditional attitude remained from the 
previous Iraqi system that it is absolutely the task of government to provide the public 
services without any input from the civilians, for example, to build and maintain a road. 
The head of the water users group in Bewre stated that: 
 “We want to be part of the ministry of water resources or any other government 
institution where the head is paid by the government and the people don’t need to 
pay any fees for drinking water” (Semi-structured interview with the head of the 
water users group in Bewre, 8 April 2006).  
It seems that people in Bewre would rely more on the vertical assistance and do not fear 
to hand over a CBO like water users group to the government which could take the 
decision-making power from the group that usually know best how to meet the water 
needs of the community.  
Nevertheless, there is lack of mechanism to help the community people helping 
themselves, which is more evident in the Harir sub-district located in a flat terrain 
without any natural barriers and closed to the urban area. In this area, the community 
organizations are more politicized and there is a comparatively lower rate of common 
action. The KDP local organization has more power than any other institution on the 
community level. For example, in Jamasor even the leader of water users group and 
village representative are appointed by the KDP and the government. In opposite, the 
CBOs in the investigated communities in the Seweil sub-district are relatively capable 
to drive the development process very independently at least for those goods and 
services that are best handled on the community level like drinking water and 
electricity32. 
 Low empowerment of the community people for local development planning makes 
the CDD approach as a dilemma in the context of the governance system in the Kurdish 
region. Therefore, in the initial stage the CDD strategy can be a combination of both 
top-down and bottom-up. But, in the process of capacity development of the community 
people and institutions there is always a risk that top-down approach would dominate. 
This is particularly true in the Kurdish region where the governance system and the 
organizational culture are inherited from the former Iraqi centralized system.  
More about the past experience with the CDD will be discussed throughout the 
presentation of other findings in the coming sections. 
4.3 Analysis of existing social capital stock for CDD 
A comprehensive study of the complex issues of local development was facilitated by 
analysing existing social capital stock. It was really a difficult task to categorize the 
social capital as a highly multifaceted issue in the local context. An in-depth look on six 
dimensions of social capital listed below, as indicators for local institutional capacity, 
has been taken to explain the nature and extent of social relations between the 
households and community institutions as part of cognitive social capital and horizontal 
bridging social capital, and links to governmental and non-governmental organizations 
as part of vertical bridging social capital.  
1. Social cohesion and inclusion  
2. Trust and solidarity  
                                                
32
 See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the targeted communities.   
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3. Collective action and cooperation  
4. Informal networks and associational life 
5. Information and communication  
6. Empowerment and political action 
In the following sub-sections, first the nature of the social capital dimensions and then 
their interrelationship in the context of the research area is described thoroughly to 
explore if and how they are interrelated and complement each other to effectively 
promote CDD. 
Social cohesion and inclusion  
The people in the research area are Kurds and Moslems and there is no ethnic and 
religious conflict among the community people. As a result, the feeling of togetherness 
or closeness is strong. The ethnic and religious homogeneity in the research area is an 
important issue to create and maintain effective connections among community people 
and institutions. But, according to synthesized results from the focus group discussions 
across the investigated communities there are some other differences in income, 
landholding, education level and political beliefs. Especially, people who are members 
of the local political party have close contact with governmental officials and thus more 
chance to get jobs as civil servants and access to a range of services. The settlements 
around the community of Marwe do not have access to piped drinking water because of 
their disadvantaged location, which have not yet led to conflict and violence but as 
stated by a farmer whose settlement is excluded from the piped drinking water:  
“This can in long-term have negative impacts on the unity of the community” 
(Integrated interview guide in Marwe, farmer in the Zeber settlement, 3 April 
2006).  
In fact, this kind of exclusion could be an obstacle to form organized community groups 
as structural social capital which can sequentially hinder the effective interaction with 
institutions outside of the community and thereby weaken bridging social capital.  
Synthesized results from both key informants group interview and focus group 
discussions across the investigated communities show that on the daily basis and in a 
relaxed atmosphere people and groups are highly interacting with each other and are 
living peacefully together. Most households are actively participating in recreational 
activities especially in cultural and religious events. There is high stock of cognitive 
social capital and thereby a great potential for promoting common action and building 
structural social capital. 
Trust and solidarity  
As mentioned, both investigated sub-districts consist of only one ethnic and religious 
group and the trust of community people in their own family or tribe is very high. The 
people on community level enjoy a high level of trust as the most important component 
of the cognitive social capital and as an essential input to increase common action and 
building structural social capital. But, according to synthesized results from the 
integrated interview guide across the investigated communities illustrated in the Table 
 4.5 on page103, there are different reasons for having trust in an institution. Trust (as a 
cognitive element) in an institution often depends on the personal experiences with the 
officials of that institution which is different from person to person and therefore it is  
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difficult to generalize the obtained results, which sometimes are contradicting33. The 
efforts were made to select households from different social groups and settlements in 
each community which are coded as follows:  
• Marwe: H1( farmer from the Kawlan settlement ), H2(civil servant from the 
village centre), H3(farmer excluded from piped drinking water from the Zeber 
settlement) 
• Bewre: H1 (village council representative), H2 (victim of landmines) 
• Jamasor: H1 (female-headed household), H2 (farmer excluded from piped 
drinking water ), H3 (landless worker) 
• Old Batas: H1(retired civil servant), H2(active member of the KDP) 
Table  4.5: Trust rate of the surveyed households in people and institutions  
Selected communities in 
the Seweil sub-district 
Selected communities in the 
Harir sub-district 
 
Marwe Bewre Jamasor Old Batas 
People and institution H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H1 H2 H3 H1 
 
H2 
 
Own family/tribe  
 
5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Other families/tribes 
 
2 3 4 4 4 3 2 2 3 5 
CBOs 
 
4 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 
Teachers  
 
4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 
Health officials 
 
4 5 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 
Sub-district government officials 
 
3 4 2 3 3 4 - 4 2 2 
District government officials 
 
1 4 3 2 3 4 - - - 4 
Local NGOs officials 
 
2 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 3 
International NGOs officials 
 
- - 4 4 4 4 - - - - 
Community Shopkeeper 
 
5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 
Police in the sub-district center 
 
4 4 4 4 434 4 4 4 4 4 
People in neighboring community 
 
4 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 
Strangers 
 
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
As can be seen from the table, to a great extent, there is trust in CBOs, teachers, health 
officials and community shopkeeper who are more accountable to the community 
people except that people in Bewre have a relatively low trust in health officials due to 
the ineffective supply of health services. The trust in the institutions outside the 
community much depends on the result of what the institution has done to solve the 
                                                
33
 A five point scale was used to analyze the trust rate of the community people in different institutions, where 5=to a 
very great extent, 4= to a great extent, 3= neither small nor great extent, 2= to a small extent, 1= to a very small 
extent. When the interviewee had no direct contact or experience with the institution in question and did not made 
any statement the result is marked with “-”. 
34
 The son of the interviewee is police officer in the sub-district centre. 
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community problems and in some cases on the family and personal relationship to 
provide the household access to social services.  
Most surveyed households expressed a relatively low rate of trust in the sub-district 
government officials because of not being very responsive to the community needs. The 
high trust of some households in the sub-district government is usually based on the 
personal reasons and professional status. For example, the interviewee of the H2 in 
Marwe highly trust the sub-district government because he is a civil servant, active 
member of the PUK and the head of the electricity users group in the community that 
make him to frequently contact the sub-district government. The interviewee of the H1 
in Jamasor (female-headed) added that she highly trust the sub-district government 
because the head of institution is a relative of her.  
Most of the interviewees added that their low trust in the sub-district government 
depends largely on the lack of decision-making power of the sub-district government 
rather than the personal incapability of the officials. But it can be also a combination of 
both. As the sampled group is very small and cannot represent the attitudes of the entire 
sub-district, careful generalization must be made. However, in general the community 
people in the research area have less trust in an institution that lacks of power and 
organizational capacity to act strongly and quickly to solve the community problems.  
The Seweil sub-district is no more consisted of a tribal system and therefore the trust 
of people in each other is much based on the personal relationships rather than tribal 
bonds. In contrast, in the Harir sub-district, which still consists of a relatively strong 
tribal system, people have less confidence in other tribal groups that could be a sign of a 
strong cognitive social capital but a weaker bridging social capital in this area. Those 
who are active members of the local political party (the KDP) like the H2 in Old Batas 
have more positive attitudes towards other tribes because within the KDP different 
tribes on the daily basis are interacting with each other and in this manner are building 
necessary trust and bridging social capital. Therefore, it can be concluded that creating 
more interaction between people and institutions leads to increased trust and thereby 
producing more bridging social capital. 
As mentioned earlier, the people in the Harir sub-district was not displaced by former 
Iraqi army and as a result remained more conservative with a stronger cognitive social 
capital. The people have had less contact with international NGOs as the area was not 
destroyed and targeted for reconstruction projects and therefore posses a relatively weak 
bridging social capital. In opposite, the people in the Seweil sub-district have more 
experiences with the international NGOs. However, the level of trust in local NGOs is 
different depending not only on the personal contacts of a single household to an NGO 
in question but also on how far the NGO has succeeded to involve community people in 
the planning of the reconstruction and development activities. As can be seen from the 
table, most households have a relatively low trust in local NGOs. Again, those 
households like the H2 in Marwe and the H2 in Old Batas that are active members of 
the local political party, as part of structural social capital, are more able to establish 
contacts with institutions and producing bridging social capital for the household 
members. 
Nevertheless, according to the synthesized results from the integrated interview 
guide across the investigated communities, over the last three years and after the fall of 
Iraqi dictatorship, the level of trust on community level have gotten better as the 
violence and armed conflict between the political parties has finally come to an end.  
One important conclusion is that less trust in the government officials are often because 
they lack decision-making power and less trust in the NGOs is due to the fact that they 
  
105 
haven’t brought any direct benefit to the households. The accountability of the 
governmental officials is an important factor to build trust between civilians and the 
government. The high trust in teachers and the health officials is a result of their 
accountability to the community people.  
In the research area, there is lack of rule of law and clear administrative procedures 
and instead the family and personal relationships play a significant role in interaction 
between the government and the civilians. Therefore, trust (as a cognitive element) in an 
institution is often based on individual relationships and experiences with the staff of 
that institution which make it impossible to conduct a collective evaluation of the 
institution in question and make generalisations.  
Moreover, the solidarity rate among community people especially in emergency case 
e.g. when the household is short of food and money or when any members of the 
household suffering illness, is very high. All interviewees of the integrated interview 
guide across the investigated communities believed that if a community project does not 
directly benefit their households but it does many others in the community, they would 
contribute time or money to the project, which is an evidence of high solidarity among 
the community people as part of cognitive social capital and thereby a potential to 
collective action and structural social capital. 
Collective action and cooperation  
As both investigated sub-districts are homogenous regarding the ethnic and religious 
composition, it can be easier to solve the conflict among the community people in a 
peaceful way and theoretically it would not be any constraints to collective action. But 
the synthesised results show that the homogeneity of the community people is not the 
only factor to strong community action35.  
The people of Seweil sub-district are less homogenous as the society was subjected 
for massive displacement and change in the social structure during 1970s and 1980s. 
But on the other hand people in this area have relatively more experiences of collective 
action as it was targeted for reconstruction efforts after 1991 where people have been in 
more interactions with the government institutions and NGOs. Local people were 
enforced into a learning process to rebuild their villages and as a result effective norms 
to community action and participation have been established. People in the Seweil sub-
district, despite their disadvantaged location in hinterland and far from the province 
centre where all institutions are, have succeeded to build community organizations and 
thereby using the bonding and cognitive social capital more effectively as an input to 
structural and bridging social capital.  
On the other hand, the people in the Harir sub-district, who have not been subjected 
for great demographic changes and still live in a relatively more homogenous and 
traditional society, have not gained many experiences of how to get together and act 
collectively for the common good36.  In Jamasor all three responders from the integrated 
interview guide (21April 2006) agreed that in the past 12 months no collective work has 
been done despite many shortcomings in social and livelihood services in the 
community. Only those who are members of local political party have more access to a 
network of different people and organizations to bring more economic benefit for their 
                                                
35
 See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the investigate communities based on the information from 
the group interview of the key informants.  
36
 See the table on page110  on group accessibility of the surveyed households in Jamasor and Old Batas.  
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household and easier access to social services. But this kind of privilege access to social 
networks and institutions can have an exclusionary effect and marginalizing more 
vulnerable households and thereby damaging collective sense and action as an 
important input to CDD.  
Informal networks and associational life   
The analysis of this dimension of social capital is consisted of two parts. In the first part, 
the access of the household members to an informal network of people beyond the 
household and relatives for assistance in emergency cases (such as the death of a 
breadwinner, harvest failure and business bankruptcy) is discussed. In the second part, 
the rate of associational life that could be formally organized groups or just groups of 
people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about things, is presented. 
The aim is to know how household members take an active part in the community’s 
associational life.  
Informal networks   
All interviewees from integrated interview guide across the investigated communities 
believed that their households have a very high access to an informal social network of 
people beyond the family and relatives for assistance in emergency cases, which again 
proves the high cognitive social capital on community level especially among the 
investigated communities in the Harir sub-district. As mentioned before, traditional 
norms and structures in this area were not destroyed by former Iraqi government during 
last decades. Anyway, there are even internal differences among the communities in a 
single sub-district. For example, in the Seweil sub-district the surveyed households in 
Bewre have a lower access to an informal network compared with the surveyed 
households in Marwe, which is located in hinterland with lower rate of road 
accessibility. However, about the importance of informal networks in community life, 
one of the interviewees from the integrated interview guide in Old Batas stated that: 
“It doesn’t matter if we live closed to urban area.  My household still need access 
to relatives and friends around us for emergency cases, for example when my wife 
is sick they can take care of our children. For building this house in 1999, the 
relatives borrowed me money and some friends offered free work” (Integrated 
interview guide in Old Batas, retired civil servant, 25 April 2006).  
The main reason for relying on informal network of people even in the areas close to 
urban area, where all government institutions and decision-making power are 
concentrated, is to fill the gaps of an ineffective vertical assistance in providing basic 
social services. The findings from integrated interview guide in Marwe (2-3 April 2006) 
show that in general people in rural hinterland receive less vertical assistance and 
therefore need relying more on their own social network. But even people in the Harir 
sub-district despite being close to urban area have still to rely on their informal network 
because: the society is still very traditional; people have no experiences how to get 
together for common good; people possess a low rate of associational life and lacks of 
bridging social capital; and as a result they have no effective access to vertical 
assistance.  
It is evident that the households even in a single community have different rate of 
access to informal networks. The interviewee of the female-headed household in 
Jamasor stated that:  
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“My husband died in 1999 and left me alone with seven children but the high 
solidarity and support from community people has eased my sadness and the 
pressure to take care of them. The community people took social responsibility for 
what happen to me and my children” (Integrated interview guide in Jamasor, 
interviewee of female- headed household, 21 April 2006).  
Indeed, among the surveyed households in Jamasor the female-headed household has 
the highest access to an informal network, which can be explained by many factors. 
Generally, women make more efforts to build a social network around them and in the 
local context there is a high solidarity with the widows. It was also observed that 
underlying personal behaviour and social competence of the household head is vital to 
create and maintain mutual social relationships.  
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Table  4.6: Group accessibility of the surveyed households in Marwe  
Selected households for the interview 
Group or organization 
H1 (settlement of Kawlan) H2 (village centre) H3 (settlement of Zeber) 
A. Political group or movement: The PUK originally initiated by people is 
the dominant political party in the sub-district. One becomes a member by 
voluntary choice paying a certain amount of membership fees. 
 The head of household is active member 
of the group who takes part in the 
group’s decision making and monthly 
meeting. 
 
B. Religious or spiritual groups:  The mosque initiated by community people 
but the Imam is usually paid by the government. The community members are 
born to the group and make contribution e.g. by paying extra to the Imam. 
The head of household is active 
member of the group who takes 
part in the group’s decision 
making and day-to-day prying. 
As in H1 As in H1 
C. Burial group: It is spontaneously built by informal male and female groups 
in cooperation with the mosque to deal with the burial activities of a dead 
person. 
Both the household head and the 
spouse are active members of the 
group who takes part in burial 
activities. 
As in H1 As in H1 
D. Education group: Parent-teacher committee was initiated by community 
people to create an encouraging environment for the pupils in school and at 
home. One becomes member of this group of voluntary choice. 
 
 
Both the head of household and the 
spouse are member of the group who 
actively take part in the group’s meeting 
and decision making. 
The head of household is 
active member of the 
group taking part in the 
decision making. 
E. Water users group: The water project was left over to the community 
people who established a membership organization to maintain the project. 
One becomes a member by paying membership fees on the monthly basis. 
The household is a member of the 
group and the head of household 
takes part of the group’s meeting 
and decision making. 
As in H1 
 
F. Electricity users  group:The power generator is left over to the community 
people who established a membership organization to maintain the project. 
One becomes a member by paying membership fees on the monthly basis. 
The household is a member of the 
group and the household head 
takes part of the group’s meeting 
and decision making. 
The head of household is the leader of 
the group and organize the group’s 
meeting and carry out the maintenance 
and operation of electricity supply and 
collect the membership fees. 
As in H1 
G. Animal keeper group: Community herdsman as an informal and 
traditional rotating group. 
 
All male adults are active member 
of the group who takes part in the 
group’s rotating activities. 
  
H. Irrigation water group: King Stream, the largest stream to provide most of 
the community’s lands with irrigation water and Sonbar Stream, which serves 
the lands in the east part of the community. Both works on the rotating basis. 
All male adults actively take part 
in the maintaining of the Sonbar 
Stream. 
 All male adults actively 
take part in the 
maintaining of the King 
Stream. 
I. Cultural association: The Kurdistan Arts Union is a civic organization that 
carries out the recreational activities e.g. arts, music, theater and film. The 
members have to pay a certain amount of membership fees on the annual basis. 
 The household head is active member of 
the group who takes part in the group’s 
meeting, decision making and activities. 
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Table  4.7: Group accessibility of the surveyed households in Bewre 
Selected households for the interview  Group or organization 
H1 (village council representative) H2 (victim of landmines) 
A. Village council representative: As a link between community people 
and government institutions is appointed by a common agreement between  
the community people and the PUK led government37.  
The household head is the representative of village 
council. 
 
B. Political group or movement: The KDP and the PUK are the two major 
political parties in the region originally initiated by people. One becomes a 
member by voluntary choice and pays certain amount of membership fees. 
The head of household is an old member of the 
KDP who takes part in the group’s decision making 
and monthly meeting. 
The head of household is an old member of the 
PUK who takes part in the group’s decision making 
and monthly meeting. 
C. Women association: The institution is affiliated to the PUK and conduct 
different activities to improve the situation of women in the community.  
The spouse is active member and takes part in the 
group’s decision making and monthly meeting. As in H1 
D. Religious or spiritual groups: Mosque initiated by community people 
but the Imam is usually paid by the government. The members are born to 
the group.  
The head of household is active member of the 
group who takes part in the group’s decision 
making.  
As in H1 
E. Burial group: Spontaneously built in cooperation with the mosque to 
deal with the burial ceremonies of a dead person  
Both the head of household and spouse are active 
members of the group who takes part in burial 
activities.   
As in H1 
F. Water users group: The water project was left over to the community 
people who established the group as a membership organization to maintain 
the project. One becomes a member of this group by paying membership 
fees on the monthly basis. 
The household is a member of the group and the 
head of household takes part of the group’s meeting 
and decision making.  As in H1 
G. Electricity users group: The power generator was left over to the 
community people who established the group as a membership organization 
to maintain the project. One becomes a member of this group by paying 
membership fees on the monthly basis. 
The household is a member of the group and the 
head of household takes part of the group’s meeting 
and decision making.  
The son is the leader of the group. He organizes 
meetings about the maintenance issues and collects 
the fees. 
H. Animal keeper group: Community herdsman as an informal and 
traditional community rotating group.  
The head of the household is an active member of 
the group and takes part in the group’s rotating 
activities. 
Male adults are active members of the group who 
take part in the group’s rotating activities. 
I. Irrigation water group: The group usually works on the rotating basis The head of household actively takes part in the 
maintaining of the community streams.  As in H1 
J. Community fund: Initiated by community to help vulnerable people with 
credit and social benefits in emergency cases. There is no membership fee.    
The household head is actively participating in the 
group meeting and decision making.  As in H1 
                                                
37
 The term of “village council” in the local context is confusing as it consists of only one member. See the sub-section of “Village council” on page 118 .  
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Table  4.8: Group accessibility of the surveyed households in Jamasor and Old Batas   
Selected households for the interview in Jamasor Selected households for the interview in  Old Batas Group or organization 
H1(Female-headed)38 H2(Farmer) H1 (landless worker) H1(Retired civil servant)39 H2 (KDP member) 
A. Political group or movement: KDP, as dominated 
political party in the province that is originally initiated 
by people One becomes a member of this group by 
voluntary choice sharing opinions of the party and 
paying a certain amount of membership fees. 
 The head of household is very 
active member of the group 
who takes part in the group’s 
decision making and monthly 
meeting. 
As in H2 
The head of household is a 
passive member of the 
group who does not take 
part in the group’s 
decision making and 
monthly meeting.  
The household head 
is very active 
member who takes 
part in the group’s 
decision making and 
monthly meeting.  
B. Religious or spiritual groups: Community mosque 
initiated by the community people but the Imam is 
usually paid by the government. The community 
members are born to the group who make a 
contribution, for example,  by paying extra to the 
Imam.    
 The head of household is 
active member of the group 
who takes part in the group’s 
decision making and day-to-
day prying. 
As in H2 
The head of household is 
active member of the 
group who takes part in 
the group’s decision 
making and day-to-day 
prying. 
 
C. Community burial group: The informal group that 
is spontaneously built by community people in close 
cooperation with the mosque to take the responsibility 
for burial activities of a dead person. There are no 
membership fees but based on the financial ability there 
is a social obligation to contribute.   
The household head is 
active member of the 
group who takes part in 
the burial activities.   
Both the head of household 
and spouse are active 
members of the group who 
takes part in burial activities.   
As in H2 
The household head is 
active member of the 
group who takes part in 
the burial activities.   As in H1 
D. Education group: Parent-teacher committee, which 
is initiated jointly by community people and the school, 
organizes meetings to discuss and solve the problems 
of pupils. One becomes member of this group of 
voluntary choice.  
The household head is 
very active member who 
takes part in the group’s 
decision making.  
 
The head of household 
is active member of the 
group who takes part in 
the group’s decision 
making. 
  The household head 
is active member of 
the group who takes 
part in the decision 
making. 
E. Water users group: It is initially built by the 
ministry of water resources, which has employed a 
community member as water manager. There are no 
membership fees but those who have access to the 
piped water have to pay for some operation and 
maintenance costs.   
The household is a 
member of the group and 
the head of household 
takes part of the group’s 
meeting and decision 
making. 
 As in H1 
  
F. Animal keeper group:   
Community herdsman as a traditional rotating group.  
 The household head is an 
active member.  
   
                                                
38
 In addition to listed groups in this table, the head of the household actively takes part in the meeting and decision making of a local women association affiliated to the KDP. According to the 
interviewee the association conducts different activities in the community to improve the situation of women and especially support the female-headed household. 
39 In addition to listed groups in this table, the head of household is a member of a local football team who plays on a irregular basis. 
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Associational life  
As can be seen from the tables in the previous pages, the people in the investigated 
communities in the Seweil sub-district enjoy a relatively high rate of organized form of 
common action in form of CBOs as part of structural social capital.  The CBOs are 
defined as the groups which are relying more on resources inside the community 
regarding the leadership, source of funding and expertises. They are either on 
membership basis like users group for respective water and electricity supply where the 
users pay a certain fees to have access to the services, or on rotating basis like irrigation 
water and community herdsman groups40. As mentioned earlier, the Harir sub-district is 
relatively poor of CBOs and even the head of water users group is appointed by 
government and no user’s fee on the regular basis is obtained41.  
In the semi-structured interview with the members of the community organizations, 
most interviewees believed that the leadership of their group was effective because the 
leaders consider the opinions and concerns of the group members, are honest and do not 
discriminate a member or a group of people. It was observed that much of the ability of 
the community groups to interact with the institutions outside the community depends 
on the individual capability of the group leaders to create and maintain trustful vertical 
relationships, which based on the personal observation not many of the group leaders 
have access to. Only those like the H2 in Marwe who has many functions (such as 
member of the local political party, civil servant and the head of the electricity users 
group) seemed to have the ability to easily create effective vertical links for the group as 
part of bridging social capital.  
However, the households have to contribute either by offering free work or cash to 
remain a member of the group and having access to the services. None of the groups to 
which surveyed households have access, contribute to the sustainable livelihood 
development in the community42. The local political parties are offering only the 
members employment within the organization or the public sector, which has an 
exclusionary effect on the community and therefore can not conform to the approach of 
sustainable CDD.  
Information and communication  
To find out the rate of access to information and communication infrastructure, the 
surveyed households in the integrated interview guide was asked to mention the four 
most important sources of information (among a long list) about what government and 
other institutions are doing such as agricultural extension, workfare, family planning, 
etc. The result is illustrated in the following table43.  
                                                
40
  For more analysis of the CBOs in the research area see the sub-section of “CBOs” on page116.   
41
 See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the investigate communities and the tables on pages108-
110  on the group accessibility of the surveyed households in the investigated communities. 
42
 Ibid.  
43
 In the table on the next page (as in the previous tables) the surveyed households in each community are coded as 
follows: Marwe: H1 (farmer from the Kawlan settlement), H2 (civil servant from the village centre), H3 (farmer 
excluded from piped drinking water from the Zeber settlement). Bewre: H1 (village council representative), H2 
(victim of landmines). Jamasor: H1 (female-headed household), H2 (farmer excluded from piped drinking water), 
H3 (landless worker). Old Batas: H1 (retired civil servant), H2 (active member of the KDP). 
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Table  4.9: Most important sources of information for the surveyed households 
Selected communities in 
the Seweil sub-district 
Selected communities in the Harir 
sub-district  
Marwe Bewre Jamasor Old Batas 
Source of information H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H1 H2 H3 H1 
 
H2 
 
Community people  
 
+ + + + + + + + + + 
Community institutions 
 
+ + + + + + + + + + 
Radio 
 
+ + + + + + + + + + 
Television 
 
+ + + + + + + + + + 
Village council representative44 
 
+ + + + + + + +   
Nearest market 
 
 +  + + + + + + + 
Newspaper and magazine 
 
 +       + + 
Telephone network 
 
     + + + + + 
As can be seen from the table, the four most important sources of information in all 
targeted communities about what government and other institutions are doing are 
community people (relatives, friends and neighbours), community institutions, radio and 
television. But, these sources are not able to provide community people with accurate 
information in order to make realistic choices from a range of options that would meet 
the community needs and fit local circumstances. Most information about the local 
market such as prices of goods or crops is spread by the community people who 
commute on the daily basis to the sub-district or province centre, which the people in 
Marwe is largely excluded from because of low road accessibility and long distance to 
the urban area.  
In the targeted communities in Seweil, access to television is only at the evening 
when the community generator is on and there is no access to newspaper and magazine 
and nearest market except for some households like the H2 in Marwe whose head is the 
civil servant in the district centre, active member of the PUK and the head of the 
electricity users group in the community, which increases the access of the household to 
different sources of information.  Furthermore, none of the investigated communities in 
the Seweil sub-district have access to national or mobile telephone network. But in 
Bewre it is possible to get access to the local mobile network in the top of mountains 
around the village, which takes more than half an hour to go there. On the other hand, 
both targeted communities in the Harir sub-district have access to mobile telephone 
network of Korek. But, the majority of the people in Jamasor including the surveyed 
households are not subscribers and use the mobile phone of their relatives to get access 
to the network. Among the targeted communities only Old Batas have daily access to 
the newspaper or magazine as it is close to the urban area.  
In general, due to the existing of natural barrier, the households in the Seweil sub-
district have a relatively low access to information, mass communication and marketing 
facilities to provide community people with knowledge and information useful to 
conduct transactions with both government and market organizations as part of vertical 
bridging social capital. This shortcoming has caused a weak link to the government and 
                                                
44
 Old Batas has no village council representative.   
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market. The lack of communication to the governmental ministries has been a 
significant limitation on CBOs’ capacity development as the head of the water users 
group in Marwe stated:  
“I don’t get any information from the ministry of water resources on what supports 
and resources are available and  how to efficiently use these resources in order to 
deal with the provision and maintenance problems of the drinking water in this 
community” (Semi-structured interview with the head of water users group in 
Marwe, 2 April 2006).  
However, access to modern information technology and Internet, which can noticeably 
contribute to the local learning and connections with a wide range of institutions as part 
of bridging social capital, is highly missing in the research area.  The lack of effective 
and transparent channels of communication usually creates an enabling environment for 
corruption and manipulation of public information by politicians, government officials, 
contracting agencies, and local elites.  
Empowerment and political action 
To analyze the sixth dimension of social capital, in the integrated interview guide the 
interviewees of the targeted households were asked if they feel having the power to 
make important decisions that change the course of their life. The result is illustrated in 
the following table45.  
Table  4.10: The household’s power to make important decisions  
Selected communities in 
the Seweil sub-district 
Selected communities in  
the Harir sub-district 
Marwe  Bewre Jamasor Old Batas 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H1 H2 H3 H1 
 
H2 
 
1 4 1 3 2 4 1 1 1 4 
As the results from the table show, in both investigated sub-district the community 
people have very limited ability to make important decisions over issues that affect 
them in everyday life. Those who are able to make important decisions to change the 
life course of their household members are usually the active members of the local 
political parties including their affiliated organizations who enjoy easier access to a 
wide range of political and governmental institutions, for example, the H2 in Marwe as 
member of the PUK and the H2 in Old Batas as member of the KDP. The normal 
civilians lack of power to improve their life situation and to make their own community 
a better place to live.  
Furthermore, the interviewees were asked how often in the past 12 months have 
people in their community got together to jointly request government officials or 
political leaders for something benefiting the community, and if any of their requests 
were successful about which the result is highlighted in the bracket in the following 
table.  
                                                
45
 A five point scale was used, where 5= Totally able to change life, 4= Mostly able to change life, 3= Neither able 
nor unable, 2= Mostly unable to change life, and 1= Totally unable to change life. For a description of the coded 
households see the section of “Information and communication” on page111.  
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Table  4.11: The rate of collective action and the responsiveness of the government  
Selected communities in 
the Seweil sub-district 
Selected communities in  
the Harir sub-district 
Marwe  Bewre         Jamasor             Old Batas 
 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H1 H2 H3 H1 
 
H2 
 
Number of jointly 
requests to the 
government 
6  
 
5 4 3 3 
 
3 
 
1  1 
 
1 
 
2 
Number of the 
successful results of 
the requests 
(0) (2) (1) (1) (1) (1) (0) (0) (0) (1) 
 
The results from the table show that the rate of common efforts and political action in 
the Harir sub-district to jointly request government officials or political leaders for 
something benefiting the community is relatively low. As a result of a weak local 
empowerment, the political leaders and governmental institutions in this area have not 
been responsive to the needs of people. The exceptions are the H2 in Old Batas who as 
an active member of the KDP has effective personal contact with the political and 
governmental institutions. But, the interviewee mentioned some reasons for why the 
government officials are usually not responsive to the need of civilians: 
“Most of governmental officials are unqualified for their jobs. There is no 
monitoring system to evaluate their performance and accountability to the 
civilians. There are many deficiencies in our administrative system that makes it 
far responsive to the needs of civilians” (Integrated interview guide in Old Batas, 
active member of the KDP, 26 April 2006).  
Even in the Seweil sub-district, the government has not been responsive to the concerns 
voiced by people despite higher political action in this area. Furthermore, all 
interviewees from the integrated interview guide mentioned that they have voted in the 
last national national/presidential election after the fall of Iraqi dictatorship. Even with 
high ambition rate of household members to vote, the local governments and local 
leaders have not effectively responded to the community need. The finding is that active 
participation of community people to demand for vertical assistance is not enough if it is 
not supported by an effective governmental system and responsible policymakers46. 
Interplay among different types of social capital  
After exploring various dimensions of social capital including the community’s social 
organization, horizontal and vertical connections, it is now relevant to provide an 
answer to one of the research questions. How is the stock of social capital in the 
research area and how is the interplay among different types of social capital to promote 
sustainable CDD?  
The community people in both investigated sub-districts are homogenous regarding 
ethnicity and religion and to some extent concerning income and social status. Trust and 
solidarity as cognitive social capital among community people is high which 
theoretically can facilitate the collective action to solve the community problems. But, 
only in the Seweil sub-district the cognitive social capital is effectively converted into 
the structural social capital in form of CBOs which consequently have led to 
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 An analysis of the governance and administrative system in the Kurdish region will be presented on page 131 .  
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coordination of community activities and gaining synergy effect as horizontal bridging 
social capital47. But, even in this area there is lack of vertical bridging social capital to 
effectively deal with governmental and non-governmental institutions based on the 
synthesized results from the semi-structured interview with the leader of community 
organizations across the investigated communities. So, the collective action and 
cooperation in the research area appears both as output of community’s cognitive social 
capital and as input to more organized and structural social capital and in this manner 
has potential to produce bridging social capital for CDD if the favourable political and 
institutional environment is created.  
Synthesised result from different methods of data collection across the investigated 
communities shows that in the research area people on community level possess a very 
strong cognitive social capital but much weaker bridging social capital. In the Seweil 
sub-district, additionally to natural barriers, another reason to weak bridging social 
capital is lack of effective communication and information infrastructure to establish 
effective links to the governmental institutions and the NGOs. But, the situation in the 
Harir sub-district with a relatively good location to the urban area and better access to 
information and communication infrastructure is not better. In general the communities 
in the Harir sub-district possess a relatively less amount of bridging social capital as 
they have had less contact to NGOs for the reconstruction efforts. But, the governance 
system, which lacks of effective management capacity, organizational effectiveness and 
participatory planning mechanisms, is to be blamed for the limited bridging social 
capital more than any other factors. There is lack of rule of law, transparency and clear 
administrative procedures to effectively meet the needs of civilians and instead the 
family and personal relationships play a significant role in the relationship between the 
governmental officials and the civil population48.  
The result of investigation of social capital dimensions as explained in the previous 
sections shows that the horizontal connections are strong in all investigated 
communities, which are manifested through the informal social network. There are 
groups of friends or relatives who help each other in times of trouble that is considered 
as strong cognitive social capital. But only in the Seweil sub-district the cognitive social 
capital is converted into more structural social capital by building CBOs for providing 
basic social services. The weakness is that this strong bond has generally not been 
embodied in an association as part of structural social capital to produce more bridging 
social capital, especially in the Harir sub-district. Furthermore, the presence of local 
branches of political parties display little or no bridging social capital for the 
community people except for their own members. For that reason, it was important to 
look at membership conditions (voluntary or not, payment of fees, etc.) and the degree 
of effective participation in institutions before making any conclusion about the social 
capital effects49. Other people who have high access to bridging social capital are those 
who have a governmental work position or are active member of the political parties 
(like the H2 in Marwe and the H2 in Old Batas) that make them to constantly interact 
with central government institutions.  
The poor people in the research area have very high access to cognitive social capital 
but it is not enough to increase the income and wealth level in a sustained way. 
Therefore, it is very essential to build structural social capital in form of CBOs, which 
                                                
47
 See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the investigate communities and the tables on pages 108-
110 on the group accessibility of the surveyed households in the investigated communities. 
48
 The deficiencies of the governance system will be more discussed in section  4.5 on page 129.  
49
 See the tables on pages 94-97 on institutional profile of the targeted communities.  
  
116 
are able to create good contact with political and governmental institutions as part of 
bridging social capital. Bridging social capital would facilitate access to a wide range of 
information and services as inputs to CDD. Therefore, the appropriate mechanisms 
should be established for using the latent cognitive social capital more effectively and 
create more structural and bridging social capital necessary to participatory local 
governance and CDD.  
Another important conclusion is that he location factor and the rate of access to the 
institutions outside of the community can not alone determine the amount and type of 
social capital. But, many different factors such as historical, socio-cultural, political, 
organizational and personal in a complex interrelationship play a significant role in 
building the social capital stock for CDD.  
4.4 Analysis of institutional capacity for local governance and CDD 
In the previous section, by analysing the social capital stock in the targeted 
communities, it became clear that the collective action and cooperation in the research 
area appears both as output of community’s cognitive social capital and only in the 
Seweil sub-district as input to more organized and structural social capital. It is now 
more evident, that the cognitive social capital on the community level has a potential 
role to produce both structural and bridging social capital for CDD if the favourable 
political and institutional environment is created.  
In this section, the capacity of existing institutions to promote structural and bridging 
social capital necessary for participatory local governance and CDD will be discussed.  
In an integrated manner, first, the role of institutions on community and sub-district 
levels and later the political establishment as an enabling environment will be analyzed.  
Community level institutions   
Depending on the historical factors discussed previously in the first and third chapters, 
each targeted sub-district has a different intuitional landscape that will be comparatively 
analysed. There is no written constitution in the targeted communities. Roughly, the 
community institutions in the research area can be categorized in four main groups: 
CBOs, village council, governmental line agencies and politicised organizations50.  
CBOs 
In the local context, a community-based organization is defined as a self-organized 
effort created by community people to provide a certain social or livelihood service in 
the community. They are relying more on resources inside the community regarding the 
leadership, source of funding and expertises, which are classified in three main groups: 
membership, voluntary and rotating groups about which more detailed information with 
some examples are provided.  
Membership groups: The users groups of drinking water and electricity in both 
investigated communities in the Seweil sub-district are recognized as membership 
CBOs. They are membership group because only members who pay certain amount of 
fees can take benefit from the groups and they are community-based because the 
community people have made genuine efforts in creating them. They are now taking the 
main role to manage and maintain the supply system of the services. 
                                                
50
 Ibid.  
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Moreover, they share the same members and no one in the community can be 
excluded from their important services as the fee is reasonably low and there is strong 
solidarity with poor people who are not able to pay. But there are always some 
exceptions, for example in Marwe some settlements could not have access to the piped 
drinking water partly due to the location factor and partly because the implementing 
agency did not take the social inclusion factors into account as an important criteria of 
CDD. In the initial stage of the reconstruction of the village in 1991, the community 
people themselves built the membership groups to solve the water and electricity 
problems. These groups have close cooperation with other community organizations 
e.g. health care centre, school and mosque, which is recognised as strong horizontal 
bridging social capital. According to the result of the interviews with members and non-
members of the surveyed CBOs, the head of these groups is appointed by community 
people who usually ask for community’s opinions before making a decision, for 
example, when there is a need to increase the membership fees51.  
In the Harir sub-district the numbers of membership CBOs are very limited. The 
community institutions do not rely on the resources inside the community and have a 
strong link to the KDP and the government. The community people are less involved in 
appointing the leader of a community group. An example of weak structural social 
capital in the Harir sub-district is that the water users group in Jamasor, in opposite to 
similar group in the investigated communities of Seweil, is not completely CBO 
because the head of the group is appointed by the ministry of water resources and 
community people has not the main role to manage and maintain the water supply 
system. The group receives some sort of assistance from outside for its organizational 
development and it is not a membership organization because no water fees on the 
regularly basis are obtained from the users. The community people become involved in 
the group only by offering free work and voluntarily contribution to the maintenance 
costs of the water system which can easily allow “free riding”52. 
Voluntary groups: An example of CBO is the Community Fund in Bewre that plays a 
vital role in social issues of the community. The organization was created by the 
community people immediately after their comeback in 1991 and the reconstruction of 
the village. About the role of the organization in the community issues, the head of the 
organization stated that:  
“The Community Fund, among others, provides the community people financial 
support in emergency cases and pay for the common expenses e.g. food expenses of 
the visitors from NGOs and government. The organization is completely supported 
by the community members for running the activities and organizational 
development. All community people voluntarily and upon their financial capability 
contribute to the Community Fund. The rich out-migrated people are socially 
obliged to contribute to the organization”(Semi-structured interview with the head 
of the Community Fund in Bewre, 8 April 2006).  
In another interview with a community member, the above information stated by the 
head of the organization was confirmed:  
“The Community Fund plays a social security role in the community without 
excluding any community member from the benefits. Its role is similar to the 
mosque, which all people born in the community are members and can take the 
benefits regardless their financial ability to contribute. The activities of the 
Community Fund have been expanded during the recent years and nowadays it 
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takes more responsibility for road maintenance and irrigation water management” 
(Semi-structured interview with a community member in Bewre, 8 April 2006).  
Furthermore, according to the interviewee, the head of the Community Fund is directly 
elected by community people and is very accountable who usually ask for community’s 
opinions before making a decision, for example, when there is a need to contribute to a 
social activity in the community. The interviewee concluded that some out-migrated 
households living in the urban area are still helping the Fund with financial means and 
there is no need to ask for financial support from the government and the NGOs.  
The main strength of the Community Fund is relying on local capacities and self-
organized efforts. Other strength is the accountability of the leader and the transparency 
in the activities of the group as the community members are allowed to periodically 
control the financial issues of the institution. The organization enjoys a high rate of trust 
among community members and it has even provided the neighbouring communities 
with advises and experience to establish a similar Fund. Because of high accountability 
and responsiveness of the organization to community people, the enforcement laws do 
not appear in this group. Regarding the institutional linkages, the Community Fund has 
close cooperation with other community institutions to solve the common issues, for 
example, it helped the water users group to provide new pipeline, which is recognized 
as strong horizontal bridging social capital (Semi-structured interview with the head of 
the Community Fund in Bewre, 8 April 2006). 
The Burial Fund in Old Batas is also recognized as voluntary organization, which is 
not formally linked to the government and rely on financial resource inside the 
community. It is built occasionally to run the burial activities after the death of a 
community member53.  
Rotating groups: The irrigation users group and the herdsman group as two main 
productive groups in the community are relaying on the rotating-based work of the 
members to provide irrigation water or livestock raising services. Among the 
investigated communities, Old Batas as most urbanized community lack this kind of 
traditional groups54.  
In fact, it was difficult to classify the mosque into the above described groups. 
Generally, the mosque has been always important in times of emergency and is a place 
for increasing spirituality, social status and self-esteem of individuals in the community. 
Synthesized results from the group interview of the community key informants show 
that the mosque, as a traditional institution, plays a significant role in the community 
life in all targeted communities and provides space for practicing the religious believes 
and obligations. As a spiritual power, it has also the ability to gather all people and 
institutions for discussion about different community issues. The important messages to 
the community members and institutions are usually announced in the mosque after the 
Friday praying. In addition, inside the mosque there is a guest room for strangers and 
visitors who are not willing to stay by people in the community.  Therefore, the mosque 
has a high social status and coordination role in the community. The Imam who 
manages the mosque is not well-paid by the government and the community people are 
usually paying him extra.  
Village council  
Before Saddam Hussein came to the power in 1967, the rural area of the Kurdish region 
was still consisted of a feudal system and the village chief Kwekha was usually 
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appointed by the local landlords Agha. During the Saddam occupation of the region the 
village chief Kwekha, which was centrally appointed by the Iraqi security service, 
changed name to Moktar. After 1991 the village council replaced the Moktar system but 
this time affiliated with the local political party. In 1997, in the dominated area of the 
KDP, the system of Moktar was suddenly restored (Group interview of the key 
informants in Jamasor, 20 April 2006; in Old Batas, 25 April 2006).  Anyway, there are 
controversial discussions whether the PUK’s “village council”, does not function as the 
KDP’s “Moktar“. Even the PUK’s village council is consisted of only one person who 
is formally elected by the community people but the participants from the focus group 
discussions in Bewre agreed that: 
“The village council lacks of decision-making power to act for the community 
needs and its only task is to inform the government about the community 
problems” (Focus group discussions with men in Bewre, 8 April 2006) 
The power deficit of the village council was confirmed in the focus group discussions 
with women in Bewre (8 April 2006) and with men in Marwe (1April 2006). In general, 
they expressed low confidence in the village council as it lacks power to act for the 
community people. Those who have the real power on community level are the elder 
people plus the local political party that usually have good rapport with the sub-district 
government and other governmental institutions.  
Governmental line agencies  
The health care centre and the primary school as governmental line agencies are 
providing community people with most important social services and are more 
accountable to the community people when the staff members are inborn. They are 
traditionally very beloved institutions among rural people. The school as a multi-
functional social institution has a high social status because it has always played a vital 
role not only in increasing awareness of the community people about their civil rights 
but also of taking more coordination efforts with other community institutions e.g. with 
the health care centre in taking prevention actions against diseases. The heath care 
centre provides both prevention and curative services and increase the health status of 
the people.  
 In 1991, when the reconstruction of the Kurdish villages was on the top agenda of 
the newly established Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the people in Marwe 
made genuine efforts and initiatives to ask the KRG to provide them primary education 
and health care services. The respective ministry of education and health accepted their 
demand and the community people provided land and helped with all means to build the 
house and other physical infrastructure for both agencies. These agencies in Marwe are 
formally linked to their respective ministries to pay the staff and provide the school 
materials. But, they are largely managed by the community people and their respective 
inborn head is more accountable to the community people (Group interview of the key 
informants in Marwe, 31 March 2006). The heads of both line agencies in Marwe are 
usually elected by staff members in agreement with their respective ministries; the 
decisions in both organizations are made democratically; and as a result they are more 
accountable to the community people than upwardly to their respective ministries55.  
On the contrary, the people in Bewre complained that the non-inborn heath officials 
most of time are not available in the community and were very dissatisfied with their 
services. They were extremely frustrated and confused to whom they have to revert to 
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solve the problem because it seemed that the officials are not accountable neither to the 
ministry of health nor to the community people (Group interview of the key informants 
in Bewre, 7 April 2006; Focus group discussions with men and women in separate 
meetings in Bewre, 8 April 2006).  
In addition, the head of education and health agencies in the targeted communities of 
the Harir sub-district are not inborn and are appointed centrally by their respective 
ministry and therefore their accountability towards community people can be 
questioned56. Furthermore, the secondary school in Jamasor lacks of effective horizontal 
interaction and relationship with other community organizations except with the health 
care centre, which can be recognised as a relatively weak horizontal bridging social 
capital (Semi-structured interview with the assistant director of the secondary school in 
Jamasor, 21 April 2006).  
Politicised organizations  
The local political parties with their respective affiliated organizations e.g. the PUK and 
its women association in the Seweil sub-district or the KDP and its farmers union in the 
Harir sub-district are powerful in their respective areas. The women association in 
Bewre as a politicised organization affiliated to the PUK has high rate of vertical 
relationship with the institutions outside of the community as strong vertical bridging 
social capital but less interaction with other community organizations as weak 
horizontal bridging social capital (Semi-structured interview with the head of women 
association in Bewre, 9 April 2006).  
The KDP provides public employment for its members and the farmer union 
affiliated to the KDP enjoys good contact and access to wide range of governmental 
institutions to provide agricultural services for farmers to which the members of the 
organization have often the privilege (Semi-structured interview with the assistant head 
of the KDP local organization in Jamasor, 21April 2006; with the head of the local 
organization of the Kurdistan Farmers Union in Old Batas, 26 April).  
Comparative analysis of community institutional landscape  
Based on the synthesized results57, a comparative analysis of the institutional landscape 
of the targeted communities to provide the services are highlighted in the Table  4.12 on 
page 122. The “accountability structure” is very important to find out to what extent the 
listed groups are community-based. As can be seen from the table, the investigated 
communities in the Seweil sub-district enjoy a relatively dense associational life based 
on CBOs (membership, voluntary and rotating groups). On the contrary, the 
investigated communities in the Harir sub-district possess a low rate of associational 
life. The differences can be explained in many ways.  It may depend on the fact that 
people in the Harir sub-district live close to the urban area and gain a comparatively 
high rate of vertical assistance. This, in turn, makes people in this area less active to 
build their own institutions and more dependent on the government for providing the 
basic social services. The community organizations in this area are more linked with the 
government that has been the main development actor in the area since 1991. This has 
created a culture and attitude of dependency on the government. The participants on the 
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focus group discussion in Jamasor (20 April 2006) agreed that: “it is only the task of 
government to provide public services”.   
As mentioned earlier in the third chapter, the society in the Seweil sub-district has 
developed differently and is no longer very homogenous in attitudes and values. It was 
subjected for destruction and massive displacement and targeted for reconstruction 
efforts during the last decades. In contrast, as the Harir sub-district was not subjected for 
destruction and internally displacement, the cultural and social norms of people was not 
destroyed and the NGOs have not conducted any reconstruction activity to influence the 
social and institutional structure (Group interview of the key informants in Jamasor: 20 
April 2006; in Old Batas, 25 April 2006). 
Other ways to explain the differences in institutional landscape is that the Seweil 
sub-district posses a relatively high political freedom and is bordered to Iran, which 
people gain other impulses and experiences in contact with different political believes 
and cultural attitudes. Changing to a less traditional society in Seweil sub-district has 
not led to decreased collective sense and togetherness among people on community 
level and as can be seen from the Table  4.12 on page 122 the rate of self-organization 
efforts in form of structural social capital is comparatively high. The opposite can be 
true, in the Harir sub-district, as very homogenous and traditional society, there is a 
relatively low rate of self-organization and collective action where community 
institutions are more affiliated to government and the KDP but surprisingly this does not 
mean that they posses more bridging social capital. In fact, the KRG lacks the main 
principle of good governance when it has no social inclusion policy and when it is not 
responsive to the need of civilians. The finding is that the people living in the hinterland 
of the Seweil sub-district have a relatively high access to structural social capital in 
form of CBOs and horizontal bridging social capital in form of good cooperation among 
community groups. They have actually been able to convert the cognitive social capital 
to more organised form of collective action as structural social capital necessary to build 
links to the governmental institutions. But the vertical bridging social capital is not 
produced because the governance system does not provide an enabling environment
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Table  4.12: Comparative analysis of the community institutional landscape  
 
Investigated communities in 
the Seweil sub-district 
Investigated  communities in 
the Harir sub-district 
  
Type of institution Marwe  Bewre  Jamasor  Old Batas  Strengths 
 
Weaknesses 
 
Membership 
groups 
-Water users group  
-Electricity users   
group  
 
-Water users 
group  
-Electricity users   
group 
- - 
Voluntary groups Parent-teacher  
  committee   Community Fund  - Burial Fund 
Rotating groups 
- Irrigation groups  
 (King Stream,  
 Sonbar Stream) 
-Community  
 herdsman 
-Irrigation groups  
-Community  
  herdsman group  
Community 
herdsman group - 
– Established by community 
people 
– Relying on local capacities 
and self-organizational efforts 
– As small organizations have 
effective decision-making 
process; effective 
communication among 
members; greater 
transparency; high trust among 
members and no need for 
enforcement laws; and 
therefore high accountability 
and responsiveness to the 
community needs. 
-Lack of human and 
organizational  
capacity 
-No links with the 
central capacities  
-Power deficit 
Line agencies and 
politicized 
organizations 
-Health care centre  
-Primary school  
-Village council 
-Health care 
centre  
-Primary school 
-Village council 
- PUK local  
  organization  
-Women 
association  
-Water users group  
-Parent-teacher  
 committee 
-Health care centre  
-Primary school  
-KDP local 
organization  
-Women association  
-Village 
representative 
-Health care 
centre  
-Primary school  
-KDP local 
organization  
 
-Relatively high human and 
organizational capacity  
-Access  to central capacities  
-Power deficit  
-Low accountability 
and responsiveness to   
the community needs 
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Sub-district level institutions 
In this sub-section the role of sub-district institutions in planning, staff management and 
financing of the basic social services will be discussed.  It has to be noted that in the 
time of conducting the empirical work in April 2006, the two administrations of the 
PUK and the KDP had not yet formed a regional unity government and had still the 
separated role in providing the social services in their respective stronghold area.  
Power deficit and limited role of local institutions in development   
All sub-district institutions are highly lacking decision-making power and essential 
resources to quickly respond to the community needs. 
In a semi-structured interview with the head of the Seweil sub-district government 
(12 April 2006), it was found out that there is no elected sub-district council to represent 
local people in the government. The head of the sub-district government is appointed by 
the ministry of interior backed by the local political party (the PUK). Furthermore, the 
interviewee stated that: 
“Usually, in my office I decide alone but there are two other officials who upon my 
request appear in the office to assist me in daily administrative work. My major 
task is to communicate the needs and problems of the local people up to the higher 
decision-making institutions. For example, on the behalf of people in Bewre I 
contacted the health ministry to solve their problems about the provision of the 
health services. In addition, in wet seasons as the road accessibility is a substantial 
problem in this area, I ask the governmental institutions in the province centre for 
necessary equipments and machines to maintain the road between the communities. 
I also follow-up the implementation and the progress of the development projects 
and evaluate the work of officials of governmental line agencies” (Semi-structured 
interview with the head of the Seweil sub-district government, 12 April 2006).  
The sub-district government in Seweil has comparatively much tasks to do as the area is 
monotonous and located in hinterland, which make the maintenance of the roads very 
difficult especially during the wet seasons. As the sub-district government is not 
delegated task-related roles and decision-making power, its organization structure is 
very simple without any technical and organizational capacitates. The interviewee 
concluded that he must follow-up the result of the demands from community people in a 
long decision-making process within the government institutions. 
The municipality in both investigated sub-districts has limited authority and 
organizational capacity and offer only services of waste collection and cleaning of the 
streets on the daily basis. The mayor of the Seweil sub-district centre (Basne) stated 
that: 
“The municipality has no role in the planning of activities e.g. drinking water, 
housing, and waste and sanitation management in the sub-district centre. The 
authority of municipality to offer demanded services is very restricted because it 
has limited capacity of both staff and resources. For example, it can only borrow a 
tractor with a driver to the communities for transportation of the animal manure 
from the residential houses. The main role of the municipality is to forward the 
needs of people to the ministry of municipality” (Semi-structured interview with the 
mayor of the Seweil sub-district centre in Basne, 12 April 2006).  
It has to be noted that the solid household waste is usually put in an uncovered 20L can 
unclassified in front of each house. The waste must be collected by the municipality on 
the daily basis otherwise it causes diseases especially during the hot seasons. According 
to the result of the focus group discussion in Old Batas (26 April 2006), the solid 
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household waste in Old Batas is only collected ones a week despite the fact that the 
community is located only one kilometre from the sub-district centre.  
The agricultural agency in both sub-districts provides only agricultural inputs e.g. 
seeds, chemical fertilizer and pesticides. It lacks decision-making power and 
organizational capacity to properly respond to the need of farmers. The head of the 
agricultural agency in the Harir sub-district emphasized that: 
“The Power of the agricultural agency to act for the needs of the farmers is very 
limited. It can only raise their demands to the governmental institutions in the 
province centre e.g. about the irrigation water problem of Old Batas which the 
farmers needed to cover the two streams with concrete” (Semi-structured interview 
with the head of agricultural agency in the Harir sub-district centre, 26 April 
2006).  
Furthermore, the agricultural line agency on the sub-district level has no authority to 
hire personnel. They are appointed centrally by the agricultural ministry. It also lacks 
own budget to make the services tailor-made to the specific needs of farmers. The 
power of the agriculture line agency on the sub-district level is very limited to 
successfully assist farmers in increasing crop production and livestock rising as two 
main livelihood sources in the area (Semi-structured interview with the head of 
agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district, 12 April 2006; with the head of the 
agricultural agency in the Harir sub-district, 26 April 2006).  
Centralized budget planning system 
Synthesized findings from the semi-structured interview with institutions in both sub-
districts show that all sub-district institutions are highly lacking financial capacity to 
quickly respond to the community needs and problems. They lack of sources of 
revenue, which make them dependent to periodically receive a certain amount of money 
from their respective ministry. The head of the Seweil sub-district government stated 
that: 
“The sub-district government receive fixed budget from the ministry of interior for 
staff wage, repairing the car and other daily expenses. It has neither the authority 
nor the organizational capacity to collect taxes from the farmers and no annual 
budget for the sub-district is determined by the ministry”(Semi-structured 
interview with the head of Seweil sub-district government, 12 April 2006) 
Furthermore, about the power deficit to decide over financial issues the mayor of the 
Seweil sub-district centre stated that: 
“The municipality lacks own budget to respond rapidly to the needs of civilians 
and even for basic inputs and simple issues I need to travel long distance to the 
ministry of municipality in the province centre. The fixed budget is only for the staff 
cost and other expenses of fuel and vehicle maintenance that has also decreased in 
2006. Upon the request, the ministry provides the municipality with daily 
expenses” (Semi-structured interview with the mayor of the Seweil sub-district 
centre, 12 April 2006) 
The line agencies e.g. health and primary school have no role in planning of activities 
and work only as a bigger agencies to provide basic health and education services for 
the sub-district centre and the surrounding villages. The centrally determined budget is 
only to keep the administration running in the sub-district and not to finance 
development activities. Upon request, the ministry provides the agencies with necessary 
equipments. For example, the education ministry provides the school e.g. fuel oil, 
stationary materials (paper, pen and pencil) and other daily expenses (Semi-structured 
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interview with the assistant director of the health care centre and with the primary 
school director in the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006).  
The agricultural agency, like other governmental agencies, lacks own budget to 
finance the different agricultural activities in the sub-district. Upon request, the 
agricultural ministry provides its agency in the sub-district with daily expenses. The 
head of the agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district stated that: 
“It is the council of ministry in province centre which determines the needs of 
farmers” (Semi-structured interview with the head of agricultural agency in the 
Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006) 
The civic organizations affiliated to the local political party follow the same course. 
They are also suffering from power deficit and have no role in planning and drawing the 
budget, which it is done centrally by the council of ministry (Semi-structured interview 
with the head of the district organization of the Kurdistan Women Union in Chwarta, 16 
April 2006; Semi-structured interview with the head of sub-district organization of the 
KDP in Harir, 26 April2006).  
Lack of authority for staff management  
Again, synthesized findings from the semi-structured interview with institutions in both 
sub-districts show that the sub-district institutions have very limited authority to employ 
local people who are more familiar with local circumstances and therefore more 
responsive to the local needs. The mayor of the municipality in the Seweil sub-district 
centre (Basne) stated that: 
“The officials of the municipality are appointed centrally by the ministry of 
municipality but as a formal procedure usually my opinion is asked.” (Semi-
structured interview with the mayor of the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 
2006).  
The line agencies (health, education and agriculture) have no authority to hire local 
people. The staff members are appointed centrally by their respective ministry and this 
has caused some problems to improve the provision of public services as the assistant 
director of the health care centre in the Seweil sub-district centre (Basne) pointed out: 
“The health agency in the Seweil sub-district centre has only two officials that are 
overloaded with huge amount of work. Despite that there are available equipments 
to give birth of a child, the health ministry has still not appointed a midwife” 
(Semi-structured interview with the assistant director of the health care centre in 
the Seweil sub-district centre, 12 April 2006).  
Besides, there is lack of manpower for agricultural production as the young villagers 
have recently left the farming and out-migrated to the urban area in searching for 
income sources. When it is about the international NGOs the situation is different. The 
Mine Action department of the Norwegian’s People Aid (NPA) has a relatively higher 
administrative and financial authority in hiring the technical staff and planning and 
implementation of their own activities. The organization has conducted mine clearance 
activities in the Seweil sub-district among others in Marwe and Bewre (Semi-structured 
interview with the head of Mine Action department of the NPA, 16 April 2006).  
Is there an enabling environment to CDD  
There are many cases from the synthesized results which show that the development 
actors including the government institutions have been unable to use participatory 
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approach of development planning and to create visions to effectively promote CDD. 
No efficient institutional coordination of the reconstruction activities have been carried 
out to gain synergy effect and to improve the situation on the ground58. Based on the 
institutional analysis on community and sub-district levels, it is now relevant to begin 
answering one of the research questions by analysing the obstacles on policy level.  
 In a conversation with a community member from the Marrane village in the Seweil 
sub-district, it was found that the number of households in Marrane after the 
reconstruction of the village in 1991was about 50, but had gradually decreased after the 
fall of Iraqi government in 2003, which in June 2005 only 20 households remained in 
the village59. He highlighted the reasons of out-migration: 
“Most young people in the community have been discouraged to work as poor 
farmers and herds and have migrated to the province centre because they earn 
more money by working within the public sector as police and security guards” 
(spontaneous conversation with  the community member from the Marrane village, 
15 June 2005).  
The respondent called this new phenomenon as the second Anfal campaign because no 
young manpower is remained in the community to work in agricultural production and 
the community is gradually becoming empty and unsustainable60. The respondent was 
also against the concept of “modern village”, which has currently been discussed in 
local media to mix different people together in a new collective town to provide the 
villagers more cost-efficient public services. This reminded him of collective towns 
constructed by the former Iraqi government to displace rural people in the Kurdish 
region of political reasons.  
Indeed, there are missing strategies to ensure sustainable rural development in the 
Kurdish region in Iraq (Mahzouni, 2005a:10). Other obstacles to create an enabling 
environment to CDD are discussed in the following sub-sections.  
Increased power of politicized organizations 
In the research area, the local organization of the political parties is powerful and the 
civic organizations are too much politicized. Detailed information about the province 
wide Kurdistan Women Union (KWU) affiliated to the PUK and the sub-district 
organization of the KDP in Harir are provided to highlight the historical reasons for 
their extreme power to influence government decisions and activities more than any 
other local organization. It is important to find out how they (as region-wide 
organizations) are contributing to produce bridging social capital necessary for local 
development. One issue is clear that the objectives of these two organizations are too 
much politicized as they were created under particular social and political circumstances 
in the Kurdish region in Iraq during last decades.  
The KWU was created in 1989 in the mountains as an affiliated organization to the 
PUK to protect the rights of women and organize them in the armed and political 
campaign against the former Iraqi regime after the conduction of the Anfal campaign in 
late 1980s. During the Anfal campaign many men were systematically killed by the 
former Iraqi army and the widows escaped to the mountains to join the Kurdish 
Peshmerga forces. Today the KWU has filial from the province centre to the 
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community level. Only the KWU district organization in Chwarta, where the Seweil 
sub-district is located, has about 1500 members who pay a small amount of membership 
fees every year and attend meetings. The KWU attract members by active campaigns 
but it is easier to find members in those households where male members are already 
the sympathizers of the PUK (Semi-structured interview with the head of the KWU 
district organization in Chwarta, 16 April 2006).  
The role of KWU on the community level is different from the role of the CBOs 
(such as the water users group in Marwe or the Community Fund in Bewre). The CBOs 
are more focused on providing basic social services with limited capacities without 
effective vertical assistance while the role of KWU is more awareness-rising about the 
rights of women and encouraging them into more participation in social and political 
life. The local organization of the KWU in Bewre receives high vertical assistance from 
the PUK and the KRG to accomplish its objective. The KWU has considerable amount 
of influence on government decisions and activities. For example, in the interview with 
the head of organization in district centre of Chwarta was explained that a few years ago 
through the women campaigns and lobbies the KWU succeeded to pass a law within the 
Kurdistan National Assembly that stopped acting the former Iraqi law in the Kurdish 
region permitting  a man to have up to four wives. The new law allow men to have only 
one wife with some exceptions (ibid)  
The KWU district organisation through the KWU province organization has contact 
with government and other institutions in the province centre but has less contact with 
the women union affiliated with the KDP. It has good relationships with other civic 
organizations affiliated with the PUK like the Student Union and the Farmer Union but 
has no horizontal relationships with the local organization of KWU in neighbouring 
districts not only because of low road accessibility but due to the local norms and 
circumstances to rely more on central institutions.  
The KDP was built in 1946 to lead the Kurdish national movement in Iraq. The KDP 
sub-district organization in Harir was established in 1992, one year after that the 
Kurdish Peshmerga forces took control over the major Kurdish areas in Iraq. According 
to the head of the KDP sub-district organisation in Harir, all governmental and political 
institutions are supposed to act for the needs and interests of the villagers. The KDP 
sub-district organization in Harir has about 6800 members who pay a small amount of 
membership fees each year and on regular basis attend meetings (Semi-structured 
interview with the head of the KDP sub-district organization in Harir, 26 April 2006).   
 Like the PUK and its affiliated organizations, one become a member of the KDP by 
sharing the same political believes. But, the family and tribal bonds play a leading role 
and it is easier to attract members in those families, which the household head is already 
an active member of the KDP. This could be recognized as a strong cognitive social 
capital that was negatively used during the armed conflict between the PUK and the 
KDP during 1990s. 
About the role of the KDP sub-district organization in Harir compared with the role 
of the CBOs (such as the community herdsman group in Jamasor or burial fund in Old 
Batas) the KDP sub-district organization conducts regular visits in the villages to better 
understand the problems of the community people. As a powerful political actor in the 
area, the organization is capable to mediate the problems of the community people and 
institutions and make pressure on the governmental institutions to quickly respond to 
the needs. The role of the CBOs is different, which are more focused on providing 
social services based on their limited capacities. 
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The KDP sub-district organisation in Harir has a very good cooperation with the sub-
district government and once a week they are meeting together to discuss and solve the 
local problems. Through the KDP district organization, it contacts the district 
government and through the KDP province organization and local government in Erbil 
has contact with the PUK and the local government in Sulaimanyah.  However, the 
organization has considerable amount of influence on the government decisions and 
activities to act for the problems of rural people. Furthermore, it has good horizontal 
relationships with the KDP organization in neighbouring sub-districts not only to 
arrange political and cultural events but also to solve the social and tribal conflicts in the 
area. There is no independent civic organization in the sub-district except those 
affiliated to the KDP like the unions of respective women, students and farmers to 
which the KDP sub-district organisation has good relationships. 
 It has to be noted that among the surveyed organizations in the research area the 
only organization that has been involved in planning and implementation of the local 
development project, is the local organization of the Kurdistan Farmers Union (KFU) 
affiliated to the KDP to deal with the problems of farmers. This is considered as an 
increased power of politicized organizations (Semi-structured interview with the head of 
the KFU in Old Batas, 26 April 2006).     
Weak role of private and voluntary organisations 
The tomato sauce factory is the only agro-processing industry in the Harir sub-district 
which was established in 1976 by an agreement between the former Iraqi government 
and the Bulgarian techno-export company. It started to produce apricot jam, grape juice 
and wine and because of the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, the factory stopped its 
production in 1983. It was restored first in 1999 which as part of oil-for-food program a 
joint plan was made by the FAO, the KRG and the Italian Bertosti company to restore 
the production and develop the agricultural industry in the region. It restarted to produce 
tomato sauce and later in 2001 the production expanded to conserve the “stony” fruits 
like apple and grape juice. After the fall of Iraqi dictatorship in 2003, the FAO left the 
Kurdish region and handed the factory over to the KRG (Semi-structured interview with 
the head of the Harir tomato sauce factory, 26 April 2006).  
The factory faced crises in 2005 because of the inefficient coordination among the 
ministries of industry and financing. There is lack of visions and effective polices and 
qualified staff within the KRG how to effectively mange the factory. The factory 
management team suffer from limited power to plan and implement the financial and 
technical activities which have caused many problems for the factory. For example, it 
has been a problem applying new technologies in order to make the production more 
cost-efficient. Moreover, there is no just-in-time delivery of the agricultural inputs and 
equipment accessories that in turn delays the supply of the products to the market (ibid). 
The head of the factory, in an interview, warned about the further negative 
consequences: 
 “Today the KRG has no vision for sustainable economic development in the 
region. The only policy has been to employ so many unproductive people in the 
public sector just to provide them an income which has created a low working 
moral and consumption culture among people. This can in long-term worsen the 
economic and political situation in the region. The farmers are also opportunistic 
and do not act according to the agreement with the factory, they simply turn to 
other buyers to gain higher prices for their products” (Semi-structured interview 
with the head of the Harir tomato sauce factory, 26 April 2006).  
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There are many obstacles to develop small scale agricultural-related industries and 
ecological tourism as a sustainable livelihood for the rural people despite that the 
Kurdish region is very rich in natural resources especially water and has a very fertile 
soil for agricultural production. There is no policy to use them in a sustainable way in 
order to achieve a long-term ecological and socioeconomic development in the region 
(Mahzouni, 2005a:10). 
Indeed, the KRG lack appropriate management strategy and organizational culture to 
effectively cope with the corruption as companies owned by the political parties have 
the privilege to be granted business tenders. This behaviour is far from fundamental 
democratic values and effective planning necessary to establish participatory local 
governance for CDD.  Because, it discriminates the private sector and creates mistrust 
to the governance system (Mahzouni, 2005b:12). 
In an interview, the head of the Mine Action department of the Norwegian’s People 
Aid (NPA) stated that: 
“In fact, clearing the fertile agricultural land from unexploded ordnance would 
bring many positive socioeconomic effects in the region. For example, it can 
prepare the fertile land for crop production and grazing land for livestock rising as 
the two main livelihood sources in the sub-district. Clearing the landmines 
decreases also health costs and social problems as the unexploded landmines have 
caused so many handicaps and dead of the breadwinners and increased number of 
orphans in the region. But, there is lack of coordination and collaboration 
mechanisms with other local institutions e.g. agricultural agency to gain synergy 
effect in mine clearance activities.” (Semi-structured interview with the head of the 
Mine Action department of the NPA, 16 April 2006) 
It can be concluded that there is no enabling environment for the private and voluntary 
sector organizations to take part in local development. The independent civic 
organizations are missing to counteract the central decision-making power within the 
KRG and the political parties. The line agencies are the only institutions to provide 
social services in the sub-district which are far from efficiency and effectiveness and 
other institutions from private sector and civil society have no role in the provision of 
public services. The monopoly of the public sector institutions to deliver basic social 
services is not justified because it eliminates competition, transparency and 
accountability in the provision of social and livelihood services. Anyway, it is now 
evident that the governance system in the research area lacks democratic principles and 
communicative planning mechanisms to promote the participatory local governance and 
CDD. In fact, the system of the KRG is too much politicized and excludes the voice of 
civil society. In addition there is lack of political will to improve the situation on the 
ground (Baker, 2006: website).  
4.5 Identification of gaps to implement existing institutional setup 
In this section a further in-depth institutional analysis mainly on the governance system 
in the Kurdish region will be presented. The Figure  4.1 on page 131 highlights the 
formal process of decision-making within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
and the process which decision-making are implemented for providing services to the 
community people. A governance system analysis which is established in a post-conflict 
context such as in the Kurdish region in Iraq needs an in-depth look on the historical, 
socio-cultural, and economic context in which the political and institutional system has 
been shaped which were partly presented in the first chapter. After the Iraqi army 
withdrawal from the Kurdish region in 1991, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces from the 
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KDP and the PUK and other small groups tried to transfer themselves from resistant 
movement to political parties. They established the KRG and other institutions but the 
armed conflict between the KDP and the PUK was hindering any political and 
institutional development until the Washington agreement in 199861. Today, the 
structure and mission of the KRG is defined as follows: 
“The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exercises executive power according 
to the Kurdistan Region’s laws as enacted by the democratically elected Kurdistan 
National Assembly (KNA)” (KRG.org 2007: website) 
Until the agreement between the KDP and the PUK in January 2006 to build a regional 
unity government, the province of Sulaimanyah was governed by a PUK-led 
administration, while the provinces of Erbil and Dohuk were governed by a KDP-led 
administration. The current unity government, led by Prime Minister (Nechirvan 
Barzani) assumed office on May 2006 to deal better with the Iraqi central government 
over the Kurdish issues. The broad-based coalition government consists of several 
political parties e.g. the KDP, the PUK and other small parties. Most ministers of the 
new unified cabinet are Kurds and belong to the KDP and the PUK but among the 
cabinet members there are a Chaldean, an Assyrian, a Yezidi, a Faili (Shia Kurd) and an 
independent Turkoman. The government is based in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan 
region. The provinces of Erbil, Sulaimanyah and Dohuk are fully administrated by the 
KRG (KRG.org 2007: website).  
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Figure  4.1: Formal decision-making process to community development   
Analysis of the governance system to community development   
The current institutional system to regional rural planning and community development 
in the Kurdish region is supposed to be hierarchic as illustrated in the above figure. In 
this system, formally, every level of decision-making from the Kurdistan National 
Assembly (KNA) appoints the staff of the next level and delegate task and 
responsibility downward in the hierarchy to the line agencies on community level. This 
means that every level is accountable upwardly only to the next level in the hierarchy 
and every manager assigns objectives or duties to a lower-level manager and grants the 
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authority needed to accomplish the objectives. The low-level managers and employees 
accept the delegation whether implicitly or explicitly and are hold accountable for the 
results. There are many advantages with this system if implemented accordingly. 
Delegating tasks enables top managers to accomplish more than if they attempted to 
handle every task personally and allow them to focus their energies on the most crucial 
and high-priority tasks they need to do such as strategic planning, coordination among 
different departments, and so on. Delegation also allows subordinates to grow and 
develop even if this means learning from their mistakes.  
It is obvious that in this system the public sector is the only actor in the governance 
system and the civil society organizations and the private sector are excluded from the 
decision-making, which is not in line with the approach of participatory local 
governance. But, the synthesized results from the empirical work, presented in the 
previous sections of this chapter show that even this management system and 
organizational structure with all shortcomings to participatory governance is not 
properly functioning in the Kurdish region. Within the KRG system, there are many 
“informal” decision-making bodies behind the formal structure illustrated in the figure 
4.1 which cause many institutional gaps and obstacles that are discussed thoroughly in 
the following sections.  
Lack of rule of law and participatory governance  
About the rule of law KRG.org (2007) states that: 
“The rule of law is the KRG’s supreme guiding principle. It is above every 
individual. Laws shall be drafted in a modern way and they shall be based on the 
principles of democracy and human rights” (KRG.org 2007: website) 
But the reality is totally different as stated by a participant of sub-district focus group 
discussions: 
“The KRG system lacks rule of law and clear administrative procedures to 
effectively meet the needs of civilians and instead the family and personal 
relationships play a significant role in the relationship between the government 
and the civil population”( A participant of the sub-district focus group discussions 
in Seweil, 18April 2006)  
The problem is that the main political parties (the PUK and the KDP) highly dominate 
the governance system and other small parties have no influential power within the 
KNA and the KRG. Sometimes a high member of the political parties can enforce even 
the Prime Minister in achieving a task no matter if that would be against the rules. In the 
reality, the governmental officials are not able to work independently and they are more 
accountable to the tribal, kinship and party political obligations than to the rule of law. 
In an interview, the head of the Kurdistan Women Union (KWU) in the Chwarta district 
as an affiliated civic organization to the PUK stated that: 
“The KWU gains much respect within the PUK and the KRG and the cooperation 
occurs under any conditions. Usually, the wife to a politician or high government 
official is an active member of the KWU who can more than the rule of law 
influence the key decision-makers within the government to act for woman 
rights”(Semi-structured interview with the head of the KWU district organization 
in Chwarta,16 April 2006).  
Today both the PUK and the KDP are region-wide and have filials from the capital of 
the Kurdistan region to the community level. Their local organizations in each level of 
decision-making, which are not illustrated in the formal structure of the KRG in the 
Figure  4.1 on page 131, are really the influential power behind any decision-making 
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within the governmental institutions. For example, the KDP sub-district organization in 
Harir plays an important role to link the community people with the institutions on the 
top level of the KRG which often the members of the KDP have the privilege, for 
instance, regarding employment opportunities. The KRG (2007) states that: 
“The mission driving the new cabinet’s program is to secure a bright future for all 
people at all socio-economic levels living in the region, through greater efficiency 
and more openness. The KRG is determined to establish strong constitutional 
institutions to further support the democratic process. Its main task is forming a 
system of good governance through the participation of all groups, with 
transparency and accountability, which means a modern, professional government. 
It is vital that confidence and trust be established between government and the 
people. Confidence is established when government runs its affairs in a transparent 
manner and is prepared to be held accountable and subject to examination” 
(KRG.org 2007: website) 
The fact is that these missions and statements to reach real democracy and good 
governance do not fit into the current management system and organizational culture of 
the KRG highly lacking the rule of law and clear administrative procedure as the 
synthesized findings from the empirical work shows and have been discussed in 
different contexts in this chapter. It is really difficult to know who is in charge to act for 
the needs of civilians and there is no participatory system of governance. For example, 
the line agencies of health and primary school in the Seweil sub-district centre (Basne) 
have no role in planning of activities and are working only as bigger agencies to provide 
basic health and education services for the sub-district centre and the surrounding 
villages62. When such a system is not able to allow the public sector institutions 
themselves to have a role in local planning, how to believe in the mission of the KRG 
which is: 
“to reduce unemployment through development of the private sector as the 
economy cannot progress without major developments in the private sector” 
(KRG.org 2007:website).  
How to achieve participatory governance when the current government system is not 
fitted to its purpose? The KRG lacks of appropriate strategies to achieve its ambitious 
goals of democracy and good governance, as Mahzouni (2006a) states that:  
“We have to stop thinking that the people in the Kurdistan region have achieved a 
relatively high level of democracy, because there is a risk to imagine that the 
democracy is a static system of governing and not a process that needs to be 
maintained and flourished continuously in accordance with the new requirements 
and needs of the citizens” (Mahzouni 2006a:10) 
To compare the Kurdish region with the rest of Iraq where the situation is continuously 
worsening has been an argument to ignore carrying out necessary reforms as important 
steps towards real democracy. But to gain a continuous and broad support from the 
international community for the Kurdish question in Iraq it is necessary to carry out 
fundamental political and institutional changes.   
Lack of delegation of responsibility in a centralized governance system  
Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (2006: leaflet) highlights that: 
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 “Only individual responsibility can give rise to competition, the constituent 
element in a free society. Only if persons are held accountable for both the good 
and harm resulting from actions, will they concentrate their energy on constructive 
action”. 
Although delegation is critical in a democratic society and to organisational 
effectiveness, the managers in the current system of the KRG fail to delegate or delegate 
weakly. The managers feel more powerful if they retain decision-making privileges for 
themselves or they might believe that they can do it better themselves feeling that 
employees lack the ability to exercise good judgment. They simply refuse to face the 
risk that employees will exercise authority poorly. In fact, most top positions within the 
KRG are taken by people loyal to the political parties who sometimes are not fitted into 
the job requirements to effectively fulfil their duties. In such a system usually the 
managers fear that employees will perform the tasks so effectively that their own 
positions will be threatened. Many empirical evidences presented earlier in this chapter 
confirm the lack of delegation within the KRG63. Some more evidences will be 
highlighted here. The primary school director in Marwe highlighted that:  
“Usually I am invited by the ministry to participate in education planning for the 
rural area but this is only a formal procedure and my views are largely ignored in 
the implementation phase” (semi-structured interview with the primary school 
director in Marwe, 1 April 2006).  
Furthermore, the head of the health care centre in Jamasor stated that: 
 “It is the officials of health ministry in Erbil who decides which medicines and 
when they should be delivered. The health care centre has no authority to demand 
a specific medicine for the community people”(Focus group discussions in 
Jamasor, the head of health care centre, 20 April 2006).  
Besides, there is a power deficit of all line agencies on the sub-district level, which can 
not revert to the district level as the next authority in the hierarchy64. Even the sub-
district government is functioning as a line agency, where there is no elected sub-district 
council and the head of the sub-district government is appointed by the ministry of 
interior backed by the local political leaders. Now after the formation of the regional 
unity government, most decision-making power is concentrated within the line agencies 
on the provincial level and the ministries on the regional level, which is recognized as a 
highly centralized governance system.  
In fact, the governance structure in most developing counties are characterised of 
such centralized decision-making power, which make people to lose their trust not only 
in local governments but also in the entire government system. For example, there are 
many reasons that teachers and administrators in Costa Rica usually avoid going 
through channels at the local and regional levels. Instead, they go directly to the 
ministry where they receive the resources that the agencies on lower-levels are unable to 
provide. The decision-making in a hierarchical organizational structure is too time-
consuming and uncertain, which make the teachers and administrators to go to the 
ministry personally to get someone to make the decision. But, only those who have the 
resources and have already political and bureaucratic contacts or work close to capital 
city can do that. As a result, the centralized governance system has an exclusionary 
effect and is not in line with the CDD approach (Rondinelli et al., 1990:135).  
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The barrier to effective delegation within the KRG comes from the centralized and 
commando-based system inherited from both the Kurdish Peshmerga period and the 
former Iraqi government, which is deeply rooted in the attitudes and minds of civilians. 
In such a system that deny any creativity and “learning by doing” on the lower level of 
the organization, the employees themselves resist accepting delegation because they 
lack self-confidence. In fact, the appointment of a job position with the KRG is not 
based on the technical and personal qualification but on the family and political 
connections of the applicant. Therefore, the employees would feel great deal of pressure 
when granted greater decision-making authority and additional duties because they fear 
to carry out their assignments poorly and receive criticism.  
Unnecessary and time-consuming administrative routines 
The above mentioned deficiencies in the KRG system have increased a considerable 
amount of frustrating administrative routines. The head of the sub-district government 
in Seweil stated that: 
“For every simple administrative matter, I have to go a long way to many 
authorities in the province centre before a decision-making take place” (Semi-
structured interview with the head of the sub-district government in Seweil, 12April 
2006).  
The unclear administrate rules and long decision-making process within the KRG to 
deliver a certain public service leads to an ineffective interaction between the civilians 
and the public institutions and consequently losing confidence in the system and 
decreasing social capital. Indeed, the interviewees from all surveyed groups and 
institutions were complaining of increased unnecessary administrative routines inherited 
from the former Iraqi government. They felt very frustrated to be repetitively referred to 
different levels of government without any result.  Therefore, they liked the idea to give 
more power to the sub-district government as the closest level of decision-making to the 
community which could reduce the administrative routines and thereby meeting the 
needs of the community people more efficiently and effectively.  
Ambiguous government system and accountability structure   
In many developing countries there are structural constrains on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of public sector institutions, which cannot be significantly improved only by 
sectoral training and consultancy programs (Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit 1993:103).  
The tremendous institutional and structural problems make the KRG so unresponsive 
to the need of civilians. But it is important to know in which circumstance the KRG was 
created. In 1991, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces from different groups without any 
experiences in governance build the KRG and other institutions based on three different 
system of behaviour: tribal and family bonds; commando-based behaviour from the 
Kurdish Peshmerga period and centralized norms of former Iraqi system, which make 
the system very ambiguous. From the findings, there are many examples of losing 
confidence in the KRG system that is not clear who is accountable to whom. The people 
in Bewre complained that the non-inborn heath officials most of the time are not 
available in the community and were very dissatisfied with their services. They were 
very frustrated and confused to whom they have to revert to solve the problem because 
it seems that the officials don’t take the responsibility as an obligation toward the 
ministry and nobody knows to whom they are accountable (Group interview of the  key 
informants in Bewre, 7 April 2006).  
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It is extremely difficult to define such a system when the officials lack accountability 
both downward to the community people and upward to the central government 
institutions. This is another example that the existing institutional norms and structures 
that must ensure the accountability of the officials upward to the central bodies 
(according to the formal structure illustrated in the Figure  4.1 on page 131), are not 
applied in the reality and can not at all conform to CDD. If the governance system is 
recognized as hierarchical, the head of the sub-district government must be accountable 
to the next level of decision-making (the district government), but in many cases the 
district government is bypassed as mentioned earlier and the sub-district government is   
more accountable to the ministry of interior and the local political party. In an interview, 
the head of the district organisation of the Kurdistan Women Union (KWU) in Chwarta 
stated that:   
“My organization doesn’t need to have contact with the sub-district government of 
Seweil as it has very close contact with the district government which usually 
responds quickly to the needs of the organization” (Semi-structured interview with 
the head of the KWU district organization in Chwarta, 16April 2006).  
In fact, there is no local organisation of the KWU in the Seweil sub-district centre, 
which recognizes the fact that the sub-district level is not taken seriously by the political 
leaders. This attitude of relying on central power is partly inherited from the former 
Iraqi system. Furthermore, the “village representative“, which is centrally appointed in 
the dominated area of the KDP and formally elected by the community people in the 
dominated area of he PUK, suffer from power deficit to act for community people. Its 
only task is to inform the government about the community problems and it is not clear 
to which level in the hierarchy it is accountable.  
To conclude, the ambiguous system of the KRG lacks the “subsidiarity principle” as 
it fails to delegate control to the lowest appropriate level of decision-making. The 
participants on the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil (18 April 2006) agreed 
that those who have the real power on the community and sub-district levels are the 
local organization of the political parties and kinship and party affiliation play a great 
role in determining the relationship of the civilians with the governmental authorities. In 
such a system, the division of power with an independent judiciary as a core element of 
a democratic society is missing, which sometimes the informal rules largely determined 
by family bonds and party affiliation can determine for dispute settlement. In addition, 
this kind of system makes the follow-up and evaluation of the work of officials 
impossible, which creates space for corruption. 
An enabling environment for corruption 
It is evident that the ambiguous system of the KRG creates an enabling environment for 
corruption as there are limited sanctions capacities and enforcement laws. Based on the 
empirical evidences and the analysing of main features of the governance system 
presented in this chapter, it can be concluded that corruption is embedded in the system 
of the KRG. In the current governance system, the political leaders fail to demonstrate 
concern for the public interest and fail to set examples of integrity. Because of the 
underpayment and unfair distribution of the public resources, the civil servants develop 
a system of self-interested incentives to engage in corrupt behaviours and actions. In 
addition, the civil society organizations are too weak to make pressure on the political 
leaders for substantial reforms. Complexity of the rules and procedures; ineffective 
management; and lack of organizational capabilities allow for poor oversight, 
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insufficient accountability, and as a result a fertile ground for corrupt actions. The main 
political parties (the KDP and the PUK) are very secure in exercising power for their 
own benefits because their behaviours and actions in the KRG and in the Kurdistan 
National Assembly (KNA) is not monitored by an active opposition, highly informed 
voters and independent media. 
To summarize, the monopoly interests; the weak political competition; and the 
absence of “watchdog” institutions within the KRG and the KNA contribute to a 
situation prone to the growth of corruption. Party political corruption is especially 
problematic in the Kurdish region where the civil society and private sector 
organizations are too weak to demand and make upward pressure to the system for a 
fairly redistribution of the public assets. In the long term, party corruption can 
undermine public trust in the political system and thereby eroding bridging social 
capital.  The more control a party has over state institutions and society, the higher is the 
risk for corrupt behaviour. Indeed, the principles of participatory local governance such 
as: participation, social inclusion, competition, responsiveness, transparency and 
accountability are highly missing within the governance system in the Kurdish region as 
discussed in the following sub-sections.  
Participation and social inclusion  
In general, the direct link between the civilians and local government level is often 
absent. Particularly, when there are no local elections and the representatives are 
appointed centrally by the government and political parties. In such cases, local 
representatives are directly accountable to the higher levels of government and only 
indirectly to the local population. Therefore, in the current system of the KRG 
representation and inclusiveness in the decision-making process on local level, as a 
main principle of democratic governance, is not guaranteed. There is a strong social bias 
in political participation and within the political elites in favor of the wealthy, educated 
and persons of higher social status. In this case the access to resources is not equal for 
all civilians and the social and educational disadvantages of certain groups in the society 
are not taken into consideration. 
Elections usually allow civilians to vote out political leaders whose previous 
performance was weak. But, if the ambiguous system does not allow transparency in the 
decision-making process and monitoring of the government activities, and if the 
illegally informal decisions with exclusionary effects are not institutionalized how to 
enable people to make their election choices.  
Responsiveness, transparency and accountability  
Responsiveness, transparency and accountability as core elements of good governance 
are missing within the KRG. The authorities are not acting according to the interests of 
the people and do not account their priorities and needs. The decisions made do not 
respect the will of civilians. 
In addition, there are no mechanisms in place to make sanctions against the poor 
performance of the authorities and there are no transparency mechanisms to hold 
authorities accountable for their decisions and actions. For instance, the information 
about a certain governmental decision is not available for the public. The separation of 
powers (legislative, executive and judicial), which is a precondition to increase 
accountability within the government and to ensure the political stability, is unclear. 
This gives space for “grand” corruption, which is not limited to large illegal 
transactions. The top-level political leaders and public officials can influence the 
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formation of laws, regulations, and other government policies to their own benefit. 
Furthermore, information on budget formulation is not transparent and available to the 
public. The system is characterized by the ambiguity between the executive and 
legislative branch of government; poor parliamentary processes; and lack of policy 
coordination.  
To sum up, lack of transparency and accountability in decision-making process; 
unclear laws and procedures; and the broad authority given to less professional officials 
without effective oversight mechanisms to hold them accountable for their performance, 
provides an enabling environment for corruption. Nevertheless, there is a relatively 
freedom of speech and expression in the Kurdish region in Iraq. Some local media have 
recently played a significant role in awareness rising of civilians about their legitimate 
rights and awaking the public opinions about the misconduct behavior of some 
government officials and political elites. But, to be more effective in combating 
corruption, appropriate enforcement laws and sanction capacities must be incorporated 
in the institutional system.  
Weak market economy as a result of cultural constraints  
It is clear that the lack of responsiveness, transparency and accountability within the 
KRG system has consequently led to increased corruption. But there are other reasons to 
increased corruption within the KRG, for example, the mode of production in the 
Kurdish society. About the widespread corruption in the Kurdish society in Iraq, Khidir 
(2007) states that: 
“People in Kurdistan, especially youths, complain about corruption and criticize 
the government for not fighting corruption, but economist and experts say many 
others in our society are corrupt” (Khidir, 2007:15) 
In the traditional Kurdish society, the institution of the family is still not reduced into 
single household because the industrial economy and welfare state is not so developed 
to make the individuals free from family obligations and bonds. The market economy is 
too weak and the proportion of industrial manpower is too small. As a result, the KRG 
will lack sufficient fiscal revenues to carry out its “modern” functions and the majority 
of people will rely on their family or tribe for support. Many public officials are facing a 
moral dilemma because they have to give privilege to their family members and party 
political colleagues no matter if this is against the formal rules and constraints. The 
civilians in the Kurdish region still feel more accountable to their own family, tribe and 
political party than to the rule of law. But this is a problem of all traditional societies 
facing modern values, as Lutz and Linder (2004:10) notes that, “Corruption must not 
but can be a dilemma of competing moralities”. They give an example of an African 
traditional society where the villagers hired to work for the government might steal 
from the government but will never do that from their own family or tribe. 
The Kurdish economy consists of agrarian subsistence economy and imported 
consumer goods, which has discouraged a productive culture among the population and 
therefore lacks any move towards industrial market economy.  
4.6 Summery and conclusions  
The comparative case study highlights both differences and common issues and 
provides an insight into the nature and phenomenon of the obstacles to the CDD in the 
research area.  
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Summery  
The result of the assessment of service provision on community level shows that there 
was no vital improvement in the life/living standards of the people in the targeted 
communities over the past four years, after the fall of Iraqi dictatorship in 2003. The 
government institutions and NGOs have only helped to provide basic social services 
often not tailor-made to the needs and aspirations of local people. The situation has 
rather been worsening for many households particularly in the investigated communities 
in the Seweil sub-district. The problem has been that the public sector institutions and 
the NGOs lack appropriate institutional mechanisms of participatory and 
interdisciplinary planning. Many empirical evidences presented in this chapter 
demonstrate that the investment choices have not encouraged broad local participation 
and have not been able to reflect the true needs of all community people and as a result 
had little chance of sustainability. 
The people in the investigated communities of Seweil have a low access to vertical 
assistance and therefore have relied more on their own limited capacity by building 
users groups as membership organization e.g. for drinking water and electricity supply. 
It seems that the community institutions are less capable in providing the environmental 
protection services (e.g. waste water management and solid waste management) and 
livelihood generating services (e.g. access to an effective irrigation system, passable 
road, marketing facilities and agricultural support services) which are all needed to 
create a sustainable community. There is lack of appropriate polices within the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to establish links to the CBOs and assist them 
in human and organizational capacity building necessary for CDD as the KRG itself 
lack these capacities.    
 The absent policies for regional rural development and CDD have had negative 
implications on the whole region. For example, in the investigated communities of 
Seweil, the children cannot keep studying after completing the primary school as there 
is no secondary school in the community or neighbouring community or town. 
Moreover, lack of communication infrastructure and road accessibility during wet 
seasons make the community people more isolated from outside world and 
consequently hinders building bridging social capital necessary for CDD. But above all 
there is lack of sustainable income sources. These shortcomings, in recent years 
especially after 2003, have forced the people in Seweil to out-migrate to urban area in 
order to have a better access to social services and income sources. The poor households 
remained in the community expect to see improvements that make their own community 
a better place to live.  
The community people in the Harir sub-district have different needs. They have a 
relatively high road accessibility and better access to basic social services as the area is 
close to an urban area. In this area there are no organized groups to deal with irrigation 
water and credit services. The irrigation is done more individually by the farmers and 
the provision of the credit is more based on family and tribal bonds. The provision of 
basic social services on the community level is more the task of the governmental 
institutions. For example, the ministry of water resources is directly responsible for 
providing people with necessary water services, which has appointed a water manager 
in each community. But this does not mean that the community people in the Harir area 
can rapidly obtain the vertical assistance to deal with water problems, for example, as 
discussed there are serious water problems in the Jamasor community.  
However, there are comparatively more coordination mechanisms on the sub-district 
level in Harir but not on the community level as the structural social capital in form of 
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the CBOs are very weak in this area. Even in the Harir sub-district people are suffering 
from the weak institutional arrangements not responsive to the local needs. There is no 
policy how to develop agricultural and tourism services as the two main potential 
livelihood sources in the Harir sub-district. The agricultural agency in the sub-district 
centre provides the farmers only with limited agricultural inputs and services.  
Furthermore, in the research area there are no formal credit institutions to support the 
farmers and other local producers. There are only governmental banks in the province 
centre to pay the salary of the civil servants and have no role in providing people with 
credit.  
Conclusions  
In an environment that even the existing institutional norms and structures are not 
implemented accordingly, the chance to promote the participatory local governance for 
CDD is very low. In addition, the principles of democracy and good governance are 
missing in the Kurdish region. For example, there are no procedures to clarify the 
decision-making and legal authority of the province assembly to which more rights and 
decision-making authority should be delegated. The heads of the government in 
respective province, district and sub-district are appointed by the political parties and 
not by an elected assembly in the mentioned spatial units. The ineffective and 
ambiguous system of administration easily allows mass corruption and abuse of power. 
Prioritizing personal benefits and corruption of the elites has led to decreasing 
confidence of civilian population in the governance system and thereby losing a 
significant amount of social capital. 
In addition, private sector has no function in providing the public services as there is 
no policy to strengthen the participatory local governance for CDD. Missing effective 
development policies has already created a consumption society that in the long-run will 
bring many harmful consequences for sustainable socioeconomic development in the 
Kurdish region (Mahzouni, 2006c:11).  
To strengthen the rule of law in the Kurdish society, to a large extent, depends on 
what civilians believe and accept as a legitimate decision and action from the KRG. The 
civilians do not accept the decision-making process within the KRG as legitimate, if the 
results of the decisions are not corresponding with their preferences and needs. When, 
the civilians lose confidence in their own government, the consequence can be that they 
will act on their own behalf, irrespective of the decision of the authorities. If a large 
number of citizens disobey the authorities, the result will be uprisings or on the 
individual level unlawful behaviour as the government has lost its legitimacy over time. 
Lessons learned from other developing countries and regions show that any system 
which allows mass corruption and abuse of power and excludes the grassroots people in 
decision-making process and  the sharing of the public resources will soon or later 
collapse (Mahzouni, 2006b:13).    
There is no vision how to carry out necessary reforms within the KRG and enhancing 
civil society in order to tackle with the current development shortcomings. In addition, 
the uncertainty about the future status of the KRG has caused limited space for 
discussion about problems to sustainable development in the region. But, this should not 
be a justification to ignore conducting necessary institutional reforms as “planning” is 
largely about how to deal with insecurities in the future.   
In the next chapter, the institutional gaps to CDD more thoroughly from a 
“participatory governance” perspective will be analysed and discussed.   
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5 Assessment of gaps towards participatory governance and 
CDD 
The main conclusion in the previous chapter was that even the existing institutional 
norms and structures consisting of an ambiguous system of behaviour, are not applied in 
the reality and not favourable to the approach of CDD. The fact is that even a well-
functioning governance system is not conformed to CDD when excluding private and 
voluntary sectors that can together with the public sector act for local development. In 
this chapter, a more in-depth analysis of the institutional gaps to CDD from a more 
“participatory governance” perspective is carried out, which was partly initiated in the 
previous chapter.  
In the first and second sections, the highly interrelated gaps on local (community and 
sub-district) and policy levels are discussed to further analyse the enabling environment 
for participatory local governance and CDD. Then, in the third section it will be 
highlighted if there is a strong link between civic social capital and institutional social 
capital as a solid base to good governance and communicative planning system. In the 
fourth section, the degree of analytical generalization and major obstacles to 
participatory local governance and effective planning for CDD in the Kurdish region is 
presented. In the last section, the applied data collection methods will be critically 
evaluated and discussed.  
5.1 Gaps/bottlenecks on local level  
The main root of institutional gaps to CDD is not on the community level but on higher 
levels of decision-making. Lack of effective institutional arrangements on the sub-
district level directly influences the shortcomings to development on the community 
level. In this section, the capacity gaps of sub-district institutions to establish effective 
local network for CDD, will be discussed. The cooperation among sub-district 
institutions, as horizontal bridging social capital, to gain synergy effect and their 
vertical links both down to the community people and institutions and up to the central 
bodies, as part of vertical bridging social capital, will be described. The aim is to know 
if there is any institutional arrangement and participatory governance mechanism on the 
sub-district level for the provision of public services.  
Accountability structure of the line agencies  
Most officials of line agencies who are appointed centrally lack accountability to the 
community people, which has caused many bottlenecks in the service provision. For 
example, the health care centre in Bewre is open only one day a week which is 
extremely insufficient for delivering of health services that should be available 24 hours 
a day (Group interview of the key informants in Bewre, 7 April 2006). There is lack of 
accountability even to the line ministries, which is not surprising in a confusing system 
of governance combined of family obligations, commando-based behaviour and 
centralized norms.  
  
142 
Power and resources of local institutions   
There are many examples from the empirical work that the sub-district institutions have 
no role in planning of the activities65.The governmental line agencies in the sub-district 
are lacking authority to hire staff and set up their own budget in order to rapidly respond 
to the needs of civilians. No annual budget from the interior ministry for the sub-district 
is determined and other governmental authorities and local civic institutions have no 
role in the process of drawing the budget, it is done centrally by the council of ministry. 
The fixed budget is only for the staff cost and upon the request the daily expenses are 
reimbursed from the ministry. The main role of the sub-district institutions is to forward 
the demands of local people to their respective ministries which nobody knows where 
the demand will last and who is responsible to act, again because of the ambiguous and 
ineffective system of governance. The sub-district government in Seweil, which has a 
major role in road maintenance and coordination of the governmental activities, lacks 
decision-making power and financial means.  
The needs of community people are usually communicated through Moktar or village 
council to the sub-district government whose authority is only to report them to the 
higher decision-making levels. The task of village council and sub-district government 
is limited on following up the administrative process, which can be very long and 
frustrating if not having personal and family relationships with the officials. The head of 
all investigated community groups in the Seweil sub-district stated that much of 
shortcomings on the services depend on the fact that the sub-district government has 
very limited decision-making power to act for community people. Furthermore, they 
believed that it is frustrating to be repetitively referred to different levels of 
governmental authorities without any result.  
In the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil (18 April 2006), the participants 
agreed that there is lack of effective policies to improve the situation of the farmers who 
are currently leaving the farmland and migrate to the cities to find a livelihood. All 
power and opportunities are concentrated in the council of ministry which decides what 
is needed in the sub-district and for the farmers. In most cases, the high-level officials 
are not responsive to the requested needs because they are too occupied with the daily 
routines, a work that can easily be done by the low-level officials if they are delegated 
power and resources. 
The sub-district as a level in the governance system has very little impact on cross-
sector policy-making to effectively provide basic social services and it has no position 
in mobilising territorial political power. The first problem to spatial integration is that 
the sub-district government lacks council of elected members to take the main 
responsibility for regional planning and development work. As a result, there is no 
guarantee of democratic control and transparency of the government activities. This has 
brought further negative consequences on trust between government and civilians and 
thereby decreasing the bridging social capital. The result from the Table  4.5 on page 
103 shows that one of the reasons that the surveyed households had less confidence in 
an institution was that the institution in question didn’t bring any direct benefit to the 
households because the institution lacked adequate power and resources to act quickly 
for community people.  
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 See the section of “Sub-district level institutions” on page 123  for the result of semi-structured interviews.  
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Past experiences with participatory governance and planning      
Based on the synthesized results from the semi-structured interviews with leaders of 
community organizations, none of the surveyed organizations has been invited to 
participate in development planning of government-and nongovernmental organisations. 
Furthermore, the community organizations including the governmental and politicised 
civic organizations which have usually high access to vertical contacts are missing links 
to any project/program from government or other institutions.  
The consensus-building mechanism among the sub-district institutions is highly 
missing to gain synergy effect in local development. There is some horizontal 
collaboration among government institutions that contribute only with limited bridging 
social capital to the CDD, because private sector and civil society organizations are 
excluded. For example, there is a governmental committee in the Harir sub-district 
consisting of representative of the agricultural agency, the sub-district government and 
the local organization of the Kurdistan Farmers Union (KFU). About the committee, the 
head of the agricultural line agency in Harir stated that: 
“The main objective of the committee is to coordinate the efforts of agricultural 
production and jointly deal with the problems of the farmers. Depending on the 
problem the village representative Moktar and the head of the KDP sub-district 
organization can also participate in the meetings. The farmers have legal right to 
protest on any decision made by the committee” (Semi-structured interview with 
the head of the agricultural line agency in Harir, 26 April 2006) 
Furthermore, the interviewee confirmed the high consensus between the governmental 
agencies in the sub-district where they are meeting together every month to discuss the 
progress of ongoing projects and follow-up of local needs within the higher 
governmental institutions.   
 Also in the Seweil sub-district some limited experiences with building local network 
have been observed where the international NGOs have been more involved in solving 
some local problems. For example, it has been a coordination effort between the sub-
district government and the Mine Action department of the Norwegian People’s Aid 
(NPA) to clear the landmines in some communities. Other cooperation has been 
between health agency and the NPA Mine Action department in awareness-raising of 
the community people to protect themselves against contaminated landmines (Semi-
structured interview with the head of the sub-district government in Seweil, 12April 
2006).  
Additionally, the agricultural agency has established contacts with a local civic 
organization called the Young Activity Organization where young people have offered 
free work to maintain streams and build small dams for irrigation purposes in seven 
communities in the Seweil sub-district. Furthermore, the municipality has a close 
collaboration with the sub-district government e.g. in road maintenance and in the 
provision of public services in the sub-district (Semi-structured interview with the head 
of the agricultural agency in the Seweil sub-district centre, 12April 2006).  
As far as can be seen from a “political legitimacy” perspective, the participatory local 
governance of any kind is incomplete in the research area. There is lack of political 
support to legally accept the sub-district government as the main actor to organize local 
development. Thus the governance system fails to fulfil the legitimating bottom-up 
process of local development planning and management. As long as this weakness 
exists, the sub-district governments will suffer from a “power deficit” as they will 
continue to lack the tools necessary to become powerful local development actor.  
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Social responsibility for environmental protection 
Not all gaps to CDD come from the government. The negative attitudes and behaviour 
of some local people, not to take social responsibility for their own community, can be 
also blamed for. There is lack of environmental awareness and common action to take 
responsibility for creating a healthy environment on the local community. In an 
interview, the acting mayor of the municipality of Harir complained about the low rate 
of cooperation from local people to protect the environment: 
“They just throw the bottles and other solid wastes on the public places and expect 
the government to collect them. The wastes are transported by the rain water into 
the agricultural land in the Harir flat terrain and cause environmental problems” 
(Semi-structured interview with the acting mayor of the municipality of Harir, 26 
April 2006).  
As a matter of fact, lack of access to basic social and livelihood generating services in 
the research area make local people not to prioritize the protection of environment.  
5.2 Gaps/bottlenecks on policy level 
Most causes of the institutional gaps to CDD are neither on the community level nor on 
the sub-district level. Through the analysis of synthesized findings, they were tracked on 
the policy level that lacks of effective strategies to regional rural development.  
Policy framework for regional rural development  
Effective political and institutional arrangements as an enabling environment to regional 
rural development and CDD are highly missing in the research area. The urban area is 
currently booming of reconstruction and physical development without considering any 
other aspects of sustainable development e.g. environmental, human and social.  
Absent of any kind of regional rural policies has actually caused the current rural-
urban mass migration in the region. For example, the education for most children in the 
rural sub-district of Seweil ends after completing the primary school. The families are 
forced to migrate to the cities as they want their children being educated instead of 
continuing the traditional village jobs. This rural out-migration, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter is called the second Anfal campaign by many local people66. The 
synthesised result from the empirical work and personal observation show that 
nowadays most young people in the investigated communities in the Seweil sub-district 
are discouraged to stay in their own community.  They refuse to work as poor farmers 
and herds and as a result no young manpower is remained in the sub-district and the 
villages have gradually become empty and unsustainable (Sub-district focus group 
discussions in Seweil, 18 April 2006).  
There are no strategies to enhance sustainable livelihood based on local resources in 
order to improve the living condition of the farmers. One of the participants on the sub-
district focus group discussions in Seweil stated that: 
“Nowadays, most food products are imported from outside of the Kurdistan region 
which compete with the domestic ones and this has further discouraged the farmers 
to stay in their villages and occupy themselves with agricultural production as 
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 Anfal campaign was pushed by the former Iraqi army to displace and systematically kill rural people of the 
Kurdistan region out of political reason. For more information see chapter one. 
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there is no demand for their products”( Sub-district focus group discussions in 
Seweil, a farmer from Marwe, 18 April 2006).  
One more participant on the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil sent a strong 
message to the policy-makers: 
 “The former Iraqi government by force and a systematic plan removed us from 
our villages to the collective towns. The current government, which is a product of 
our own efforts, should have implemented a better plan to resettle us in the 
destroyed villages. It must help us to provide basic social services and livelihood 
opportunities convincing us not to voluntarily migrate back to the cities” (Sub-
district focus group discussions in Seweil, a farmer from Bewre, 18 April 2006).   
The participants of the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil agreed that rural 
people in the Kurdistan region are highly discriminated in resource allocating and 
consequently they are forced to migrate to the cities in searching for a better life. 
One of the proposals on the rural workshop in the Sulaimanyah province (30 June 
2005) was to establish a rural development institution that has a very high decision-
making status and report directly to the council of ministry. This is another example to 
show how deeply the top-down approach to improve the situation on the ground is 
rooted in the minds and attitudes of local people. Indeed, any idea of institutional 
building to increase income sources for community people is worth considering but the 
great risk to build such an institution on high level is that it might rapidly shift from its 
original visions and missions and become a rigid governmental organization that are 
more accountable to the government than to the community people in the rural area.    
Institutional and organizational obstacles to participatory local governance   
The ambiguous government system, described in the chapter four, is behind the limited 
organizational capacity and weak coordination mechanisms among public institutions to 
support CDD.  There are many reasons why the sub-district institutions can not properly 
respond to the community needs especially regarding the basic social services, for 
example:  
– The officials in the ministries are not very responsive to the needs of line agencies 
on local level due to the lack of clear administrative procedures. Nobody knows who 
is in charge to act for civilians;  
– The institutions have low capacity e.g. the municipality in the Harir sub-district has 
limited capacity of both staff and resources required to effectively collect the solid 
waste in Old Batas; and 
–  There is high lack of organizational coordination. One of the reasons behind the 
crises of the Harir tomato sauce factory in 2005 was inefficient coordination among 
the ministries of industry and financing67.  
As part of deficiency of governance system, the governmental line agencies are the only 
institutions to provide social services e.g. health and education services in the sub-
district. Other local institutions from the civil society and private sector have no role in 
planning and provision of the basic social services despite the fact that the governmental 
institutions have limited capacity. For instance, the agricultural agency is the only 
institution that provides limited agricultural inputs and services in the sub-district that 
are far from sufficiently. The agency lacks adequate power and resources to effectively 
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 For the results of the interview with the head of the Harir tomato sauce factory see page128.  
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respond to the needs of the farmers. Indeed, the farmers have to go to the province 
centre and make the further follow-up of their demand within the ministry but they have 
little capacity to deal with the ambiguous and non-transparent system. It is always 
difficult to get the right person because the accountability structure of the system is 
unclear (Semi-structured interview with the head of the agricultural agency in the 
Seweil sub-district centre Basne, 12 April 2006).   
One of the reasons of mass out-migration of rural people is that the private sector 
does not make any profit to participate in development activities in remote rural area 
because of low quality of road infrastructure and high transportation cost. Besides, the 
companies owned by the political parties have the privilege to a wide range of facilities 
against the principles of market economy and democracy. This institutional behaviour 
that discriminate the private sector is an obstacle to establish participatory local 
governance for CDD. Mr. Fasal Mirani, the secretary of the KDP, in an interview with a 
local newspaper states that: 
“We need to implement a top-down institutional reform to establish a civil society 
in Kurdistan but the Kurdish political parties and the KRG are now the main 
obstacles to achieve this goal. Even if some of the leaders believe in civil society 
but in practice do not take any step to achieve that. The institutional reform to 
establish a civil society in the region should start from the political leadership”. 
(Hawlati weekly newspaper, 2005: No.231, p.3).  
There is no political will from the top leaders to initiate institutional reforms. Therefore, 
it is essential to empower local people and institutions that can put pressure on the 
system for necessary reforms and gradually strengthen the civil society for building 
participatory local governance. Otherwise, the risk is that the corruption and abuse of 
power might be transferred from central bodies to the local elites when conducting 
institutional reform for decentralization.  
The surveyed households in the research area had different attitudes about the work 
of sub-district government because kinship and party affiliation play a great role in 
determining the relationship of the civilians with the governmental authorities68. 
Creating personal and informal relationships to the government officials are very 
helpful to build mutual trust and to produce bridging social capital. But, on the other 
hand in the absence of rule of law to protect the right of marginalized groups, this can 
have an exclusionary effect and thereby a negative impact on sustainable local 
development.   
The incompatible mixed and ambiguous system of administration easily allows mass 
corruption and abuse of power. For example, there are competing moralities and 
attitudes between the top governmental officials loyal to the local political parties who 
before 1991 were guerrillas in the mountains and the administrators from the former 
Iraqi system who act strictly according to the administrative procedures.  There is lack 
of rule of law, transparency and accountability as three major pillars of good 
governance and democracy and consequently the misuse of institutional power to obtain 
unjust advantages.  
It is evident that increased corruption of the elites has led to decreased confidence of 
civilian population in the KRG. The latest discussions on the local media have been 
very much focused on the current management and organizational structure of the KRG 
that is unable to provide basic social services for civilians. Nowadays, there is a public 
movement against this kind of negative development. For example, in the town of 
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 See the table on page103 .  
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Darbandikhan in the Sulaimanyah province, a centre for institutional reform and 
fighting corruption has been opened (Hawlati weekly newspaper, 2005: No.231, p.2). 
 There are no effective policies to ensure the sustainable socioeconomic development 
in the region. There is an urgent need to change the current structure of the KRG in 
order to promote civil society, increase transparency and alleviate the corruption as a 
main obstacle to build trust in government (Mahzouni, 2005b:12 ; 2006b: 13).  
5.3 The link between civic and institutional social capital  
The largest increments in social capital occur where beliefs in participation are 
reinforced by the existence of rules that are clear and fairly implemented. This is a good 
example of the mutually reinforcing role of civic social capital and institutional social 
capital. How the civic social capital is interrelated with institutional social capital 
(government system, rules of law etc.) in the research area? Does structural and 
cognitive social capital complement each other to produce bridging social capital 
necessary to participatory local governance and CDD?  
Strong civic social capital  
As was discussed in the previous chapter69 and can be seen from the Figure  5.1 on page 
149, there is a strong cognitive social capital (social cohesion, trust and solidarity and 
collective action) on the community level as the community people are relative to each 
other, and there are good informal relationships among people. When it is about the 
structural social capital (associational life, information access and political action) on 
the community level, there are some local variations. Most important manifestation of 
the structural social capital in the investigated communities of the Seweil sub-district is 
a relatively high density of the CBOs such as users groups for drinking water and 
electricity supply. In addition, there is effective relationship among community 
institutions. The people are usually informed through the village council or mosque to 
participate in meetings with community organizations about a certain issue. In the 
Seweil sub-district, in general, there is no obstacle to get people organized on the 
community level and personal contact and common interests among community 
organizations play a significant role to create horizontal bridging social capital.  
On the other hand, in the investigated communities of the Harir sub-district the 
family and tribal relationships among people are relatively high as part of cognitive 
social capital but unlike in Seweil sub-district the cognitive social capital has not been 
converted into the users groups as structural social capital to effectively deal with local 
needs and to efficiently demand government institutions for vertical assistance as part of 
“vertical” bridging social capital70. It can be concluded that there is local variations 
across the research area regarding the amount of civic social capital (both in form of 
cognitive and structural social capital). In general, people in those areas that have been 
subjected for displacement and targeted for reconstruction efforts have a comparatively 
high experience to convert cognitive social capital into membership groups as part of 
structural social capital.  
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 See the section of “Interplay among different types of social capital” on page 114.  
70
 See the tables on pages 94-97  on institutional profile of the investigate communities. See also the tables on pages 
108-110 on group accessibility of the surveyed households in the investigated communities.   
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Weak institutional social capital 
Having high access to strong civic social capital on the community level is not enough 
to achieve CDD if the institutional social capital to promote an enabling environment 
for local governance, is not in place.  In the research area, even in the Seweil sub-
district with a relatively strong civic social capital, there is a missing link to the 
governmental institutions as weak “vertical” bridging social capital. In the Harir sub-
district because of the location advantage, the vertical interaction of the community 
organizations with the government institutions is relatively high but not effective 
enough to produce bridging social capital. Some examples for weak “vertical” bridging 
social capital in the research area are highlighted as follows: 
– In Jamasor the school has very limited vertical relationship with institutions 
outside of the community except formal relationship with the education ministry 
(Semi-structured interview with the assistant director of the secondary school in 
Jamasor, 21 April 2006).  
– The vertical assistance from the government institutions has not been effective 
enough to solve the drinking water problem in Jamasor (Focus group discussions 
with men in Jamasor, 20 April 006).  
– The capacity of the health care centre in all investigated communities is very 
limited to deliver the demanded health services which much depend on 
ineffective institutional arrangements for building the organizational and human 
capacity of the line agencies.  
The community organizations are not capable to help each other in the process of 
capacity building as they all face the same problems and shortcomings and lack of 
effective vertical interaction with the government institutions and the NGOs. They have 
not been invited to participate in any development planning process and are not linked 
to any project/program, neither the KDP local organization which has enormous access 
to vertical contacts within the KDP and the government.  
The main reason of weak “vertical” bridging social capital is the ineffective 
governance system where the kinship and party affiliation play a vital role in 
determining the links of the community people and organizations to the public sector 
institutions which is recognized as weak “vertical” bridging social capital. The results of 
the table 4.5 on page 103 shows that those households whose head were member of the 
local political parties (H2 in Marwe or H2 in Old Batas) or those who were close 
relatives to the governmental officials (H1 in Jamasor) had a relatively high trust in the 
government institutions as they have access to a wide range of services which the 
normal civilians are excluded from. In other words, there is a missing link between 
normal citizens and the government necessary to build participatory local governance 
for CDD.  
To summarize, as can be seen from Figure  5.1 on page 149, civic social capital 
(cognitive social capital and to some extent structural social capital) operates very well 
on the community level. But, there are local variations across the research area 
regarding the amount of civic social capital both in form of cognitive and structural 
social capital. The ambiguous governance system as weak institutional social capital is 
the main obstacle to CDD, which make the coordination and consensus-building among 
the government institutions both on policy and sub-district levels very difficult. 
Furthermore, the centralized and ineffective governance system is the main reason 
behind power deficit of the sub-district institutions and in this manner an obstacle to 
create participatory local governance. Achieving CDD only a strong civic social capital 
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on community level is not enough. It also requires a strong institutional social capital 
that is linked to civic social capital in an effective system of local governance where 
local stakeholders are completing and strengthen each other.   
 
 
 
Figure  5.1: The link between civic and institutional social capital to CDD  
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5.4 Conclusions  
Degree of analytical generalization  
The problem of any case study is that the result is based on the special context and it 
must be carefully examined to make some analytical generalizations. It is now clear that 
the problems to community development differ greatly across the research area due to 
differences in socio-cultural, political and economic structures on local level. This 
diversity creates challenges to compare the obtained data across sub-districts and 
communities and to make generalizations about the root of the problems. The 
comparative case study provides a synthesis of the main findings to recommend relevant 
policies for establishing effective system of behaviour for participatory local 
governance and CDD. 
In the final stage of the empirical work, focus group discussions on sub-district level 
were conducted71. The aim was to already present the obtained data and initiate the 
analysis of the institutional problems to implement CDD. As can be seen from the tables 
on the following pages, “institutional reform” was presented as the output of focus 
group discussions in both sub-districts except that the participants in the Harir sub-
district included also the “intellectual reform” which could mean that more education 
and individual capacity development are required in this area.  
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 Originally it was planned to conduct a future workshop but later because of financial problems, and limited time 
and recourses, the focus group discussions was conducted instead. Please note that the results of the discussions 
presented in the tables on the following pages are in fact the inputs and ideas of the participants but have been 
translated into English and reformulated to make them readable.  
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Table  5.1: The result of the sub-district focus group discussions in Seweil  
Assessment of the key 
community problems 
Collection of the  
proposed solutions 
Most 
appropriate 
 solution 
Basic social services 
-No secondary school 
-Lack of teaching room  
-No play ground for the pupils  
-No community library  
-No centre for recreational  
 activities e.g. sport and  
 cultural events   
-Inefficient delivery of  
 drinking water  
-Low road accessibility 
-Ineffective sanitation system   
-Non-satisfactory  housing  
 conditions  
Livelihood support services 
-Lack of support services to  
 farmers in input, production 
 and marketing facilities  
-No veterinary centre to treat  
 the diseases of livestock 
Institutional setup 
-Lack of an integrated and   
 strategic plan for agricultural  
  and rural development  
-Discrimination of rural people  
-Ineffective evaluation and  
 monitoring of administrative  
 tasks 
-Ineffective vertical relationship 
 with the governmental   
  institutions  
-limited vertical assistance  
-Lack of transparency and  
 civilians insight in the work of  
 government  
-Increased corruption  
 
National level  
-To establish security and political stability  
-To reach a sustained political solution 
  for the Kurdistan  region72 
-To increase the coordination between the  
 ministries 
-Raising food security 
Regional level  
-To eliminate corruption and opportunistic   
 behaviour  
-To  establish an effective planning system 
 and management   
-To create an integrated planning system  
 for rural development  
-To increase the transparency of  the 
  financial issues within the government 
-To increase the sense of responsibility  
 of the civil servants  
-To create a strong organizational culture 
 that no one is above the law  
Local level  
Institutional change:  
-To provide the sub-district government   
 and village council more power and 
resources 
-To determine a sub-district annual budget  
-To increase the decision-making   
 power  and financial capability of  
 the line agencies in the sub-district  
-To involve local people in the planning  
 and implementation process of  
 development activities   
-To increase the accountability of  
 government to the local needs  
-To minimize the administrative routines 
  and opportunistic behaviour  and speed up  
  the decision-making process  
Improvement of  livelihood sources :  
-To invest more on education   
-To create road and market infrastructure  
-To create  supporting prise policies on 
  agricultural and livestock products   
-To create small scale agricultural-related  
 industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
reform 
 
  
Despite active participation of the people in the Seweil sub-district in election and their 
efforts to demand for vertical assistance as strong civic social capital, the governance 
system characterising of weak institutional social capital has not been responsive. The 
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conclusion is that the active participation of local people to gain vertical assistance is 
not enough if not supported by an effective governance system and a strong political 
commitment. As mentioned earlier, lack of accountability and transparency within the  
KRG system and weak institutional social capital have recently led to growing public 
mistrust and protest and thereby an additional deficit of bridging social capital.   
  
Table  5.2: The result of the sub-district focus group discussions in Harir 
Assessment of the key 
community problems 
Collection of the  
proposed solutions 
Most 
appropriate 
solution 
Basic social services 
-Lack of secondary school 
-Lack of student  room  
-No play ground for the pupils  
-Lack of the health equipments  
-No community library  
-No centre for recreational   
 activities e.g. sport and cultural 
events   
-Inefficient delivery of drinking  
 water  
-Low road accessibility to the  
 communities  
-Ineffective sanitation and waste  
 collection system   
-Lack of housing projects  
Livelihood support services 
-Lack of support services to   
 farmers in input, production and  
 marketing facilities  
-Lack of credit and irrigation  
 services  
-Lack of support for developing 
agricultural-related industries  
Institutional setup 
-Lack of follow-up and  
 transparency mechanisms and  
civilians insight into the work of 
government  
-Increased corruption  
-Discrimination of the  rural people 
National level  
-To reach a sustained political solution 
  for the Kurdistan  region73.  
-To increase the coordination between the  
 ministries.  
Regional level  
-To eliminate corruption and 
opportunistic behaviour from regional 
government  institutions  
-To increase the transparency of the  
 government budget and financial 
activities   
 -To create integrated policies for regional 
rural  development 
-To implement awareness raising 
activities 
Local level  
Institutional change:  
-To provide the sub-district government   
 and the communities  with more 
decision- making power and resources 
-Nobody above the law 
Improvement of  livelihood sources :  
-To invest more on education   
-To create  supporting prise policies on  
 agricultural and livestock products   
-Market accessibility 
-To create small scale agricultural-related 
 industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intellectual 
and 
institutional 
reform 
 
The participants of the focus group discussions in the Harir sub-district discussed less 
openly with each other and in comparison with the focus group discussions in the 
Seweil sub-district not many inputs from the participants were received. For example, 
there were not many different ideas how to solve the discussed problems and the 
researcher had to actively encourage the participants for an interactive discussion. In 
addition, based on personal observations throughout the empirical work can be 
concluded that people in the Harir sub-district are relatively less willing to openly 
evaluate and criticize the work of governmental institutions in spite of living closed to 
the sub-district centre and having easier access to the institutions. It can be concluded 
that only the location factor does not play a significant role in determining the 
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empowerment and political action of people. Other historical, socio-cultural and 
political circumstances must be considered as well.  
The synthesized result of the focus group discussions in both targeted sub-districts as 
can be seen from the tables above, confirms that there are some variations in local needs 
due to the differences in geographical, historical and socio-cultural features. But, the 
differences are significantly decreasing on policy level which consists of the same 
governance system and institutional structure. However, on local level some common 
economic and socio-cultural issues were observed during the empirical work and based 
on the results of the analysis as follows: 
• Limited availability of alternative livelihood opportunities, which makes people to 
give priority to income-generating rather than voluntary activities for sustainable 
community development; 
• Limited capacity and low level of maturity of civil society organization; and  
• Negative socio-cultural traits (e.g. people’s dole-out mentality and “wait and see” 
attitude).  
 Based on the historical and political development in the Kurdish region in Iraq during 
the last decades as discussed both in the first chapter and in the fourth chapter, the 
respective governance system of the PUK and the KDP share the same organizational 
structure and norms. As a result, they face the same obstacles to implement existing 
institutional arrangement to community development, which is also confirmed by the 
synthesized result of the focus group discussions in both sub-districts. As mentioned in 
chapter one, they have been facing many difficulties to build consensus for how to 
establish a regional unity government and work for creating a civil society. 
However, the comparative case study provides a synthesis of the main findings to 
recommend relevant policies for establishing effective system of behaviour for 
participatory local governance and CDD. But, as mentioned, every case study is limited 
for broad generalisations. The findings for obstacles to CDD in both investigated sub-
districts can only be generalized for those obstacles that are caused by the same policies 
within the KRG which will be discussed in the following section.    
Major obstacles to participatory local governance and CDD 
The results in the following tables are based on the synthesized result of all data 
collection methods and case studies. The first column highlights the methods from 
which the synthesised results about the problems are obtained. The second and third 
columns summarize the key results based on the empirical work and the fourth and fifth 
columns as the conclusions where the interpretation of the author from the left to the 
right is increasing to analyse the further impacts of the main causes of the development 
problems in a cause-effect relationship.    
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Table  5.3: Cause of the problems on local level  
Method74  Problem  Cause Immediate effect Further 
consequences 
Failure of NGOs to 
involve people in 
development planning 
Decreased collective 
sense  
Increased community 
division and reduced 
social capital  
1,4  
 
Social exclusion from 
services  
Kinship &party 
affiliation determining 
the relationship to 
government 
Increased corruption 
and abused power  
Decreased social 
cohesion and 
degrading bonding 
social capital 
2,4,5 Lack of 
organizational 
effectiveness 
Kinship &party 
affiliation determining 
the relationship with 
government 
Missing link between 
normal citizens and 
the government  
Decreased trust in 
government  and 
degrading bridging 
social capital 
1,2,3,4,5,6 Low vertical 
assistance to 
community  
Lack of communicative 
planning  
Weak bridging social 
capital  
The goal of 
sustainable CDD is 
not achieved  
1,4 Power deficit of 
village council  
Centralized decision-
making structure  
Lack of subsidiarity 
principle 
Powerless 
community people  
1,2,3,4,5,6 Ineffective service 
delivery   
The market is 
monopolized by 
ineffective public sector 
Shortages of social, 
livelihood, 
environmental 
services 
The goal of 
sustainable CDD is 
not achieved  
1,2,3,4,5 Lack of local 
participation  
Failure to incorporate 
the knowledge and 
initiatives of 
community rganizations 
in project planning  
Existing capacity is 
undermined rather 
than strengthened 
1,2,3,4 Low capacity of 
CBOs 
Lack of appropriate 
mechanisms to support 
CDD 
Low contributions 
from beneficiaries to 
recurrent costs of 
social services  
Low sense of 
ownership and 
unsustainable use of 
community resources 
1,2,3,4,5,6 Frustrating 
administrative 
routines  
Centralized decision-
making power within 
the line agencies  
Views of agency staff 
are largely ignored in 
the planning phase  
Community needs are 
ignored 
1,2,6 Shortage of 
accountability of 
governmental 
officials  
Lack of evaluation and 
monitoring  system 
Increased corruption 
and abused power 
Losing trust in the 
government and 
degrading bridging 
social capital 
1,2,3,4,5,6 Ineffective service 
delivery to 
community  
Poor complementary 
institutional 
arrangements 
Increased 
dependency on 
central government 
Investment choices 
do not reflect the true 
needs of people  
1,2,4,5,6 Power deficit and 
lack of capacity of 
sub-district 
institutions  
Centralized political, 
administrative and 
financial power 
Institutions are not 
responsive to the 
community 
needs 
Loosing trust in the 
government and 
degrading bridging 
social capital    
2,3,4,5 Unsustainable 
development projects  
Lack of bottom-up 
approach in local 
planning  
Ineffective use of 
limited resources  
Community problems 
remained unsolved  
5, and 
active 
observation 
Low cooperation 
sense of local people 
to care for 
environment  
Lack of polices to 
increase the knowledge 
and  information of 
civilians  
Degrading the 
environment 
Unsustainable 
community  
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Table  5.4: Cause of the problems on policy level 
Method75 Problem Cause  Immediate effect  Further 
consequences 
1,2,4,5,6 Lack of 
commitment and 
responsibility of 
policymakers   
Weak civil society 
organizations and 
opposition parties  
Low working spirit 
of governmental 
officials  
2,5,6 Lack of 
transparency and 
control of the 
government work 
Lack of strong and 
organized opposition 
parties  
Increased 
corruption, abused 
power and 
arrogance  
 
 
Low confidence of 
civilians and losing 
of  bridging social 
capital  
1,2,5 Low incitement of 
private investment 
Lack of effective 
policies and 
institutional 
arrangements 
Inefficient 
provision of social 
and livelihood 
services  
Rural-urban mass 
migration and 
unsustainable 
spatial develop 
6,  active 
observation and 
secondary data 
Emerging a 
consumption 
society  
Lack of effective policy 
to promote local 
economy  
Farmers are 
discouraged and 
shift to other non-
productive 
activities  
Decreased national 
food security and 
unsustainable 
development  
5,6, active 
observation and 
secondary data 
Increased regional 
disparities  
Ineffective policies to 
integrated  regional 
rural development 
Increased informal 
settlements in the 
urban area  
Unsustainable 
development  
1,2,4,5,6, 
active 
observation and 
secondary data 
Lack of effective 
policies to promote 
regional rural 
development  
Political parties have 
more power than 
government institutions  
Weak civil society 
organizations  
Lack of 
complementary 
institutional 
support to CDD 
Governance, partnership and collaboration are new phenomena in the Kurdish regional 
planning and development context and it is hard to find a comprehensive research about 
these phenomena. As presented in the tables, most causes to the problems on local level 
are a direct result of missing effective policies to promote local participation in 
development planning, which in turn causes other problems discussed in the following 
sections.  
Lack of horizontal and vertical co-ordination   
There are many problems in the ongoing governance system in the Kurdish region. First 
of all, there is the problem related to the creation of appropriate spatial administrative 
units that are able to integrate people and mobilize political power. Then, there is the 
horizontal coordination problem where no regional policy-making and implementation 
are expanded from the centralized governance structure to a more participatory 
governance structure. In addition, there is the vertical coordination problem, which 
relates to the extremely difficult balance between “top-down” and “bottom-up” policy 
in the centralized power structure. Lack of integrated institutional framework, which 
partly has been inherited from the former Iraqi government system, has created the rural 
sub-districts without any tools for regional rural planning.  
In the current governance structure the horizontal integration problem is to set up 
cooperation and to coordinate the activities among different public organisations. There 
are also the vertical coordination problems among the line agencies of a ministry where 
lacking accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of public services 
have caused mistrust in the system and therefore a deficit of bridging social capital, for 
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instance, in the case of health service provision in Bewre76. The horizontal and vertical 
coordination problem among different public sector institutions continues to be the main 
obstacle for regional rural planning in the Kurdish region and this problem will continue 
to be impossible for the sub-district government to deal with.  
Missing participatory approach in development planning and management  
One of the main strength and success determinants of any development project is to 
include the participatory approach and involving the institutions closed to the ground, 
which is not the case in the research area and as a result causes many problems to local 
development as highlighted in the Table  5.1 on page 151 and Table  5.2 on page 152. 
The sub-district has no elected council and the sub-district appointed governor lacks of 
decision-making power and the village representative is only a symbolic figure set up 
by the government or local political party. These shortcomings are greater in the Harir 
sub-district which lacks of CBOs to fill the gaps of an effective vertical assistance.  
In fact, all surveyed institutions liked the idea to give more decision-making power to 
the institutions on the sub-district and community levels. Lack of participatory 
mechanisms in local planning has actually led to many unsustainable development 
projects in the research area77.  
Weak link between civic and institutional social capital   
Even in the Seweil sub-district with relatively high self-organized efforts, there is no 
strong link between CBOs as civic social capital and the governmental institutions as 
institutional social capital. For example, the water users group in Marwe has no formal 
link to the central government institutions. The leader of all surveyed organizations 
believed that community institutions can not help each other in the process of capacity 
building as they all face the same problems and shortcomings but in most cases the 
government can do that.  But, the question is how an ineffective institutional system can 
help improving the situation on the ground.  
Weak bridging social capital in the research area depends on the ineffective and 
ambiguous governance system causing lack of rule of law, transparency and 
accountability within the government institutions. There is shortage of effective policies 
and joint concepts to create synergy effect between different disciplines and 
stakeholders to support CDD. There are growing evidences that the problem of 
underdevelopment in the research area is, to a significant extent, a problem of 
underdeveloped institutions lacking of effective policies to ensure sustainable livelihood 
for rural people, which was the final output of the focus group discussions in both 
targeted sub-districts78.  
Furthermore, there is no institutional arrangement to increase access of the farmers to 
inputs and marketing facilities and supporting services to effectively use local resources. 
The capacity of community organizations is very limited, which are only providing 
basic social services and don’t play a vital role to promote local production and 
sustainable livelihood sources. This has led to low productivity in agriculture and 
poverty in the rural area and as a result mass rural out-migration and social unrest 
during recent years, which are listed in the Table  5.3 and the Table  5.4.  Indeed, there is 
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not much political will to improve the situation on the ground and the KRG is now 
under intense pressure to carry out reforms and regain trust from civilians79.  
To conclude, participation can have positive impacts on governance because it 
improves information flow, accountability, the transparency of the political process and 
it gives voice to those most directly affected by a public policy. But, the process to 
empower people, build social capital and strengthens local governance for CDD is 
highly lacking in the Kurdish region. Establishing participatory local governance for 
CDD requires not only an effective public sector but a strong commitment from the 
political leadership to create a solid base for the civil society organisations and the 
private sector that are capable to enforce policy reforms. Most causes of the problems 
on local level (community and sub-district levels) are rooted on policy level and 
therefore the macro variables are considered as independent. 
 Now, when it is quite clear where the causes of most problems to the community 
development are, it is relevant to propose appropriate strategies and a favourable 
institutional framework to CDD in the next chapter.  
5.5 Critical evaluation of the empirical work   
The first period of the empirical work, which partly included the obtaining information 
about the social capital on macro level, brought significant amount of benefits. The 
relevancy of the research concepts and methodologies to the local context and 
requirements were pre-tested. It became clearer how the participatory methods of data 
collection and triangulation could increase the validity and reliability of the obtained 
data, where participants from different groups and disciplines are given the chance to 
discuss and cross-check the obtained information. In addition, the strength to involve 
the target group in the entire process of the research and build trust and confidence for 
what the result of the research is promising was confirmed. 
The appropriate ways to analyze the obtained data and apply results were more 
determined after the empirical work based on the methodological triangulation80. The 
institutional arrangements to CDD were analyzed through generating data on various 
dimensions and types of social capital in the selected sites. The rate of horizontal 
interaction of local people and institutions and their vertical links to the institutions on 
higher levels of decision-making as the community’s stock of cognitive, structural and 
bridging social capital was assessed.  
It was really a difficult task to categorize the social capital as a cross-sectoral and 
highly complex issue in a post-conflict situation such as in the Kurdish region in Iraq. 
Anyway, a critical evaluation of the applied data collection methods is necessary to 
ensure that the analysis is more scientific and in this manner proposing the appropriate 
institutional arrangements that fulfil the needs of grassroots people and enhance the 
process of participatory local governance for CDD.  
Was the triangulation successful  
During the second period of the empirical work, data was obtained from community key 
informants, group of households and community institutions, where triangulation was 
applied to find more reliable data on institutional gaps to local governance and CDD. A 
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map of existing institutions and issues relating to social capital was provided on the 
community level for reference in the later phases of data collection. A consensus was 
also created about the definition of “community” in which the research had taken place 
that was used throughout the community profile exercise as well as for “the integrated 
interview guide” as most comprehensive data collection method to define the 
catchments areas of the institutions.  
It was confirmed that the local context requires a different approach to data 
collection method. In general, face-to-face communication has always the advantages to 
avoid misunderstanding between sender and receiver of a message and thereby 
increasing the reliability of the exchanged information. Mahzouni (2000:16) emphasizes 
the need to use “personal communication channels” which allow for personal 
addressing and feedback in any cultural setting.  
In particular, the circumstances in the research area e.g. low rate of literacy among 
rural people would not allow giving out questionnaire forms without any oral 
explanations. For example, it was important to cross-check with the respondents what 
was meant with “effective leadership” in local context, which would have not been 
possible if the questionnaire was left out to the respondent without any face-to-face 
communication. Therefore, the integrated interview guide was carried out making sure 
that the interviewee has understood the message and in this manner increasing the rate 
of response, the reliability of obtained information and the analytical generalization.  
Before starting any personal interview or discussion, efforts were made to create an 
atmosphere that the interviewee feels comfortable and ensured that the obtained 
information would be taken confidentially and used only for the research purpose which 
helped to obtain more reliable data. Furthermore, respecting the principles of research 
ethic, the efforts were made to ask the questions in a neutral way not to influence the 
interviewee to answer in a certain manner.  
Nevertheless, the application of triangulation required allocating limited time and 
resources on six different methods in different sites which made it impossible, for 
example, in the integrated interview guide to interview a larger number of the 
households in each targeted community. Only 2-3 households were interviewed but they 
were quite representative of the concern of the vulnerable groups and the community 
problems. The interview was very long and in-depth which partly cross-checked the 
information obtained from other methods as part of triangulation. If only this method 
had been applied, it would have negative implications on the results of analysis. It is 
evident that by taking six different methods for triangulation, less time and resources 
were left to take a big sample in each method and locality.  
 In addition, an active observation from the researcher was required to cross-check 
obtained information from different levels and disciplines. Applying many different 
methods in different sites would have made the analyzing and sensitizing the data very 
difficult if it would have been done by several people. Therefore, despite the limited 
time all planned activities were carried out by the researcher himself with the aim of 
providing a more consistent human judgment of the context of the problems and 
avoiding information bias and distorted result. But, in a qualitative research the human 
judgment of a given situation can also increase the information bias and thereby 
decreasing the neutrality to conduct a scientific study. Bridging this gap, the researcher 
was very aware about the principles of the research ethics to try to be neutral in 
collecting and analysing data and not to bring the results of the study in such ways that 
would negatively affect the reliability of the obtained data. However, in the social 
research it is impossible to achieve absolute neutrality in collecting and analyzing data.  
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The advantages of triangulation, as a tool to ensure the validity and reliability of the 
obtained data in the context of research area have been confirmed.  In chapter four, 
many good cases of successful triangulation were presented where the information 
about a certain community problem from different people and institutions has been 
cross-checked and completed step-by-step and thereby increasing the reliability of the 
obtained data. A short summery of these cases are presented here.  
 The first case is about the beekeeping project in Bewre in the Seweil sub-district, 
which the information about the main reasons behind the failure of the project has been 
cross-checked and completed step by step. The obtained information from the 
agriculture agency in the Seweil sub-district did complete the already acquired 
information from community people and groups.  
The second case is the problem of health care centre in Bewre, which the views of 
community  people about the shortcomings of the health services was confirmed by the 
head of women association in the community who has been asked by her organization to 
write a report about the quality of the health services in the community.  
The third case is about the demand of people in Bewre to establish a secondary 
school in the community. They complained that the ministry of education has ignored 
their demand. In an interview, the head of women association in the community 
confirmed the need to establish a secondary school in Bewre. But, she informed that the 
ministry of education did not agree on their demand because it had already planned to 
build the student houses in the district centre for secondary school pupils from Bewre.  
The fourth case is about the water problem in Jamasor. During the interviews with 
many people and institutions, both on community and sub-district levels, other 
information about the main problems to carry out the huge water project in the Harir 
area was found which was unknown for the community people. It was found out that 
neither the community people nor the agricultural agency had been involved in planning 
and implementation of the water project. It was a central decision without any 
involvement of farmers, agricultural agency, the ministry of water resources and the 
geology experts at the university. The head of sub-district organization of the KDP in an 
interview stated that the main problem of finalizing the water project was lack of huge 
water pipes that must be imported from foreign countries about which the surveyed 
people and institutions in Jamasor didn’t leave out any information81.  
To summarize, there are many arguments that triangulation has increased the validity 
and reliability of the obtained information in the research area, which would not have 
been possible through applying conventional survey that misses the complex 
relationships between different people and institutions. 
How local limitations were managed   
There were some limitations in applying the methods especially regarding focus group 
discussions on the sub-district level despite carefully designed activities for effective 
group interaction. Some efforts were made to deal with limitations which are discussed 
as follows.  
In social science research, there can be some interactive problems to establish a focus 
group as a method for collecting data through group discussions, for example, when the 
participants fail to add to a larger common ground. As the group members are supposed 
to represent various professionals, social groups and disciplines, an important problem 
can be that they do not act as members of the focus group and fail to contribute to the 
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common ground. As a result, the possibilities of drawing conclusions from focus group 
materials will be limited as the group members fail to agree on the core problem and 
solution (Hyden and Bülow, 2003:311).  
During the empirical work, it was frequently observed that the participants of a group 
discussion did not act and speak as members of a group but become instead individuals 
talking about a given topic even if proper selection criteria of the participants were 
already set up. Sometimes, the possible result was a collection of expressions that made 
it difficult to link it with the topic. This was really a problem when conducting the rural 
workshop in Sulaimanyah during the first period of the empirical work especially 
among an elite group whose composition was deliberately set up by the researcher for 
pre-testing. Therefore, for the second period of the empirical work some issues were 
considered in advance to establish a common communicative ground before conducting 
any group discussion. For example, the participants for group discussions were selected 
in accordance with the objective of the applied method that they temporarily share a 
situation and are able to focus their cognitive and visual attention on group discussion.  
To some degree in both sub-district focus group discussions, the participates who 
belonged to different professionals, social groups and political parties did not talk and 
interact as individuals and instead tried to create a common ground for their present 
interaction. But, in some cases it was difficult to establish a common ground between 
some participants who had different intentions about what the problems, causes and 
effects were and which solutions would be appropriate to solve the discussed problems. 
It was hard to stop some group members to frequently talk as individuals or 
representatives of their own groups and make them understanding that they should act 
as members of an ad hoc group. Some members also shift between these different 
modes during the discussion which was taken into account when analyzing material 
obtained from focus groups. But, taking active observation was helpful to know in what 
capacity and from what perspectives the group members talked. 
In the research area, it is very usual that the civic organizations e.g. the farmer unions 
or women organizations are affiliated with the dominant political party in the area, in 
this way they make efforts only for the interests of the party and are failing to contribute 
to the common ground during a certain group discussion. Therefore, the researcher had 
a very important role to find the local norms and ways to strengthen the communication 
atmosphere among the participants e.g. by referring to what someone else has said 
previously in the group or by presenting the topic in a way to wake interests that the 
participants start to act and view themselves as members of a group sharing a common 
ground instead of continuing to interact as individuals outside of the focus group. 
However, due to relatively low communication skills of the group members, it was 
sometimes very difficult to increase the social coherence among the group members.  
The selected participants on the sub-district focus group discussions had different 
level of education and were from different groups and discipline. Therefore, it was 
expected that a participant would present a story that the other participants find it hard 
to understand or to which they are unable to respond. Actually, sometimes the 
participants were unable to contribute to the discussion as they lacked adequate 
experiences to effectively work in a group. The utopian visions of some people were 
regarded with horror by another, for example the idea of creating “modern village” 
which is to put small settlements of villages into a bigger one in order to offer the 
villagers better and more cost-efficient social services. Therefore, in some cases, the 
researcher had to take an active role not only in the group’s selection and composition 
but also as a moderator to control the topic and the group dynamics during the 
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discussion. Effort was made to build a consensus between the participants and find a 
middle course to come to a reasonable result, otherwise the researcher tried to keep a 
low profile and only facilitate application of the used tool. There were not many 
different ideas and inputs by the participants in the sub-district focus group discussions 
in Harir. The participants discussed less openly with each other and therefore the 
researcher, by asking some questions, took an active role in encouraging them into the 
discussion.  
Other limitations and considerations 
There were other local limitations in conducting the methods. Conducting any kind of 
group discussion needs cognitive performances e.g. communication, understanding, 
agreement and acceptance, etc. which takes its own time and needs a relaxed 
atmosphere to work creatively and can not be forced into a rigid time schedule which 
was a gap due to the time and resource limitation of conducting the empirical work.  
Focus group discussions were carried out only in one session with men in the 
investigated communities of the Harir sub-district because the local traditional values 
did not allow gathering women in a group for discussion with a stranger and it was 
important to consider the further impact of this limitation on the analysis and the result 
of collected data. Closing the gaps other ways were found to capture the views of 
women on the community issues e.g. by purposely selecting one female-headed 
household in Jamasor for the integrated interview guide. Furthermore, a participant of 
focus group discussion in Bewre was stopped to dominate and divert the discussion for 
her own personal interests and as a result she angrily left the group. 
Besides, the indicators of a sustainable community point to areas where the links 
between the economy, environment and society are weak, but to find out the problem 
areas was a limitation in the context of research area as there is no data for 
environmental assessment of a rural community.  
To conclude, staying a few days in each selected community helped to build 
confidence with community people and involve them in the investigation process. This 
made it easier to have a good judgment of the local circumstances, avoiding information 
bias and consequently obtaining more reliable information about the community 
problems. Active observation to cross-check the consistency and reliability of obtained 
information from different people and disciplines helped to bridge the gaps of data 
collection and thereby conducting a neutral and scientific study. Despite all limitations a 
pure assessment of the current needs and problems on community level and the 
institutional bottlenecks to respond accordingly has been conducted. It is evident that 
analytical generalization of obtained data from macro level and to a large extent from 
meso level, which deal with the same system of governance and institutional 
arrangement, is very high82. The comparative case study provided a synthesis of the 
main findings to recommend relevant strategies for establishing effective system for 
participatory local governance and CDD which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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6 Proposals for promoting sustainable CDD  
The chapter is aimed to bring together both conceptual and evidence-based analysis. 
The attempt is not to solve a particular problem in the research area but to contribute to 
the creation of a new institutional and policy framework within which problems 
involving community development might be examined and solved and thereby creating 
a sense of right direction for appropriate solutions. The Kurdish region needs to move 
over to a new system and a significant policy shift to improve the situation on the 
ground. Recommending such a comprehensive and integrated strategy, it is important to 
develop an appropriate institutional framework including all three levels of analysis, 
namely, community, sub-district and policy. It is essential to know how different types 
of social capital can be produced; how the capacities can be developed; and what local 
limitations will exist.  
In this chapter, some appropriate strategies and necessary actions are proposed to 
provide a space for discussion and key challenges for the future in order to remove the 
obstacles to sustainable CDD in the Kurdish region. The processes to change the 
situation on the ground are to empower people, build social capital and strengthen 
governance. These kinds of fundamental changes in a society need capacity 
development of all kinds both on local level (community and sub-district) and policy 
level. The goal is to create a favourable environment for sustainable CDD in form of 
policy reforms and institutional capacity development to strengthen links between 
community groups and government institutions.    
6.1 Local capacity building   
Empowering the sub-districts  
Promoting participatory local governance, the appropriate decentralization policies must 
be designed and implemented. In this sense, decentralization is a strategy of governance 
to facilitate the transfer of power closer to those who are most affected by the exercise 
of power. The main strategy is to strengthen the position of the sub-district in 
mobilising territorial, social and political power and transforming this to the central 
political power. The sub-district level must be seen as a participatory governance 
structure where in an institution-building process the horizontal link and coordination is 
expanded from the public sector to include the private and voluntary sectors.  
In the participatory governance structure as it relates to local planning and 
development, the three sectors (public, private and voluntary) should be more or less 
equal partners when they set up their partnership agreements as the key solution to 
promote regional rural development. In this way the public sector is in a very different 
power situation compared to that of a centralized governance structure. By commands, 
instructions and control in the centralized government structure, the horizontal 
coordination can be achieved. But these power tools are not adequate as regards 
partnership-building which must be built on mutual trust, understanding and agreements 
to combine different resources and gain synergy effects. In the partnership-building 
process, the public sector should not take a dominant position because the other partners 
can increasingly become disinclined to participate.   
In the participatory governance structure, the main question is to find an adequate 
balance between top-down and bottom-up power for different productions. The sub-
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district level will be the most important producer of welfare state services for rural 
development. The district and province levels will thus become the ones responsible for 
regional planning and development work and for welfare state services such as upper 
secondary schools, communications, land use planning and management and so on. The 
sub-district as a society must however become stronger actor in both regional and global 
economic competition in order to strengthen the local identity, which can be done by 
creating and implementing the following strategies:  
– Improving the road accessibility and providing basic social services in rural 
communities;  
– Creating other sources of livelihood in addition to an environmentally compatible 
agriculture production, for example by promoting small scale rural industries which 
are integrated fully in backward and forward linkages; and  
– Reinforcing the link between rural and urban economies.   
The concept of the “Regionen Aktiv” (See page 40), initiated by the Federal Ministry of 
Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture in Germany in 2001 might be a good 
example for the Kurdish region to promote regional rural development and CDD. The 
ministry of agriculture can in cooperation with other government institutions initiative 
the process. But, the preconditions are that the capacity of local people and institutions 
to design and implement their own development strategies supported by a favourable 
policy and regulatory framework, is already in place. However, pilot projects on a 
certain sub-district where local people are more empowered and have more potential for 
community initiative and collective action can be implemented.  
The rural area must be an attractive place to work and live. There is no doubt that 
ensuring sustainable livelihood as part of CDD in the rural area is a precondition to 
decrease or stop the current rural-urban mass migration in the Kurdish region that has 
brought social unrest and a consumption society in the region. The policy-makers must 
consider an integrated approach to regional rural development both on sub-district and 
community levels.  
Enhancement of the sub-district government 
In general, the elected sub-district council accountable to the local people must be in 
place before starting any effort to achieve CDD. Now, there is no sub-district council to 
represent local people in the government and the sub-district government functions as a 
line agency accountable to the ministry of interior by which the head of the sub-district 
government is appointed, which is far from the principals of  local democracy. A sub-
district council, which represent different people and civil society organizations, must 
be elected by the local people with the aim of appointing a head of the sub-district 
government accountable to the grassroots people. The sub-district council is absolutely 
needed to oversee the work of the local government; taking care of complains from 
civilians; counterbalancing the centralized power and thereby increasing the 
accountability downwards to the grassroots people. The sub-district elected council will 
become the main actor in the process of regional rural change that support the 
integration of people and sectors both horizontally and vertically in a participatory 
governance structure.  
Actually, in all investigated communities people highly complained about being 
repetitively referred to different levels of governmental decision-making power without 
any result. Therefore, more power must be delegated to the qualified staff members of 
the sub-district government who are already in place to reduce the administrative 
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routines and thereby meeting the needs of the community people more efficiently. But, 
before any transferring of power, the local government must be provided with qualified 
and experienced staff to efficiently and effectively carry out the delegated tasks. 
Therefore, as a first step towards democratic decentralization reform, it is imperative to 
provide the staff of the sub-district government with necessary technical capacity and 
training in management, planning, accounting and financing. The capacity can be built 
internally by the central government institutions or can be accessed via partnerships and 
contracting arrangements with private sector firms or NGOs. There is no alternative to 
“learning by doing”, and other capacity-building support can only complement the 
necessary experiential learning. In addition, the sub-district government must be 
equipped with a budget based on the specific needs of the sub-district and determined 
independently from the district one to strengthen the role of local government in 
development planning and management.  
In the participatory governance structure, the sub-districts should be given a position 
to play a major role in local planning and development work where each sub-district is 
expected to prepare a strategic plan which defines the long-term objectives, and an 
operational plan that describes how to achieve the objectives. In addition, the sub-
district is to draw up a one-year budget and an annual report that includes accounts.  
But even if the democratic decentralization is successfully implemented it is 
important to consider the accountability structure of the sub-district government because 
elections can still be structured in ways that make the elected councils and officials 
upwardly accountable, for example in the case of the formally elected village council in 
the Seweil sub-district. When powers are transferred to lower-level actors who are more 
accountable to the community people, even if they are appointed centrally, the reform 
may be categorized as democratic decentralization as in the case of the line agencies of 
health and education in the targeted community of Marwe.   
Fiscal arrangements to the sub-district government  
To complement local tax revenues, which is currently not taking place in the Kurdish 
region, fiscal transfers from central bodies to elected sub-district governments can be 
made in different forms (general, block and specific grants). In the case of general 
grants, sub-district governments have full discretion over allocation of resources. Sub-
district government officials are then accountable primarily to their constituents. The 
block grants are more restricted for sector-oriented development, for example, to 
improve the education level or health status in a certain region or community. The 
specific grants are even more tied to specific purposes within a sector, for example, to 
improve the education level or health status of female-headed households in a certain 
community. In contrast to the specific grants, the block grants give full space for local 
allocation decisions (Kroës, 2003:16-26).  
Transferring more power and resources to line agencies  
Steps towards administrative decentralization reform are also essential to empower the 
sub-district as a society. More power and resources from governmental ministries 
should be transferred to their respective agencies on community and sub-district levels. 
People in the remote rural area in the Kurdish region because of low road accessibility 
especially in the wet seasons are unable to access more advanced health and education 
services in the next town. Therefore, it is justified to increase the organizational 
capacity of the line agencies of health care and education in form of access to more 
decision-making power and resources enabling them to efficiently respond to the local 
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needs. In general, all line agencies on community and sub-district levels need human 
and organizational capacity development.  
Strengthen the existing institutional arrangement  
Findings show that there is some limited horizontal cooperation and consensus-building 
mechanism among the sub-district level institutions which based on the participatory 
governance can be further expanded. For example, in the Seweil sub-district some 
coordination efforts have taken place between the health agency, and international 
NGOs like Norwegian People’s Aid to raise awareness of community people in 
protecting against contaminated landmines. In the Harir sub-district there is a 
governmental committee consisted of the sub-district government, the local organization 
of the Kurdistan Farmers Union and the agricultural agency to jointly deal with the 
problems of the farmers.  
These kinds of limited arrangements can be further expanded by involving other 
NGOs and local civic organizations of farmers, women and students and other civil 
society groups. Even if most civic organizations are currently affiliated to the local 
political parties, they could to some extent reflect the problems of different groups in 
the society. But they must be given more power and resources to make their voice 
heard. In any case, it is important to create links and consensus-building mechanisms 
among the existing local institutions in the sub-district development process. 
 Including other relevant stakeholders from civil society and private sector into a 
local network can provide a broad institutional landscape with plenty of experiences and 
expertises to support CDD. As a step towards participatory local governance, broad 
stakeholder participation can help to effectively use local resources and to support 
community initiatives. It can also ensure that local knowledge and preferences are 
incorporated in designing of development activities. Furthermore, as part of CDD 
approach building participatory mechanisms for community control and stakeholder 
involvement is essential to increase the community’s sense of ownership of a project or 
program to sustain outcomes. This implies providing inclusive community groups with 
knowledge, control, and authority over decisions and resources throughout all phases. 
Appropriate capacity building activities and decentralization strategies should be 
designed to engage relevant stakeholders at the earliest opportunity and dynamically 
over time.  
Capacity development of the CBOs 
Enabling community people to solve their own problems is absolutely the key point to 
the CDD. To know where to start a CDD could be a very difficult task as it requires 
many reforms and capacity building and inputs from many institutions. Based on the 
result of the analysis, the CBOs are the most accountable institutions to the community 
people and therefore building their capacity is very vital to any CDD intervention.  
Contribution from the beneficiaries to recurrent costs is important for the sustainable 
delivery of the basic social services where the public sector has failed. User fees have 
been more applied on drinking water and electricity supply which tends to have greater 
revenue-earning potential and it has shown to be an important factor in building 
community ownership and thereby contributing to greater sustainability. In most cases, 
it has not been any risk of under-provision of services to poor people because the fees 
are very low only for covering the recurrent costs. These CBOs with clear lines of 
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responsibility, open decision-making processes, and direct accountability to the 
community people have shown the capability to improve service provision, and to make 
more effective use of the local resources and therefore are more sustainable if their 
capacity is increased. However, the following strategies are recommended to increase 
the capacity of the CBOs.  
Legal recognition of the CBOs 
 For local organizations to be a vehicle for CDD, it is important that the KRG provide a 
supportive environment for strengthening civil society organizations especially the 
CBOs. At a minimum, this implies legal recognition of such organizations and of their 
right to do business. But, more important, it implies the government commitment to the 
enhanced participation and capacity building of these organizations for involving them 
in local governance. Furthermore, simplifying the rules; enforcing the laws 
transparently; reducing unnecessary bureaucratic requirements; and building support 
systems will all reinforce the ability of the CBOs to successfully carry out a CDD.  
Building local network institutions  
The Figure  6.1 on page 167 shows how to build up learning network institutions 
consisting of different channels and disciplines. Different institutions will enhance each 
other’s effectiveness in their respective tasks to increase the capacity of the CBOs as 
driving force behind any CDD. The network is able to pool the internal and external 
knowledge and facilitate a learning process through exchange of ideas. The comparative 
advantages must be analyzed to determine clear roles and responsibilities of each 
institution to effectively and efficiently provide the CBOs with a certain service and 
input. 
The network can include many kinds of horizontal and vertical links among local 
actors from public, private and voluntary sectors that can make the network very 
complex. This requires an appropriate management and monitoring system to 
coordinate the activities and prevent any corrupted behaviour of the involved actors. 
The actors must agree on common objectives, rules and actions of plans to effectively 
collaborate and gain synergy effect in supporting the CBOs, where no actor dominate 
over the decision-making process. In initial stage towards participatory local 
governance, which unequal power among the actors highly exists, the main issue is how 
to create consensus and trust as part of social capital among involved actors83.  
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Figure  6.1: Learning network institutions to support CBOs 
Capacity building of CBOs is an important building block for CDD. The impact of 
CDD approaches is directly related to the strength of the CBOs driving the process. 
Capacity should be built on existing community strengths including local organizations, 
traditional knowledge, and culture-based skills so that the capacity is strengthened 
rather than undermined. In the research area there is latent cognitive social capital which 
needs to be activated and used effectively to produce a flow of benefits. Converting of 
cognitive social capital into the CBOs as part of structural social capital is necessary to 
produce bridging social capital. The following strategies are recommended, which 
depending on the kind of capacity development requirements of a certain CBO, the 
actors in a learning network illustrated in the Figure  6.1 can try to find best ways to 
implement them: 
 
Central 
government 
institutions 
 
International 
NGOs  
 
 
Line agencies  
Civic 
organizations 
including other 
experienced 
CBOs 
 
 
Intermediary 
support 
organizations 
 (NGOs and 
private firms)  
 
 
Sub-district 
government  
 
 
CBOs  
 
Source: Mahzouni, 2007  
  
168 
– The CBOs in the Kurdish region need the managerial and technical skills required 
for effective decision-making and to undertake the necessary tasks and the 
implementation of the activities.  
– Much of the success of the CBOs to be responsive to the community needs depends 
on the personal capabilities and emotional intelligence of their leaders to establish 
trustful relationship with the political and governmental leaders. Therefore, there is 
a tremendous need to increase the managerial and communication skills of the 
leader of CBOs.  
– Because some CBOs rely on volunteer efforts, they can dissipate at critical stages or 
can lack continuity. Therefore, an important component of any capacity-building 
activity is to institutionalize the leadership function in CBOs. 
Training and capacity building of CBOs through “learning by doing” should thus be an 
important component of any CDD approach. Relying fully on community organizations 
to directly manage development interventions requires investment in training, both on 
how to manage the implementation of an investment and how to effectively deliver and 
maintain the services.  
It is vital that the actors within the learning network including the CBOs understand 
and believe in the CDD approach. They must be able to reach a consensus how in the 
best way can help the CBOs to help themselves. Then, depending on the kind of 
expertise required to implement the planned capacity-building activity can the actors go 
in partnership with each other. For example, the ministry of water resources or 
municipality in partnership with international NGOs and private sector, if appropriate, 
can be directly responsible for the capacity building of water users groups providing 
community people with necessary water services. In agreement with the community 
people, a local person as water manager can be elected who has the technical expertise 
and can rapidly obtain the vertical assistance to deal with water problems on the 
community level.  
Such a learning network can also be created to increase the capacity of the sub-
district governments that need access to qualified personnel and systems in finance, 
planning, management, implementation and monitoring in order to manage the 
responsibilities being passed to them. Some sub-district governments may not have this 
capacity in house but are able to access it through partnerships with other local actors 
such as NGOs and private firms 
To summarize, the lasting impact of any CDD approach depends on the capacity of 
CBOs providing services and goods on a sustainable basis, often in partnership with 
responsive formal institutions or other actors illustrated in the Figure  6.1 on page 167. 
Capacity building of CBOs, and strengthening linkages with institutions both on the 
community and higher levels, is a critical area for investment. It is imperative to 
strengthen the links between CBOs as horizontal bridging social capital, which 
community people depend on for their day-to-day livelihood and create effective links 
of CBOs to government institutions and NGOs as vertical bridging social capital. It is 
frequently advisable for development agencies to work through existing community 
organizations. It is necessary to create a solid base for CBOs by encouraging them to 
enter a learning process and capacity building in partnership with appropriate 
institutions.  
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Institutional arrangements to support CBOs 
The private sector or civil society and local government can provide critical support to 
CDD. There are many variations regarding the context and the exact roles of each 
player and careful investigation is needed to determine which approach is most 
satisfactory in a particular local context which is recognizing the value of a more local 
approach to enhance participatory local governance. The initiative to these kinds of 
partnerships can be from any actors in the learning network illustrated in the Figure  6.1 
on page 167, but it is essential that the CBOs and other community groups are the main 
actors to define the needs for the capacity development and the kinds of the actions that 
must be done.  
According to Dongier et.al (2002: 308), there are a range of institutional options to 
support CBOs. Among them depending on the local circumstances and the role of sub-
district government, two broad sets of arrangements can be appropriate for the current 
situation in the Kurdish region as follows: 
• CBOs in partnership with intermediary support organizations  
• CBOs in partnership with elected sub-district government  
CBOs in partnership with intermediary support organizations 
The CBOs in partnership with intermediary support organizations (NGO or private 
firms) is appropriate alongside or in lieu of the sub-district government approach. But 
they are more relevant in the current situation of the Kurdish region which the sub-
district government is not yet empowered to play as a network-builder and as 
intermediate link between central bodies and CBOs.  
With increased sectarian violence in the centre and south of Iraq and the failure of 
US policy to establish security in the new Iraq, the future of the country including the 
status of the KRG is unclear. In such an unstable situation, the decentralization reforms 
might not be the priority of the KRG. Instead, a diversified strategy that engages local 
government and also works directly with NGOs or private firms or provides CBOs 
direct access to capacities can be appropriate. In addition, a diversified strategy can 
create healthy competition among actors and introduce incentives for stronger 
performance which duplication and coordination are thoughtfully considered. With an 
ineffective role of the KRG in local development, such a strategy may allow targeting of 
poor or marginal groups that may otherwise not be targeted by the sub-district 
government.  
The KRG can finance and contract with intermediary support organizations to 
provide support to CBOs and facilitate the process of the CDD. This mode of support 
has been tested in many countries where important resources have been channelled 
through NGOs to support CBOs. Accountable village council, elected sub-district 
government and central government agencies, where appropriate, may be also involved 
in the process. In any case, as a long-term strategy toward local governance, it is 
important to create functional linkages between CBOs and government institutions and 
to promote an enabling environment through appropriate policy and institutional reform. 
It is also necessary to create a control system to fight against local corruption and the 
hidden agenda of many NGOs ensuring that the funds are really used to improve the 
situation of poor in the community. 
In addition, partnership arrangements between CBOs and intermediary support 
organizations may be a suitable option, particularly where communities are 
characterized by highly polarized local social and power structures along class, tribe, 
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ethnic, or religious lines. Working directly with CBOs, without intermediaries, may 
worsen tensions, inequalities, and social exclusion. Therefore, in such cases, it can be 
appropriate to rely on intermediary support organizations to facilitate the formation and 
capacity building of new inclusive CBOs. But, there should be political support for 
development of these organizations and it is necessary to ensure that funds reach 
excluded groups.  
These intermediaries support the CBOs by performing a range of functions, in some 
cases, focusing on facilitating and building capacity, and in other cases, also funding 
and providing implementation services. They all should use a community-driven 
approach to respond to the demands of the poor and build local capacity. Working 
through intermediary support organizations are overseen by a central government 
agency or the funding organization.  
Nevertheless, careful screening of the NGOs and firms based on strict eligibility 
criteria is a key factor for success. Payments and funding levels for intermediaries 
should be tied to their performance, measured through evaluation against clear 
standards, including indicators related to sustained service provision and institutional 
sustainability of the CBOs, and not just to the physical outputs or service setup. Given 
proper incentives, NGOs and private firms can facilitate development of lasting links 
between communities and local governments.  
Experiences in many countries have shown that an adequate supply of intermediary 
support organizations can be developed rapidly. Key to this growth is a demand for their 
services, at sufficiently attractive terms, over several years. Capacity building and 
training support are important, but more important is the power of market demand in 
inducing social entrepreneurs to create support organizations. The Kurdish region has 
not adequate human resources and entrepreneurial talent available to create and staff 
such organizations, but again it needs promoting an enabling environment for this kind 
of competence development. In the Kurdish region, it is possible to induce rapid 
development of intermediary support organizations by establishing consistent demand 
for their services and through programs of capacity building. NGOs and private firms 
can grow quickly as a result of entrepreneurial initiatives, but it is important to have a 
supportive government and the correct legal and regulatory environment to allow these 
organizations to flourish. It is equally important to put in place effective measures to 
screen these private players and to hold them accountable for their results. 
Furthermore, it must be ensured that exit strategy is in place for intermediaries. 
While intermediary support organizations can play a key role in developing capacity as 
an important building block for CDD, an objective should be the eventual phasing out 
of intensive support. According to the group interview with the key informants in Bewre 
(7 April 2006), the NGOs and firms looking for work have sometimes extended their 
stay with community beyond what is required, particularly, the UN agencies which in 
1996 were given mandate to carry out the oil-for-food programme in the Kurdish region 
in Iraq. Therefore, incentives need to be designed to encourage appropriate exit 
strategies, which may include funding of operating costs of intermediaries on a 
declining basis to be able to hand over services to CBOs and local governments, where 
appropriate. 
CBOs in partnership with elected sub-district government  
Partnerships between CBOs and sub-district governments are most appropriate where 
there is political commitment and where policies for democratization, decentralization, 
and revenue sharing are already in place with supporting administrative and fiscal 
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frameworks. This approach links the CDD with the decentralization agenda, which has 
not yet initiated in the Kurdish region but has gained momentum in many countries. The 
aim has been to strengthen the national system of intergovernmental transfer of 
functions and resources; to allow resource allocation decisions to be accountable to 
local priorities and to provide a sustainable source of CBO funding. When appropriate, 
the function of coordinating support to communities is decentralized to elected sub-
district governments and village councils that are capable: 
• To create an enabling environment for community efforts to flourish, ranging from 
building more participatory planning of local investment priorities to subcontracting 
with CBOs for the provision of goods and services for which CBOs have 
comparative advantages; 
• To bring government closer to the people, increasing accountability and 
transparency, as well as building bonds of trust; 
• To provide long-term financing of recurrent cost within a framework of fiscal 
decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal flows, thereby creating a local funding 
base for CDD; and 
• To help balance competing needs and demands and fair distribution of resources 
across diverse communities. 
Experience suggests that environments with a long history of community empowerment 
and capacity building are more likely to foster inclusive local governance. Therefore, 
significant efforts must be made to empower grassroots people and to create 
community-level capacity in those communities that are needed. Mass communication 
campaigns and regular meetings with community people, if not manipulated by local 
elites, are essential to reach poor communities and inform them about the rules and 
available resources for making investments.  
Creating network of CBOs 
Over time, a successful CDD in a single community motivate surrounding communities 
to participate in CDD, which could be an effective strategy to rapidly demonstrate 
impacts and convincing neighbouring groups of the benefits of collective action, gaining 
credibility and spreading information about self-mobilizing demand for CDD activities. 
In a network of CBOs, lateral communication between communities and grassroots 
organizations can become very valuable. For example, such networks can inform 
members of the CBOs about changes in procedures or policies that affect their work. 
They can also coordinate activities; support horizontal learning; accelerate the 
establishment of new CBOs; build structural and bridging social capital; and expand 
into new strategic activities. Support for CBO networks can take the form of organizing 
meetings for clusters of CBOs, establishing a newsletter or annual conference and 
providing training for the leaders of CBOs in a particular area e.g. for all water users 
groups in the Seweil sub-district or rotating groups of irrigation water and livestock 
raising in the Harir sub-district.  
Although CBOs learn by doing, the rate of learning and quality of implementation 
can be increased if CBOs learn from the good practices and innovations of other CBOs. 
Community-to-community exchanges provide opportunities to observe the potential 
benefits of participating in specific initiatives, and facilitate learning on how to replicate 
successful processes. The CDD must be supported on a large scale so that many 
communities can simultaneously drive investment decisions and gaining synergy 
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effects. The horizontal cooperation among community organizations should be 
increased to provide the community people not only with good quality of basic social 
services but also with access to information in order to increase voice of vulnerable 
groups. Based on the result of the empirical work, additionally to natural barriers 
another reason to weak bridging social capital is lack of effective communication and 
information infrastructure to establish effective contact between community and the 
governmental institutions. Natural barriers to produce bridging social capital can be 
solved by establishing effective communication infrastructure to facilitate vertical 
contact with the institutions.   
In general, in the research area men still do not account on women’s views about a 
particular issue and findings shows that all community institutions are man-dominated 
which can use mosque as a channel of communication and source of information. In this 
case, the local women association, for instance, in Bewre could have a significant role 
to give inputs to other CBOs such as informing the health care centre about the health 
status of women and how to take preventive actions against certain diseases.  
Having a significant impact on macro indicators of sustainability and pressing ahead 
for policy reforms, CDD needs to take place in many communities simultaneously. It is 
no longer recommended to design CDD as small, nonreplicable and isolated 
interventions. The challenge of scaling up is not about bigger projects or bigger 
organizations but rather about achieving effective results in a large number of 
communities to make the CDD more sustainable. However, it must be ensured that 
approval and disbursement processes are as decentralized as possible to respond rapidly 
to demands from additional communities; to reduce delays; and making sure that the 
benefits from investment on the CDD can be assessed quickly by local groups. When 
the capacity of existing CBOs is already enhanced, a subset of CBOs may grow into 
larger networks or join more formally with public sector processes and in that way 
increasing the role of civil society organizations in local governance. Emphasis of 
policy interventions might be placed on improving the ability to make use of 
information available via a social network.   
A coherent financing strategy to CDD 
The key element underlying the interest in fiscal decentralization is to achieve 
efficiency, transparency, and accountability in the provision of public services. In any 
approach to support CDD, the optimum financing strategy should consider the 
affordability of subsidies and cost-recovery principles. This may encourage 
communities to search for private financing alternatives or mixed approaches that 
employ a complementary merge of public and private financing options. Financing for 
CDD has traditionally been provided either in form of public sector grants that match 
community contributions or by external donor support. However, additionally to the 
public sector grants, distinct strategies and policies will need to be in place to mobilize 
the different sources of funds. A coherent financing strategy should involve a 
combination of alternative financing options consisting of public sector grants, 
community contributions, credit, and private commercial investment tailored to the 
specific context84.  
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Community contributions 
As discussed in the theoretical framework there is growing evidence that community-
driven investments result in greater sustainability and at lower unit costs than centrally 
managed investments. The CDD can offer effective means of improving the efficiency 
of public financing and ensuring that public resources reach more communities85. 
People seem to make better choices when they have their own resources at stake. The 
community participation and ownership should be increased as community 
contributions to investment and recurrent costs has shown to be an important factor in 
building ownership and ensuring that appropriate choices are made and investments are 
sustainable. The level and type of community contribution should be appropriate to the 
sector and type of service. 
Contributions from beneficiaries and local actors in both initial start-up costs and the 
recurrent operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of services can help reduce the 
burden on scarce public resources and improve sustainability of service. Mandatory 
contributions have shown to be important in building community ownership, helping to 
ensure that cost-and service-level choices are not distorted by external grants, and 
determined through willingness to pay, all of which contribute to greater sustainability. 
Possible mechanisms for collecting local contributions should be established. User fees, 
in particular, have become important for the delivery of social services in the research 
area where the public sector has failed to provide adequate services. Some caution is 
warranted, however, when applying user fees to public goods, because of the risk of 
under-provision of services to poor people.  
Credit financing and private commercial investment 
Access to credit can help resolve cash flow constrains that prevent poor individuals and 
community groups from being able to afford upfront investment or contributions. 
Therefore, it is important to support the development of viable financial institutions, 
which allow poor people to access a range of financial services essential to address their 
short-term cash flow constraints and to increase their capacity to make the investments 
more durable. For example, the capacity building of the Community Fund in Bewre, 
which as a traditional institution has shown to be very responsive to the community 
needs, is an important area of investment.  
Moreover, entrepreneurs as active investors and providers of local services in several 
sectors can provide essential services to poor consumers and compete with collective 
approaches in the Kurdish region, if there are supporting policies.  Entrepreneurs may 
not invest if they risk being displaced by community grants. This shows the importance 
of defining financial policies for each sector and providing clear rules for community 
investments. Ignoring the potential of commercial private provision in certain sectors 
and contexts could reduce the total amount of services provided to poor people and 
increase the burden on public finance.  
Defining roles of players and financing rules   
Effective and undistorted local financing might need setting minimum levels of local 
contributions and maximum grant levels based on: poor people’s capacity-to-pay 
constraints; fiscal constraints relating to the affordability of subsidies; and cost-recovery 
principles. It is critical to recognize that financial policies on minimum levels of local 
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contributions need to vary from sector to sector, to capture the higher local financing 
potential of the more private types of local services. In addition, the subsidies should be 
eliminated for private goods and services that could be provided on a fully commercial 
basis. This requires specifying those goods that can be provided to poor people by the 
private sector on a commercially viable basis and remove them from the list of services 
financed by CDD grants.  
CDD requires integrated policies that coordinate institutional arrangements among 
different sectors. The difference in revenue-earning potential across sectors calls for 
different financial policies with respect to minimum amounts of community 
contributions and credit financing. For example, in a rural community electricity 
distribution or water supply seems to have greater revenue-earning potential than 
natural resource management or the provision of primary health and education. 
Similarly, the relevance and competitiveness of CBOs relative to other institutions will 
vary across sectors. These differences call for defining roles of players and financing 
rules. 
A clear distinction must be made between support services that are recurrent or 
permanent in nature and those that are temporary. For recurrent services, sustainability 
requires putting in place permanent institution and financing arrangements at a cost that 
can be supported over the medium and long term. Temporary services, such as initial 
intensive capacity-building support to CBOs, may, however, not require sustainable 
financing or permanent institutional structures. For such temporary services, explicit 
exit strategies need to be designed and implemented that is a critical component of all 
CDD interventions. 
To summarize, even in optimistic scenarios, the financing requirements to improve 
poor people’s access to basic services far exceed the availability of public funds. It is, 
therefore, important to finance as much of the community-driven investments as 
possible through private and community investment. In general, it is important to keep 
grants focused on those things that cannot be financed through private and community 
investment, and in those communities most in need of subsidies. One of the key 
challenges for scaling up CDD is to increase scarce public financial resources over a 
greater number of communities. This can be achieved by supplementing public 
financing with local and private finance sources, promoting market delivery of private 
goods, and retaining matching grants only for those goods and services that 
communities and the market will not sufficiently finance. 
6.2 Promoting good governance  
The synthesized result convinces that fundamental policy reforms to facilitate 
institutional building as part of social capital on local level is absolutely a great area of 
concern. There is no doubt that producing any form of social capital to enhance CDD is 
a long-term investment that persists over time. Social capital may take many years to 
form as it is a characteristic of specific culture that is not readily changed. Two major 
issues in the process of social capital building for CDD must be addressed: first, the 
conduction of fundamental change in the governance system as part of institutional 
social capital and the capacity building of local people and institutions as part of civic 
social capital; and second, the creation of benefits from social capital building by 
establishing participatory local governance to support CDD.  
Based on the synthesised result, it is now clear that the main capacity gaps are on the 
policy level that causes many shortcomings on local level development. Therefore, the 
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enabling environment in form of carrying out substantial political and institutional 
reforms on policy level must be first created in order to obtain maximal benefits and 
sustainable results from any community-driven investment. In the Kurdish region, many 
political, institutional and organizational reforms are needed to create an enabling 
environment for good governance; eliminate the widespread corruption; and thereby 
promoting local governance and CDD, which are discussed in the following sections. 
Political and institutional consolidation 
Political consolidation requires establishing a system of political pluralism with a basic 
consensus on achieving political goals on accepted rules of fair competition among 
formal political actors. In a multi-party-system through direct and indirect elections, 
representative legislative bodies are established to build the government and 
continuously monitor its activities. The political consolidation is reached if all political 
actors are aware about and accept their own legal rights and obligations and act 
accordingly in interaction with each other. They must distinguish between their personal 
and the public interest. Furthermore, it must be commonly accepted norms that persons 
in charge for the public are not allowed to take any action for their own interest against 
the public interests.  
Institutional consolidation means that formal rules on decentralization, competencies 
and the responsibilities of authorities on all levels including their power relationships 
are clearly defined to avoid any opportunistic behaviour from the major political actors.  
In addition, it is essential that the participation of civil society organizations is 
institutionalized and they are adequately empowered to have a say in policy formulation 
and implementation. In a political pluralism, no single actor either from political elites 
or from civil society is dominating the process of decision-making and the conflicts are 
resolved by consensus. The two dimensions of consolidation (political and institutional) 
are very interdependent, which need long time horizon to achieve. Indeed, stable and 
favourable political system as an enabling environment facilitates the institutional 
reform and consolidation. In order to create a favourable environment for political and 
institutional consolidation in the Kurdish region, the strategies in the following sub-
sections are recommended.  
Broaden the political landscape  
The current electoral system in the Kurdish region, which is in favour of a power 
sharing of fifty-to-fifty between the major political parties ( the KDP and the PUK), 
must be changed to increase the power of opposition parties within the Kurdistan 
National Assembly (KNA).  But at the same time a situation should be avoided where 
too many small parties with very different values and agenda make the agreement and 
decision-making within the KNA impossible. However, a multi-party coalition 
government can increase the transparency and leave less space for corruption and abuse 
of power. In long-term, the political landscape of the Kurdish region must be enlarged. 
As part of social capital building, it must be on the top agenda of the regional unity 
government recently formed by the KDP and the PUK how to regain heart and mind of 
the civilians. Building the regional unity government seems like a significant move 
forward to eliminate any risk of internal division and armed conflict happening again. 
Especially, in the current situation of Iraq, the Kurdish community, must more than ever 
put the differences aside and strengthen the reconciliation efforts in order to create a 
stronger position in dealing with the central government in Baghdad and the 
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international community. This will not in itself solve all the problems but an important 
step in right direction to build institutional social capital and shared values as a key 
platform to common action and consensus-building towards participatory local 
governance and CDD. 
Enhancing the role of the Kurdistan National Assembly  
The separation between legislative, executive and judicial powers must be defined to 
ensure the transparency and the accountability of each entity within the governance 
system. Gradually, more decision- making power should be shifted from the political 
parties to the KNA as a representative and democratically elected body which could 
increase the transparency of the KRG and public control on financial issues. Increasing 
the role of the KNA in the supervision of financial matters and publishing the yearly 
budget will increase civilians’ insight into the government activities and ensure the 
transparency as one of the main pillar of democracy and good governance.  
Promoting civil society and free media   
Granting authority and resources to local bodies without accountability can lead to 
corruption and lower productive efficiency. Therefore, decentralization of the political 
decision-making process and privatization of some public goods and services need to be 
followed by reforms that guarantee the transparency and accountability of local 
governments and other local actors from civil society and private sector. A key to 
increase transparency is the development of a strong civil society which is able to 
provide citizens with information about government and business activities and an 
opportunity to have their voices heard. Civil society organizations can play a positive 
role in limiting corruption by means of their activities in education, oversight, and 
facilitating access to public services. In this process of information dissemination and 
awareness rising, an independent and responsible media can play a central role.  
The civilian rights against any sort of power abuse and corruption must be 
institutionalized. As a main principle of good governance, the involvement of civil 
society organizations as control mechanisms will prevent corruption in public 
administration, public finance, law and justice. In addition, the private sector 
involvement in the development process should be encouraged to enhance free market 
economy and competition which leads to lower prices and higher quality of public 
services. By speeding up the democratization process and enhancing participatory 
governance, more international support for Kurdish question can be justified 
(Mahzouni, 2006d). 
Appropriate management strategy  
Political and institutional consolidation often requires organizational and management 
reforms such as: 
• The role and authority of the leadership is clearly defined; 
• The hierarchies and processes are defined by the rule of law; 
• The divisions of tasks and competencies are well-defined; and 
• The personal interest is separated from the official role.   
Maybe, the mechanistic management strategy even if it is originated from western 
culture can be appropriate for the current situation of the KRG only for some routine 
tasks that can be carried out in a relatively certain work environment where grater 
importance and prestige is articulated to internal rules and regulations rather than to 
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general knowledge, expertise and skill, for example, in the case of accounting and 
financial activities of a ministry or line agency. However, the organizational structures 
and management processes must be compatible with traditional norms and practices. 
Otherwise, sufficient resources must be provided to reorient people toward the 
organizational values required by new management strategies.    
Enhancing public sector transparency and accountability   
The KRG is currently the most important actor in the distribution of the resources and 
provision of the basic services for the civilians in the Kurdish region but it is too fragile 
and lacks political commitment and institutional capacity to develop and implement 
pro-poor polices.  As a step toward local governance for CDD, major reforms within the 
public sector must be carried out. Structures and regulations must be designed to 
enhance rule of law, transparency and accountability as three major pillars of 
democracy and good governance. Guarantee of democratic control and transparency of 
the government activities can be done in many ways and in many stages to combat 
corruption and power abuse (Mahzouni, 2005b; 2006b; 2007). In the following sub-
sections, some appropriate mechanisms and strategies to strengthen good governance 
and to fight corruption within the public sector are discussed.   
Strengthen the rule of law 
It is essential to ensure that laws and regulations are clear and do not leave too much 
room for subjective interpretation and corruption, especially within the public finance 
sector that provides institutional mechanisms for monetary transactions associated with 
public infrastructure. In most transitional countries, political and economic development 
and the survival of the parties in government often depend on financial aid from 
international community. If a government in transition invests in good governance, 
transparency and accountability, it will contribute to its prestige and it is more likely 
that the country’s demand for grants, credits and investment will be more approved by 
the international aid agencies. Establishing clear rules, transparency, and accountability 
as core elements of good governance are important safeguards to prevent corruption or 
the capture of community resources by elites. In addition, Introducing participatory 
planning as core element of social capital enhances good governance and the 
sustainability.  
Legislative framework conditions for administrative bodies, public sector and civil 
society and transferring of more decision-making power to low-level officials must be 
established. There is a need in the Kurdish region to put in place systems to monitor 
corruption. It needs watchdogs groups to control the performance of the public sector 
institutions on different levels.  
Autonomous and transparent regulatory system  
A precondition to achieve good governance and democracy in a society is to strengthen 
the rule of law by establishing autonomous and transparent regulatory bodies with the 
full authority for the enforcement of anticorruption laws. The integrity and competence 
of the officials within the justice sector, which are fundamental to effectively enforce 
the rule of law, should not be subjected to direct control and manipulation by other 
governmental and political leaders. The regulatory system should have full authority to 
push forward more aggressive enforcement of laws against corrupt practices and to 
punish those in authority who ignore the laws for their own benefits.  
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In addition, the government officials need a clear code of conduct, for example, it is 
essential to clarify the procedures and set limits on accepting gifts in return for 
professional actions, even if gift-giving maybe a cultural norm in the traditional Kurdish 
society. However, codes of conduct alone do little to reduce corruption unless there are 
effective means of communication, clear sanctions for violating the codes, and 
consistent support from top leaders.  
Leadership commitment  
No reform can be successfully conducted if not supported by public-spirited and 
committed leaders who are respected for their integrity and leadership skills. The 
leaders, who respect the rule of law; show integrity in their own transactions; promote 
transparency in the operation of their offices; and take legal action against subordinates 
who are found violating rules, can make a significant contribution in creating values 
against corruption. Improving the examples of leadership that encourage integrity is a 
critical anticorruption strategy. Changing public attitudes to become less tolerant of 
corruption and more demanding of a corruption-free-society depends on the sustained 
examples of integrity by senior leaders within public, private and voluntary sectors. 
Therefore, these sectors should jointly take important steps in encouraging and 
rewarding integrity in leadership. They can, for example, cooperate on the provision of 
training in ethics-based behaviour and judgment. Codes of ethics in each entity must be 
internalized and supported through training, dialogue, and enforcement if they are to be 
effective.  
The role of leadership in motivating ethical and corruption-free behaviour is crucial 
to any success in eliminating corruption. Leaders who show integrity and demand the 
same from others inspire public service, and such leadership style must be directly 
supported. On the other hand, when top leaders are corrupt, they lack moral platform to 
demand honesty and anticorruption behaviour in others.   
Enhancing professionalism  
In the traditional Kurdish society, the industrial market economy and competition is not 
developed yet to encourage the individual performance. It is difficult for the 
governmental officials to identify themselves with the secondary roles as professionals 
than those in the family and make destination between a private and a public sphere. 
Therefore, capacity building of governmental officials can include more professional 
pride and values. The levels of professionalism and ethical standards of a certain 
institution together shape the effectiveness and the responsiveness of that institution to 
the needs of public. Therefore, it is recommended that: 
– Appointments and promotions throughout public sector institutions are made on the 
basis of merit and in a transparent manner and not on family and party political 
bonds; 
– Filling  people into the right job and developing a remuneration structure and 
performance-based rewards system to provide better incentives and increase the 
accountability of public institutions to the civilians ; and 
– The public sector institutions must set a high priority for ethical training and 
capacity building efforts for appointed officials who interact with the private sector. 
The best way to raise awareness is through public education and open dialogue 
about the negative effects of corruption and how it affects the social capital of the 
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entity and the socioeconomic development in the society. The enforcement of codes 
of ethics must be institutionalized. 
Besides, an economic and social solution to underpaid civil servants must be found. The 
civil servants are less engaged in corruption if they receive benefits and security of 
employment that allows them to achieve and sustain a reasonable standard of quality of 
life. It is simply not reasonable to expect integrity and the provision of high-quality 
services from the civil servants who are underpaid, undervalued, inadequately trained, 
and as a result poorly motivated. It is important to increase their professionalism that 
they are more efficient in performing their tasks. Working within the public sector must 
be made economically viable so that talented, competent, and public-minded individuals 
can be attracted and retained.  
Administrative reforms  
Within the institutions of the KRG, there are many unnecessary and counter-productive 
procedures that are not very helpful to efficiently and effectively provide the civilians 
with public services. In many cases, the complexity of the administrative system is 
artificially imposed by the corrupt officials to create a market for corruption. Therefore, 
reviewing all bureaucratic procedures at the interface between public and government 
officials is essential to increase transparency and accountability and reduce 
opportunities for corruption. Corruption does not grow in an environment open to public 
inspection and in which the law and administrative procedures clearly define the 
obligations of public officials to be accountable for their performance and action. 
Alongside, the use of external independent auditors to provide oversight of the 
performance of government agencies and institutions would reduce opportunities for 
corrupt transactions.  
Use of information technology  
Information technology seems to be an important strategy in reduction of corruption 
because it can de-personalize and simplify the transaction between citizen and 
government official. Appropriate information technology applications provide important 
potentials and opportunities to make government function more efficiently and openly. 
It can also remove many government operations from inappropriate manipulation by 
self-interested officials especially regarding public finance, tax administration and court 
records. Better use of information technology to monitor accounts and performance of 
the public sector institutions can increase transparency and accountability that provide 
less space to corruption and abuse of power.  
From institutional monopoly to institutional pluralism  
All other things being equal, pluralism promotes accountable, efficient and effective 
administration. Accountable administrative systems manage resources more efficiently 
and effectively. In an institutional pluralism when the power is delegated to private 
sector and civil society organizations, the main question is how it can be assured that the 
procurement of public goods and services is done fairly and competitively. In the 
current situation, many central ministries will not enthusiastically support “devolution” 
of power to local-level units. In addition, public sector provides most employment in the 
region according to Khidir (2007:15) and the private sector and civil society 
organization are not yet empowered and lack adequate capacities to take over the 
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responsibilities and task-related roles from the public sector. Therefore, the transition 
toward institutional pluralism in the Kurdish region must be a gradual process. 
The fundamental question is how the KRG can move from conventional 
administrative structures, where roles are highly monopolized, to new structures where 
roles are shared through devolution and delegation. Actually, this question is at the very 
heart of current political and institutional development of many developing countries to 
increase accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness in the provision of the public 
services. Decentralization, as a strategy of governance to facilitate the transfer of power 
closer to those who are most affected by exercise of power, is now dominating the 
agenda of most developing countries. The probability to succeed in carrying out a top-
down decentralization reform in the absence of a strong civil society is very slight. 
Kokor and Kroës (2000:4) emphasise the transition problem of decentralization in 
Ghana, where limited organizational and management capacities on district level to 
effectively take over the responsibilities and delegated tasks has been one of the major 
obstacle to successfully implement the decentralization policies.  
 According to Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (1999:17), national 
policies about decentralization in most developing countries, for example in Kenya, 
have generally come to nothing because of the enormous resistance by the existing 
bureaucracy. While Kenya’s decentralization strategy has led to some gains in 
efficiency and effectiveness, it has not led to increased accountability through the 
sharing of roles related to tasks through “devolution” or “delegation”. It was difficult to 
find a complementary strength between central and local governments. The Kenyan 
case suggests that it is difficult to achieve accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency 
in a highly centralized administrative system. Indeed, most developing countries have 
succeeded to implement only “de-concentration” as central monopoly and have done 
little success in devolution and delegation and as a result have achieved less efficiency 
and accountability in the execution of public sector tasks (Cohen and Peterson 
1999:164- 165). 
In fact, many countries have been forced to re-centralize the system because of not 
taking appropriate policies to enhance the institutional capacity on local level. An 
enabling environment for developing civil society and institution-building on local level 
must be in place not only to counterbalance the power from the central authorities but to 
prevent local elites to capture the benefits. The community people must be empowered 
and the capacity of CBOs must be developed that gradually put pressure upward to the 
system for more step-by-step transfer of power and resources to those who are most 
affected by exercise of power. 
 It can be concluded that a fast move from centralized role and structure to 
decentralized role (delegation) and structure in the current context of the Kurdish region 
is not recommended. Instead, the decentralization process can be carried out in two 
stages as follows: 
• From centralized role and structure to spatially decentralized structure (de-
concentration or devolution) but still centralized role.  For example, from the central 
ministries sufficient legal power and financial capacity to the line agencies in the 
sub-district centre should be transferred in order to rapidly meet the needs of local 
people. A coherent financing framework should be developed of different funds to 
finance basic social infrastructure on the community level, and productive activities 
and economic infrastructure on the sub-district level. In this stage, the sub-district 
government if accountable to local people, can have the authority of financial 
allocation.  
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• Then, from centralized role and spatially decentralized structure (de-concentration) 
to decentralised role and structure (delegation). In this stage besides line agencies 
and sub-district government, where appropriate, the civil society organizations and 
private sector are also involved in the planning process. 
However, the current political and institutional framework in the Kurdish region, where 
the roles are monopolized and structure is centralized, is not particularly helpful to 
create participatory local governance for CDD. The problem is that local-level people 
and institutions lack adequate capacities especially in managerial and technical capacity 
to take over the delegated roles. Therefore, the core strategy in the current governance 
system must be de-concentration; local capacity building; and greater participation of 
the civil society and private sector that can gradually lead to devolution and delegation.  
Towards a corruption-free-society  
The corruption in the Kurdish region like many other developing countries and regions 
has been viewed as inherently cross-sectoral. Therefore, anticorruption strategies can be 
more effective if they are supported and guided by coherent principles of strengthening 
governance (accountability, transparency and participation) and reinforcing the 
foundation of civil society. Reforms must focus on personal ethics and the societal 
attitude toward ethical behaviour. There must be a common belief in the society that 
ethics matter and ethical behaviour must be rewarded, and the rewards must exceed the 
risks of engaging in corrupt behaviour. In addition, there must be a public awakening 
what negative effects the corruption can have on the social capital building and 
socioeconomic development.   
Significant progresses in fighting public sector corruption can be achieved by 
ensuring political will, effective and civic-minded leadership and competent and well-
trained public sector staff. Reform-minded political leaders have a vital role to lead 
public anticorruption campaigns and reforms. The practices, procedures and values of 
any given public institution directly influence the behaviour of that institution and its 
exposure to corruption. Moreover, improving in public expenditure management by 
using modern information technology can reduce opportunities for corruption as they 
can increase transparency of transactions and budgets, as well as increasing 
accountability of institutions and decision-makers, which can lead to a significant 
reduction in corruption. Other strategies to combat corrupt behaviour in a certain 
institution within the KRG are: 
• Introducing clear and open administrative procedures and regulations;   
• Reforming the decision-making process to be more transparent where the level of 
authority and judgment exercised by the officials are increased and as a result the 
accountability of the officials to the public and to the laws are ensured;  
• The degree of oversight throughout all levels of that institution should be 
enhanced; and 
• Control mechanisms and sanction capacities must be in place where the manner 
in which the officials of that institution interact with the public is evaluated in 
order to decrease the chance for corrupt behaviour and ensure the accountability 
of the officials.   
 Involving the public as full participants in fighting corruption is the most powerful and 
effective approach available because it starts at the place where corruption hurts the 
human being highly. However, it has been recognized that the most sustainable 
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anticorruption strategies are those that combine the elements of preventive reforms, law 
enforcement, and public awareness. Many positive initiatives are being taken in 
countries around the world to reduce the opportunities for all kinds of corruption at all 
levels: petty, grand, and state capture. These initiatives may be small, but they are 
important steps in the right direction, which slowly transforming cultures of systemic 
corruption into societies that demand greater transparency from government; strict 
accountability of officials for their actions; and strong enforcement of existing laws and 
regulations. These changes require commitment of political leaders, citizens, and the 
media over the long term to ensure that preventive reforms are widely institutionalized 
to reduce opportunities for widespread corruption. In this process, it is important to 
ensure that the public is educated about the social costs of corruption and about legal 
and civil rights. 
6.3 Conclusions  
In this chapter, the fundamental reforms both on local and policy levels are 
recommended where the process and necessary actions to build local capacity and 
promote good governance have been described. In some cases, if necessary and relevant 
to the research questions and objectives, detail information about how the strategies can 
be implemented has been provided. A “strategy” is more than a “plan”. It is both an 
ambitious vision and a pragmatic approach for achieving that vision. Therefore, in this 
research, more guidelines and long-term strategies on what should be done are provided 
than describing in detail what different activities by whom and how can be 
implemented. For proposing who should do what and how in a fixed time frame, a 
SWOT analysis for each strategy is needed, which is beyond the task of the work 
because it needs more investigation on the ground and an assessment of the potentials 
and limitations to achieve a certain strategy.  
However, the benefits of social capital would be long-lasting by creating and 
maintaining more interconnections among people and institutions e.g. cooperative 
activities, networking for information or at least maintaining or reinforcing the existing 
social capital structure. The main issue is how the positive aspects of social capital can 
be encouraged while avoiding the destruction of existing social capital. This requires 
developing an integrated policy framework ensuring that social capital on both local and 
policy levels are rather enhancing and completing each other in order to gradually 
remove the obstacles to CDD. Creating an enabling environment for CDD is vital in any 
development process and in any context. In the Kurdish region as a long-term strategy, 
incremental steps in the right direction towards participatory local governance must be 
undertaken.  
Local capacity building  
The appropriate mechanisms must be designed to increase the capacity of local 
institutions before integrating them in participatory local governance. Particularly, the 
common action of community people as cognitive social capital should be transformed 
into structural social capital to effectively obtain the vertical assistance. This can be 
done by human and organizational capacity building of local people and organizations. 
The technical and organizational capacity of the CBOs like water and electricity users 
groups must be developed. For example, it is critical to increase the communication 
skills of the leader of CBOs because in an ineffective system of governance such as the 
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KRG consisting of unclear rules and procedures, the personal capability to create 
trustful relationships with different institutions appears to play a significant role. In 
addition, enhancing CBOs require different institutional arrangements in accordance 
with the local context of each rural sub-district. But, the community people must initiate 
the CDD process and the government institutions and NGOs should only create an 
enabling environment for CDD in form of capacity building.  
The norms related to types of institutional networks cannot be assumed a priori and 
must be investigated independently for each separate context. What is social capital in 
one context can be unsocial in another as any social capital formation is specific to a 
particular cultural domain and may have little or no value outside that domain. 
Therefore, a contextually approach to social capital formation and intuition-building on 
local level is essential.  Nevertheless, the CBOs could have long lasting effect on the 
CDD if they are supported by an appropriate institutional arrangement. It is important to 
note that all arrangements to support the CBOs, both in initial stage towards local 
governance and later on, can be more or less community driven. The extent to which 
communities have control over investment and management decisions is determined 
less by the model applied than by the division of roles between the partners. Partnership 
arrangements in which the key investment decisions for example, choices of level of 
services, contracting decisions are made primarily by a support organization cannot be 
described as community driven. Furthermore, partnership with CBOs that do not 
include women or minorities, or do not represent their interests, can be described as 
neither community driven nor inclusive because key members of the community are 
excluded.  
Partnerships between CBOs and intermediary support organizations is appropriate 
institutional arrangement for the Kurdish region now, while taking incremental steps 
towards real decentralization by devolution of more power and resources to the sub-
district government. First stage towards good governance must be to prepare the civil 
society on local level and increase the public support for any fundamental change. As a 
starting point to create a solid base for good governance, empowering local people and 
capacity development of local institutions is the key area of investment.  
In the current situation of the Kurdish region, the political environment does not 
support the expression of local choice. The local governance is very weak and the local 
government lack the mandate to promote community empowerment. The sub-district 
government is not responsive to the community initiatives and not inclusive of the 
poorest. But on the other hand there is a strong cognitive social capital, sometimes, 
transformed into CBOs as structural social capital. Indeed, CBOs can help demonstrate 
the benefits of local participation and accountability as well as local revenue-earning 
potential, which, in the medium term, have the positive spill-over effect of 
strengthening sub-district government. However, the following guidelines must be taken 
into consideration to make any CDD investment more sustainable in the research area: 
– The grassroots people and existing social institutions are actively involved in the 
development process. 
– The strategies for social justice and democratic participation are embedded into the 
development process to ensure equity, gender equality and the right of ethnic and 
religious minorities.  
– The income generated from agro-economic activities is based on local resources; 
incentive mechanisms and political stability are in place to encourage the 
reinvestment in the community or region; and sustainable use of land, water and 
other natural resources is ensured.    
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To achieve sustainable development in the rural periphery of the Kurdish region, it is 
absolutely necessary that the social, economic and ecological objectives to be balanced 
and integrated in a multi-disciplinary and participatory local governance. Local network 
institutions should build as much as possible on existing roles and relationships to 
strengthen the local identity and the sense of responsibility. 
Incremental but secure steps towards participatory local governance  
Based on the obstacles to CDD discussed in the previous chapters and local 
circumstances, on each level of decision-making (community, sub-district and policy) 
structural change must be carried out towards effective CDD. There is no fixed starting 
point and necessary actions can be sequentially or independently implemented on each 
level  but it is important to ensure that the result of actions are rather reinforcing than 
counteracting each other to gain synergy effect. The overall strategy to strengthen the 
CDD is to take small steps in the right direction which requires developing a coherent 
strategy to CDD including areas of action and time frame. Different political and 
institutional reforms are needed to successfully achieve a real decentralization reform as 
a core strategy for enhancing participatory local governance and CDD.  
During the transitional period towards participatory local governance, it is 
recommended that only the public sector initiates spatial planning to obtain horizontal 
and vertical coordination within the public sector itself rather than within the complex 
formed by the public, private and voluntary sectors. Because, in the current context of 
the Kurdish region, the public sector institutions themselves lack capacities and 
effective policies to set up examples of integration and coordination. Therefore, the 
recommended strategy is the administrative decentralization enhancing horizontal and 
vertical coordination between public institutions, which gradually create an enabling 
environment for local governance and CDD. In the transition stage, when still a top-
down tradition is an essential part of the KRG system, sub-district is part of the nation-
building process and a tool to decentralise power and responsibility to territories within 
the Kurdish region.  
In addition, in the initial stage towards participatory local governance for CDD, more 
involvement of community people and institutions in planning and implementation of 
the development activities must be encouraged in order to increase the sense of 
ownership and set up a culture of participation. Another step to enter into the process of 
democratic decentralization is to increase the legal status of a really elected village 
council and increase its accountability downwardly to the community people. In this 
situation the local planning is discussed in the context of “political will” seeing it as a 
legitimate process focusing on the interaction between the higher levels of decision-
making and the local institutions. 
The sub-district government must be given adequate power and financial recourses to 
respond quickly to the need of the community people and strengthen its role to 
coordinate development activities in the sub-district. In addition, the line agencies on 
the community and sub-district levels must be involved in planning of their respective 
activities. For example, to the agricultural agency should be given sufficient authority 
and resources to assist farmers in increasing crop production and livestock raising as 
two main livelihood sources of the villagers.  
Anticorruption reforms must create incentives for good behaviour, but also set up 
systems of external accountability, using citizen monitoring as well as government 
oversight institutions. Supporting these structures, anticorruption efforts must foster a 
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broad coalition of reformers both inside and outside the government. Such coalitions are 
critical to sustaining reforms in the face of change in the government political or any 
disagreement. Indeed, fighting corruption is not a one-time action which requires 
constant maintenance and sustained commitment. Therefore, it is important that 
effective systems and incentives backing by broad coalition are already in place in 
fighting corruption.  
To summarize, recovering from the past conflicts, genocide and ethnic cleansing 
conducted by former Iraq government, people in the Kurdish region need to take many 
steps towards a real democracy including the creation of strong institutions and rule of 
law. As society is based on capable institutions to compromise and build consensus on 
common issues, where the commitments and challenges to institutional capacity 
building must be from both government and civil society. However, the main strategies 
in the initial stage towards participatory local governance for CDD are as follows: 
• Carrying out administrative decentralization reform;  
• Enhancing the capacity of CBOs and other civic organizations to put pressure on the 
central power for necessary reforms towards good governance and communicative 
planning ; and 
• To gradually empower the sub-district government to take over responsibility and 
resources for local development planning.  
In the next chapter, the challenges for institutional capacity development as 
comprehensive social capital-building in the Kurdish region will be recommended. 
Further, the contributions of this thesis to the scientific world and the aspects for future 
research will be highlighted.  
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7 General outlooks 
Social capital is considered as an asset that can be accumulated to create a flow of 
benefits. Social capital in the research area is a highly complex phenomenon, varying in 
a number of dimensions. There are many examples about the positive impact of social 
capital on community development in the research area e.g. the benefit of collective 
action to effectively manage water or electricity supply system as common resources. 
The question of policy interventions which make use of social capital is of particular 
interest. But, at the same time, local people and institutions must be empowered and 
their capacity must be built to take genuine initiatives from their sides and to ensure that 
the policy reforms are in line with their needs and aspirations. 
 In the first section of this chapter, some challenges for institutional capacity 
development towards participatory local governance and CDD are discussed. In the 
second section, the contributions of this thesis to the current academic debates about the 
role of social capital and institutions for development will be highlighted. In the last 
section related to the development topics discussed in this dissertation, the aspects for 
future research will be indicated.    
7.1 The challenges for institutional capacity development 
The need for a gradual move toward institutional pluralism  
Participatory local governance is a kind of social reconstruction which needs to pass 
though a painful process and many efforts. Therefore, the overall strategy might be to 
take incremental but secure steps towards a real democracy and local governance in the 
Kurdish region. The real circumstances in the Kurdish region in Iraq must be examined 
in more detail to increase the chance for a successful implementation of the proposed 
strategies. Decentralization, as a strategy for participatory local governance, is not only 
a policy reform but a socio-cultural movement from the civilians. Decentralization is 
not a linear process, which needs continuous reviewing, monitoring and maintaining the 
obtained results. In addition, it is essential to find appropriate mechanisms for capacity 
enhancement of the civil society organizations like the CBOs before designing any 
decentralization reform.  
Evidences show that lack of human and management capacities on local level 
especially in remote rural area in many developing countries, for example in Ethiopia 
and Kenya, has been the main constrain to successfully implement the devolutionary 
strategy, where tasks, roles and relationships between central and local government 
were not well-defined and as a result “de-concentration” dressed up as “devolution” 
(Cohen and Peterson, 1999:119-138).  
The main objective of the institutional pluralism is to promote administrative 
principles of accountability, management efficiency, effective resource mobilization, 
and, ultimately equity. The constitution of the Kurdish region must clearly describe the 
new structures, tasks and roles within a new framework of institutional pluralism. The 
legal relationships between different levels or units of governance must be clearly 
defined otherwise it might create space for many non-negotiable disputes and slow 
down the process towards decentralization reforms which can in turn increase the risk 
for re-centralization of the system.  
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Institutional pluralism can assist in maximizing the accountability of governmental 
institutions and making them more productive. Changing of the administrative culture 
can be done by increased competition from private sector. But, in the current context of 
the Kurdish region the reduction of the state’s role in carrying out public sector tasks 
can be a threat to civil servants holding jobs within the different public sector 
institutions. As a matter of fact, the public sector is the biggest employer in the region 
and mass of people has no other alternative income.    
Local approach to capacity development   
In the Kurdish region, there are great local variations regarding socio-economic and 
topography features that call for a local approach to promote local actors to design their 
own institutional arrangements for local development. Therefore, any standard design of 
institutional arrangement to enhance the capacity of local people and institutions in the 
research area must be avoided. For example, as discussed in previous chapter86, while 
the CBOs in the Seweil sub-district is more capable to go in partnership with the 
intermediary support organizations, the Harir sub-district lack of essential CBOs, which 
need more individual and organizational capacity building.  
Consolidation of the civic culture 
Achieving stability and legitimacy of good governance requires not only the political 
and institutional consolidation but also a consolidation of the behaviour of the 
individuals and civic culture that take account for both bottom-up and top-down 
decision-making process. It is easier to reach consolidation on a cognitive basis but in a 
modern society there is a great need for co-operation beyond the family ties. Achieving 
the consolidation of the civic culture all individuals in a society must distinguish 
between their individual or family rights and duties and those of a larger community. It 
is also essential that the political and institutional system is transparent and accountable 
to the civilians and in this manner building mutual confidence between state and the 
civilians. For example, it must be explicit for everyone that taxation and access to public 
goods is fair and people accept their rights and duties as citizens.  
However, the adaptation of behaviour of individuals and civic culture to new values, 
attitudes and systems of behaviour need more efforts and time and might take 
generations to change. The consolidation of the civic culture is much harder to achieve 
than the political and institutional consolidation particularly when the low education 
level and low skills of the civilians allow manipulation by the political elites. Linder 
(2004) emphasised that:  
“it is the elite’s behaviour, attitudes and values that stimulate and promote civic 
culture in a "trickle-down" process” (Linder, 2004:46).   
In the Kurdish society applying CDD approach could be a dilemma because the civil 
society organizations are still not empowered and the elite groups are less committed to 
work for fundamental changes. Therefore, in the initial stage the CDD strategy can be a 
combination of both top-down and bottom-up. But, in the process of local capacity 
building the risk for the dominance of a top-down approach must be excluded. This is 
particularly true in the Kurdish region where the governance system and the 
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 See the section of “Institutional arrangements to support CBOs” on page169 .  
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organizational behaviour are largely inherited from the centralized system of the former 
Iraqi government.  
Limitations of implementing participatory local governance  
In the political power structure of the Kurdish region, the territorial and horizontal 
power is weak compared to that of sectoral and vertical power. This is, however, a 
particular problem as the instrumental rationality and top-down policy initiatives seem 
to dominate over the communicative rationality and bottom-up policy in the governance 
system. During the transitional period towards participatory governance structure, other 
values such as democracy, participation, and equality should be highly promoted among 
the civilians. Otherwise, powerful professions and their respective sector authorities 
who are basing their existence on instrumental rationality can maintain their dominant 
positions in the society. The solution to this problem is to mobilize territorial power to 
meet sectoral power in a political process. In a participatory local governance context 
this means that communicative bottom-up power can be used to counter instrumental 
top-down power, and thus contribute to the empowerment of local people and 
institutions.  
The dilemma of fighting corruption  
It is not in the interest of all individuals in a society to conduct change. Those 
individuals and groups best placed to influence the reforms in public policy are usually 
top leaders and managers of political parties including their affiliated organizations and 
public sector institutions, who are also the ones who lose the most from a system change 
towards a corruption-free-society.  The effect of anticorruption strategies can be limited 
and stopped by the fact that those officials who are most influential in bringing about 
change (e.g. political leaders, bureaucrats, chief executive, etc) are often the ones who 
may lose the power and benefits when corruption is reduced or eliminated. As a result, 
both political elites and managers of the private sector organizations who have gained 
power and market assess may out-compete non-corrupt colleagues and firms.  
7.2 Contributions to the scientific world  
In this section, it will be discussed how far the research is contributing to the existing 
knowledge of development theories about the role of social capital and institutions in 
sustainable local development.  
Interdisciplinary study of the development topics   
Many sectoral studies about the post-conflict issues in the Kurdish region related to 
social and political sciences, economics and anthropology have been carried out but not 
related to planning and development theories. It was impossible to find a research about 
the participatory and interdisciplinary planning in the Kurdish region. This research has 
conducted a study of sustainable CDD, social capital and local governance as complex 
issues that require a locally-based and an integrated approach to analyse the problems 
on many levels and among many sectors. This might be a significant contribution to 
current scientific debate about the central role of democracy and good governance for 
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sustainable local development in the Kurdish region and other neighbouring regions and 
countries with similar circumstances.    
Social capital needs a comprehensive investigation framework 
One of the main contributions of this research is to develop a framework to easier 
examine and understand the phenomenon of social capital as a very complex and 
context-based issue. Analysing social capital in any particular context needs a 
comprehensive view on most significant influencing factors. Only a single factor like 
the location or the rate of access to the government institutions can not alone determine 
the amount and type of social capital necessary to community development. Only the 
physical closeness of a community to the central government institutions doesn’t mean 
more access to effective vertical assistance and basic social services. In addition, the 
homogeneity of the community people is not the only factor to increased community 
action. 
 Many different factors such as historical, political, socio-cultural and personal 
highly interrelated can play a significant role in building social capital stock and are 
important in determining the rate of empowerment and political action of people. 
Therefore, taking a comprehensive view on these factors is essential to find out, for 
example, why people in a certain community have not been able to effectively convert 
the latent cognitive social capital into the structural social capital. Contribution to the 
development of an integrated framework to examine and build social capital on all three 
levels of micro, meso and macro is another key input of this research to the existing 
social capital theories for local development.  
Trust as most important component of social capital  
There are growing evidences in the Kurdish region that the problem of 
underdevelopment is to a significant extent a problem of underdeveloped institutions 
and weak institutional arrangement. Trust as most important component of any form of 
social capital and institution-building, has a vital role in creating more interaction 
between people and institutions and thereby producing more bridging social capital.  In 
another word, trust has a lasting and spill-over effect not only in creating institutions but 
in maintaining effective formal and informal relationships among institutions, which 
could in turn build base for further institution-building. For example, by creating the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) different local tribes gather in one institution; put 
the differences aside; and create more positive attitudes to each other by interacting on 
the daily basis. In fact, many local civic organisations even if highly politicised have 
been created as a result of trust-building. Therefore, it can be concluded that building 
institutions for any purpose can build trust and connection among local people and 
thereby producing bridging social capital.  
Producing bridging social capital need an enabling environment  
Bridging social capital is defined as both horizontal interactions between community 
organizations and as vertical links to the institutions on higher decision-making levels. 
People on community level possess a very strong cognitive social capital but a much 
weaker bridging social capital. An additional contribution of this research work is that 
active participation of community people to demand for vertical assistance is not 
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enough if it is not supported by an effective governance system and responsible policy-
makers. The democratic principals such as rule of law, transparency and accountability 
are very vital to produce bridging social capital necessary to promote sustainable CDD. 
When the tribal and party political bonds play a significant role in the relationship 
between the governmental officials and the civilian population, there is little chance for 
establishing a stable democracy, good governance and sustainable development in any 
given context. 
It is true that common action can only work on the basis of common values as part of 
cognitive social capital but not enough to achieve a sustainable CDD. Therefore, the 
appropriate political and institutional reforms, discussed in the previous chapter, should 
be carried out to create more structural and bridging social capital and thereby using the 
cognitive social capital more effectively. The collective action and cooperation in the 
research area appears both as output of community’s cognitive social capital and as 
input to more organized and structural social capital such as the CBOs. The CBOs have 
a potential role to link the community people to the government institutions and to 
produce bridging social capital for sustainable CDD but need an enabling environment 
to flourish. Moreover, creating effective communication and information infrastructure 
is considered as an important input to establish effective links to the governmental 
institutions and creating vertical bridging social capital. However, the people in rural 
hinterland who receive less vertical assistance needs to rely more on their own social 
network and CBOs to compensate the ineffective vertical assistance.  
Sustainable CDD for increased global security  
Last but not least, the common action from international community to prevent violence 
and war and combat terrorism for increasing global security cannot be achieved without 
creating social and economic justices and democratic principals on local level in 
developing countries. Nowadays, there is an economic boom in the Kurdish region in 
Iraq mainly in housing sector without considering the fair distribution of resources 
among civilians. As a result, new mass out-migration of young people to Europe in 
searching for a better future has started. Increasing freedom, peace, democracy and 
creating sustainable livelihood sources for local people in developing countries are 
central issues to decrease mass migration to developed countries and prevent social 
unrest and thereby increasing global security. These issues are actually major areas for 
investment from international development agencies. 
7.3 Aspects of further research   
The serious study of the role of social capital and institutions in local development in 
the Kurdish region in Iraq has just begun. This study might be the first of its kind in the 
Kurdish region to conduct a pure assessment of the inter-institutional relationships both 
horizontally and vertically as part of social capital for local development. The focus is 
more on analysing the capacity of CBOs as most accountable institutions to the 
grassroots people. In addition, the study evaluates the governance system in the Kurdish 
region that does not create an enabling environment to CDD. But, due to the limited 
time it was not possible to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the entities within the 
system. An effective system of governance to local development is not just about to 
make effective policies on central level but how to successfully implement the policies 
and continuously evaluate their impact on local level. Indeed, if there are no effective 
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organizations with qualified staff on local level, the policies cannot be implemented 
effectively and efficiently. Therefore, further research related to the organizational 
capacity development of the entities both on local and policy levels can be done. 
Particularly, it is of high significance to investigate how to facilitate effective inter-
organizational relationship between entities and stakeholders from the public, voluntary 
and private sectors in participatory local governance which in turn includes the 
following research questions:  
– Based on organizational theories, how to increase the expertises and communication 
skills of the employees of a single entity to effectively and efficiently perform the 
tasks within the entity and build trustful relationships with other entities within the 
KRG system;  
– How to increase the work moral and ethical behaviour of the employees within the 
entities to be service-minded and responsive to the civilians;  
– How to create and maintain administrative resources and mechanisms in order to 
promote accountability within the public sector such as building an elite  
administrative cadre that is committed to reinforcing professionalism ; and 
– Can introducing E-governance challenge the ambiguous system of the KRG and 
increase transparency, rule of law and accountability which in sequence includes the 
following questions: 
o How the modern information system can reduce the unnecessary 
administrative routines, decrease corruption and contribute to 
effectiveness of public sector institutions; 
o The subsidiarity principle is intended to ensure that decisions are taken 
as closely as possible to the citizen. Can by introducing E-governance 
more responsibility and authority be delegated to low-level officials and 
thereby enhancing transparency and accountability within the public 
sector ; and  
o What are more cost-efficient tools than computer-based applications to 
promote good governance and reduce corruption.  
Before entering into a local network in a participatory governance structure every entity 
must have a clear mission and strategy how to build consensus with other entities to 
build a solid base for common action. Then, a further research can be about how to 
build an effective organization with a shared vision which everyone agrees on. When it 
is about governmental institutions on policy level, an area of research is definitively 
how to enhance the strategic management and “management by objectives” where the 
top managers at each ministry with the managers of line agencies on local level jointly 
set up common goals.  
Last but not least, the historical, social and cultural factors, which all together have 
caused the current management and organizational problems and poor governance in the 
Kurdish region, are important areas for investigation. For example, how degradation of 
Kurdish cultural heritage and social norms and conducting genocide policies by former 
Iraqi regime has negatively influenced the social capital and organizational behaviour 
within the KRG system.  
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9 Appendix 
Table  9.1: Surveyed households and groups in the Seweil sub-district    
Applied data 
collection 
methods87 
Marwe Bewre 
Integrated interview 
guide  
 
1. Farmer from  Kawlan settlement (2 April) 
2. Civil servant from the village centre  
        (2 April) 
3. Farmer excluded from piped drinking water 
in the Zeber settlement(3 April) 
1. Village council representative 
        (8 April) 
2. Victim of landmines(9 April) 
Semi-structured 
interview of 
leaders, members 
and non members 
of community 
organizations 
1. Health care centre (Head and assistant head 
and a group member, 1 April) 
2. Primary school(Director, a teacher and 
father of a pupil, 1 April) 
3. Water users group (Head, a female group 
member and a household head with no 
access to  drinking piped water, 2 April) 
 
1. Community fund (Head and a 
community member, 8 April) 
2. Water users group (Head, a 
female group member, 8 April) 
3. Women association (head, a 
group member and a female not 
member of the group, 9 April) 
Group interview of 
the community  key 
informants 
7 participants (Three  elderly persons, school 
director, a teacher, assistant head of the health 
centre and village council representative, 31 
March) 
7 participants (Three elderly persons, 
head of the Community Fund, a 
member of the local organization of 
the PUK, village council 
representative together with his 
spouse, 7 April) 
Focus group 
discussions with 
male and female 
groups in separate 
sessions 
1. Seven male participants  (three farmers from 
different settlements, two elderly persons 
and two merchants, 1 April) 
2. Eight  female participants (two elderly 
women, two housewives, two girls aged 18-
20 staying at house,  two intermediary 
school girls, 2 April) 
1. Seven male participants  (two 
elderly persons, village council 
representative, household head 
who has lost his legs of 
landmines and his son, one 
shopkeeper and a herd keeper, 8 
April) 
2. Ten  female participants (two 
elderly women, six housewives 
aged 18-40, a female-headed 
household who lost his husband 
in the Anfal campaign88 and a 
young girl staying at home, 8 
April) 
Semi-structured 
interview of sub-
district institutions 
(12-16 April) 
1. The head of the sub-district government (12 April) 
2. The mayor of the municipality(12 April) 
3. The assistant director of the health care centre(12 April) 
4. The primary school director(12 April) 
5.  The head of the agricultural line agency(12 April) 
6. The head of district organization of the Kurdistan Women Union89(16 April) 
7. The head of Mine Action department of the Norwegian’s People Aid (16 April) 
Sub-district focus 
group discussions 
 (18 April) 
 
1. The head of the sub-district government 
2. The mayor of the municipality 
3. The primary school director 
4. The head of the agricultural line agency 
5. One engineer from the agricultural line agency  
6. Two civil servants  
7. Five farmers from the Bewre community  
8. Two representatives  from the Marwe community 
9. A PhD student in spatial planning from Erbil   
 
                                                
87
 All data collection methods were carried out during April 2006 except the group interview of the key informants in 
Marwe on 31 March 2006.  
88
 For information about the Anfal campaign see on page 6 in chapter one.  
89
 There is no sub-district organisation of the KWU in Seweil.  
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Table  9.2: Surveyed households and groups in the Harir sub-district   
Applied data 
collection 
methods90 
Jamasor Old Batas 
Integrated interview 
guide  
 
1. Female-headed  household (21 April) 
2. Farmer excluded from  piped drinking 
water (21 April) 
3. Landless worker (21 April) 
1. Retired civil servant (25 April) 
2. Active member of the KDP (26 
April) 
 
Semi-structured 
interview of leaders, 
members and non 
members of 
community 
organizations 
1. Secondary school (assistant director and 
father of a pupil,  21 April)91  
2. Water users group (Head, a group 
member and a household head with no 
access to  drinking piped water, 21April) 
3. The KDP local organization (assistant 
head, a group member and a male not 
member of the group, 21 April) 
 
1. Local organization of  the 
Kurdistan Farmers Union(head, a 
group member and a male not 
member of the group, 26 April) 
2. Primary school (Director, a 
teacher and father of a pupil, 24 
April) 
 
Group interview of 
the community  key 
informants 
Ten  participants (Five elderly persons,  
former village council representative  
Moktar, three farmers and a merchant, 20 
April) 
   
Four participants (An elderly person, 
head of local organization of  the 
Kurdistan Farmers Union, primary 
school director and a member of the 
KDP, 25 April) 
Focus group 
discussions with 
male group 
Eleven male participants 92 (two civil servants 
of the mosque, village council representative 
Moktar, head of health care centre, assistant 
director of secondary school, assistant head of 
local organization of the KDP, one herd 
keeper, one young  jobless, one member of the 
KDP, one retired,  and a farmer, 20 April) 
Six male participants93 (Two elderly 
persons, one teacher,  one worker,  one 
civil servant and a member of the 
KDP, 26 April) 
 
Semi-structured 
interview of sub-
district institutions 
(26 April) 
 
1. The assistant head of the sub-district government 
2.  The acting  mayor of the municipality 
3. The head of the agricultural line agency 
4. The head of the sub-district organization of the KDP 
5. The head of the Harir tomato sauce factory as the only agro-processing industry in 
the sub-district 
 
Sub-district focus 
group discussions 
 (27 April) 
 
1. The head of the agricultural line agency 
2. The assistant director of secondary school in Jamasor 
3. The assistant head of the KDP local organization in Jamasor 
4. One farmer from Jamasor  
5. One farmer from Old Batas  
6. A journalist form local press  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
90
 All data collection methods were carried out during April 2006. 
91
  The interview with staff members of the school was not conducted as they were absent by the investigation time. 
92
 Due to the local traditional restrictions no focus group discussions with the female members was conducted.  
93
 Ibid. 
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Questions for tabulations in the following tables  
1) Over the past 12 months, what have been the 3 main income sources of the 
household? 
2) Does the household own any farmland? If yes, which type(s) of land? 
3) What is the food availability for the household? 
4) In the past 12 months, did your household have to sell some properties in order to 
have money to buy enough food, clothing, or to pay health care? 
5) Compared to the last year, what is the safe status of your household now?  
6) How many female respective male children aged 5-14 is living in the household? 
7) Of them, how many female respective male children do regularly attend school? 
8) Which are the 2 most important drinking water facilities that the household uses? 
9) What lighting facilities does this household have?  
10) What cooking fuel does this household use most often?  
11) What toilet facilities does this house use? 
 
Table  9.3: Household livelihood and welfare in Marwe  
Tabulated 
questions  
H1 (settlement of 
Kawlan) 
H2 (village centre) H3 (settlement of Zeber) 
(1) 
Income sources 
-Crop production  
-Livestock raising  
Civil servant and the head of 
electricity users group 
-Crop production  
-Livestock raising  
-Trading  
(2) 
Type of farmland 
Irrigated land 
 
Has no farmland -Irrigated land 
-Wasteland/Grazing land 
(3) 
Food availability 
Has a variety of foods 
 
Has a variety of foods 
 
Has enough but simple food 
(4) 
Sold property 
Livestock 
 
Nothing Livestock 
 
(5) 
Saving status 
More savings 
 
More savings 
 
Fewer savings 
(6) 
children aged 5-14 
Female: 2        Male:1 Female: 0        Male:1 Female:  3       Male: 0 
(7) 
School attendance  
Female: 2        Male:1 Female: 0        Male:1 Female:  3        
(8 ) 
Drinking water 
-Public standpipe 
-Spring 
-Public standpipe 
-Spring 
-Spring 
B  -Taking  water from neighbours 
(9 ) 
Lighting facilities 
-Community power 
generator  
-Kerosene lighting 
-Community power 
generator  
-Own power generator 
-Community power generator  
-Kerosene lighting 
 
(10 ) 
Cooking fuels 
-Natural gas 
-Kerosene 
-Firewood 
-Natural gas  
-Kerosene 
-Firewood 
-Natural gas 
-Kerosene 
-Firewood 
(11) 
Toilet facilities 
Outside latrine chal Inside flush Auwdast -Inside flush  
-Outside latrine 
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Table  9.4: Household livelihood and welfare in Bewre 
Tabulated questions  H1 (farmer) H2 (handicap of landmines) 
(1) 
Income sources 
-Crop production /orchard  
-Livestock raising  
-Wage of being Kurdish militia  
-Handicap benefits of being landmines victim 
-Wage of his son as a police in the sub-district  
-Farming (only for household consumption) 
(2) 
Type of farmland 
-Irrigated land  
-Non-irrigated annual crop land 
-Waste- and grazing land  
-Non-irrigated annual crop land 
-Waste- and grazing land 
(3) 
Food availability  
Has enough but simple food 
 
Has enough but simple food 
 
(4) 
Sold property 
Livestock 
 
Livestock 
 
(5) 
 Saving status  
Fewer savings  The same amount of savings 
 
(6) 
children aged  5-14 
Female: 1        Male: 0 Female: 1        Male:2 
(7) 
School attendance  
Female: 1         
 
Female: 1       Male:2 
(8 ) 
Drinking water facilities 
-Public standpipe 
-Spring 
-Public standpipe 
-Spring 
(9 ) 
Lighting facilities 
-Community power generator  
-Owen power generator 
-Community power generator  
-Kerosene lighting 
(10 ) 
Cooking fuels 
-Gas 
-Kerosene 
-Firewood 
-Gas 
-Kerosene 
-Firewood 
(11) 
Toilet facilities 
-Outside latrine chal  
-Toilet inside the mosque (only 
for men) 
-Outside latrine chal  
-Toilet inside the mosque (only for men) 
 
Table  9.5: Household livelihood and welfare in Jamasor 
Tabulated questions  H1 (female-headed) H2 (farmer) H3 (landless worker) 
(1) 
Income sources 
-Crop production  
-Retirement and social 
benefit 
-Crop production  
-Livestock raising  
-School cleaner  
Construction work      
(2) 
Type of farmland 
Non-irrigated annual 
crop land 
Non-irrigated annual crop 
land 
Has no land  
 
(3) 
Food availability 
Has enough but simple 
food 
Has enough but simple food  Has enough but simple food  
(4) 
Sold property 
Livestock 
 
Livestock  
 
Household properties e.g. 
fridge, air cooling device, 
etc.   
(5)  
Saving status  
Fewer savings More savings 
 
More savings  
(6) 
children aged 5-14 
Female:  1      Male: 3 Female: 2       Male:5 Female: 0        Male:2 
(7) 
School attendance  
Female:  1      Male: 3 Female: 0        Male:2 Male:2 
(8 ) 
Drinking water  
-Public standpipe 
-Community well 
Community well  -Public standpipe 
-Community well 
(9 ) 
Lighting facilities 
-Public power grid   
-Kerosene lighting 
-Public power grid   
-Kerosene lighting 
-Public power grid   
-Kerosene lighting 
(10 ) 
Cooking fuels 
-Natural gas 
-Kerosene 
-Firewood 
-Natural gas 
-Kerosene 
-Firewood 
-Natural gas 
-Kerosene 
-Firewood 
(11) 
Toilet facilities 
Outside latrine chal -Outside latrine chal 
-The toilet inside the mosque 
-Outside latrine chal  
-The toilet inside the mosque 
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Table  9.6: Household livelihood and welfare in Old Batas 
Tabulated questions  H1 (retired) H2 (KDP member) 
(1) 
Income sources 
Retirement and social benefit  -Wages from the KDP 
-Crop production  
(2) 
Type of farmland 
Has no land  Non-irrigated annual crop land 
 
(3) 
Food availability  
Has enough but simple food 
 
Has enough but simple food 
 
(4) 
Sold property 
-Land 
-Livestock  
-Land 
-Household equipments  
(5)  
Saving status 
More savings  
 
More savings 
(6) 
Children aged 5-14 
Female: 2        Male: 0 Female: 2        Male:2 
(7) 
School attendance  
Female: 2        
 
Female: 2      Male:2 
(8 ) 
Drinking water facilities  
-Indoor tap 
-Spring 
-Indoor tap 
-Spring 
(9 ) 
Lighting facilities 
-Public electricity   
-Kerosene lighting  
-Public electricity   
-Own power generator   
(10 ) 
Cooking fuels 
-Natural gas 
-Kerosene and firewood 
-Natural gas 
-Kerosene and firewood  
(11) 
Toilet facilities 
-Outside latrine 
-The toilet inside the mosque  
-Outside latrine 
-The toilet inside the mosque  
 
